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TECHNOLOGY AT WORK 
The Future of Innovation and Employment 
 
It is a pleasure to introduce Technology at Work: The Future of Innovation and 
Employment. This report is the second in a long-term series of Citi GPS reports co-
produced by Citi and the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford in order to 
explore some of the most pressing global challenges of the 21st century.  This report 
follows the launch report in the Citi Oxford Martin School collaboration that was 
entitled Future Opportunities, Future Shocks: Key Trends Shaping the Global 
Economy and Society which outlined not just the key trends that we see shaping 
global markets, society and technology but also the potential risks and shocks to the 
global system. 
In this new report, Oxford Martin School academics Dr. Carl Benedikt Frey and 
Associate Professor Michael Osborne examine a pressing subject increasingly in 
the headlines: the changing nature of innovation and work, and the associated 
implications for the future of employment and society more widely. We are also very 
pleased to say that this report marks the launch of the Oxford Martin Programme on 
Technology and Employment, a long-term programme of research at the University 
of Oxford supported by Citi that will focus on many of the areas covered in this 
report.  
The digital age is set to cause more upheaval than previous technological 
revolutions because change is happening faster than ever before and is 
fundamentally altering the way we live and work. Technology is now enabling not 
just the automation of repetitive tasks but also cognitive tasks involving subtle and 
non-routine judgment. Through robotics, big data, the digitisation of industries and 
the Internet of Things the nature of occupations and whole industries is changing 
and also the dynamics of economic growth. The economic benefits of recent 
technological developments are not being widely shared. Productivity has increased 
globally but real median wages have stagnated in many OECD countries leading to 
significant declines in labour’s share of GDP. 
Writing in partnership with Citi analysts, Carl Frey and Michael Osborne 
comprehensively assess the extent of automation and its effects on the labour 
market across industries and countries. Crucially, in addition to analysing the risks 
and opportunities of the digital era, the authors propose pathways and strategies 
that can help governments and societies adapt successfully.  
We hope that you enjoy this Citi GPS report. Going forward, further reports will 
share the results of the exciting collaboration between Citi and the Oxford Martin 
School. 
 
  
Andrew Pitt   Ian Goldin 
Global Head of Research  Director of the Oxford Martin School 
Citi    Professor of Globalisation & Development  
    University of Oxford 
 
 
The Changing Nature of Innovation and Work
Addressing inequality brought on by technological change
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The Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment is a new 
research programme established in January 2015 with support from Citi. It has been 
created to investigate the implications of a rapidly changing technological landscape 
for economies and societies. The programme will provide an in-depth understanding 
of how technology is transforming the economy, to help leaders create a successful 
transition into new ways of working in the 21st century. The programme is part of a 
wider research partnership between the Oxford Martin School and Citi, analysing 
some of the most pressing global challenges of the 21st Century. 
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1. The Changing Nature of Innovation 
The 21st century has already brought remarkable technological 
achievements. The leading corporations of the digital age — including 
YouTube, Facebook and eBay — barely existed only a decade ago. The 
Human Genome Project was completed in 2003, the year Skype was first 
released. The first iPhone was launched in 2007 and in 2010 Google 
announced their first fully autonomous car. 1 
Yet, the benefits of these developments have not been widely shared. Real median 
wages have stagnated in about half of all OECD countries since 2000, and have 
fallen even further behind growth in productivity. Between 1980 and 2000, each 
pound of UK gross domestic product (GDP) growth, for example, was accompanied 
by around 90 pence of median wage growth. Over the period 2000 to 2007, the 
equivalent number was 43 pence.2  
As a result, many countries have witnessed significant declines in labour’s share of 
GDP. According to a 2013 study by Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, 42 
out of 59 countries experienced a fall in the share of GDP accruing to labour — a 
trend that is also found in emerging economies like China. Crucially, about half of 
this decline can be explained by the decrease in the relative price of investment 
goods, which in turn is driven by advances in computer-driven technologies, leading 
companies to substitute labour for capital in production. In the United States the 
decline in the labour share has been even more substantial when a small group of 
highly skilled workers with soaring income is excluded.3 
Instead of labour, the greatest beneficiaries of the digital age have been 
shareholders. According to a recent estimate, the three leading companies of 
Silicon Valley employed some 137,000 workers in 2014 with a combined market 
capitalisation of $1.09 trillion.4 By contrast, in 1990 the three largest companies in 
Detroit had a market capitalisation of $36 billion while collectively employing about 
1.2 million workers.  
To be sure, the digital age has brought indisputable gains to consumers, including 
the World Wide Web and smartphones, but its impact on the world of work has 
arguably been more disruptive than anything seen in the past. Thus, less than 20% 
of American workers now believe that the generation currently entering the 
workforce will have better lives than themselves. A recent report even predicts that 
living standards for many low-to-middle income households in the United Kingdom 
are likely to be lower by 2020 than they were in 2008.5 
Substantial wealth is being created with only a few workers, and with the exception 
of a small fraction of highly skilled workers, wages may not rise over their lifetime. 
Building on a widely discussed paper entitled The Future of Employment: How 
Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation?, by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael 
Osborne, this report examines how the changing nature of innovation, stemming 
from the digital revolution, is transforming the world of work and the challenges it 
brings. 
                                                          
1 The authors are very grateful to Andrew Pitt and Professor Ian Goldin for guidance in 
framing this report, as well as to Kathleen Boyle at Citi and Anushya Devendra the 
Oxford Martin School for their advice and editorial support. 
2 Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013). 
3 Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013). 
4 Chui and Manyika (2014). 
5 Resolution Foundation (2013). 
In addition to providing remarkable 
achievements in technology… 
…the digital age has also decreased 
labour’s share of GDP 
The digital age has benefited consumers but 
not necessarily workers 
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Labour Share of Income – Citi Economics 
Figure 1 shows two measures of the US labour share using data from the European Commission’s AMECO 
database. One measures the wages and salaries of all workers as a share of gross national income (GNI); the other 
considers total compensation, which includes not only wages and salaries but also payments made by firms for 
social insurance benefits, as a share of GNI. Both of these measures show a clear downward trend since the 
1980s, although the wage and salary share falls more sharply than the total compensation share due to the 
increased reliance of US workers on retirement and healthcare benefits as a portion of their income.6  
Figure 2 shows a GDP-weighted average of the labour share for 19 advanced economies, also using AMECO 
data.7 According to this measure, labour shares on average across the advanced world have declined from around 
61% in the mid-1970s to 54% in 2014.  
Figure 1. Labour share estimates for the United States  Figure 2. 19-Economy average labour share estimate 
 
 
 
Source: BLS, Citi Research  Source: European Commission, Citi Research 
 
                                                          
6 It should also be noted that the labour shares shown in Figure 1 are biased downward 
due the earnings of the self-employed (roughly 10 million workers in the US), who have 
been increasingly earning more on average than the non-self-employed. Properly 
adjusting the labour share for the earnings of the self-employed shows that the bias is 
roughly 1/3 – that is, 1/3 of the drop in the headline labour share is due to the earnings of 
the self-employed not being properly accounted for. See Michael, Hobijn & Aysegül 
(2013). 
7 The 19 advanced economies included are: the US, the UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, Australia and Germany. The labour share shown is the compensation 
share – i.e., wages and salaries plus social insurance contributions as a percent of GNI. 
In addition, in Figure 2 adjustments are made to account for the earnings of the self-
employed. Specifically, the earnings of the self-employed are removed from both the 
numerator and denominator. Thus a more accurate name for the series shown would be 
the payroll share, defined as the total earnings of all non-self-employed workers as a 
share of GNI adjusted to exclude the earnings of the self-employed. 
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The Future of Innovation: Slowdown or Showdown? 
In Capital in the Twenty-first Century, Thomas Piketty argues that labour’s share of 
GDP tends to fall when the rate of return on capital is greater than the rate of 
economic growth.8 As a result, a wealth gap will emerge between owners of capital 
and those who rely on their labour. For wealth not to concentrate in the hands of the 
few, it is essential that economic growth be accompanied by the creative destruction 
of old wealth.  
Thus, a faster rate of economic growth will reduce the importance of wealth in a 
country, while sluggish growth will increase it. A key ingredient in inclusive 
capitalism is therefore continuous creative destruction, giving rise to a new 
generation of innovators and entrepreneurs. While the digital age has undoubtedly 
witnessed the rise of a new generation of digital enterprise, growth has failed to 
outpace the rate of return on capital, according to Piketty’s estimations. He shows 
that the temporary inclusive capitalism of the post-war era, when the rate of 
economic growth exceeded the return on capital, is over. Instead, slow growth rates 
are pushing the concentration of wealth back toward Victorian levels — a tendency 
Piketty proclaims to be the normal state of capitalism. 
To be sure, economic growth matters, and innovation matters to economic growth. 
That the rate of economic growth has recently fallen is therefore particularly 
concerning. Between 1939 and 2000, average per capita output in the United States 
grew at 2.7% annually; since 2000, this figure has averaged only 0.9%. While there 
is ongoing disagreement about the cause of the recent decline in growth rates, 
economists such as Robert Gordon9 and Tyler Cowen10, as well as tech-
entrepreneurs like Peter Thiel,11 have argued that this is the result of a slowdown in 
innovation. In their view, the extensive type of growth that relies on adding more 
capital or workers in production — a process that is subject to diminishing returns — 
has come to an end. For example, over the past 50 years, some 75% of income 
growth in the United States has been due to rising educational attainment and 
research intensity.12 As a much larger share of the population go to college and 
work in idea-generating industries than was the case 50 years ago, and this 
transformation can only happen once, there is concern that we may not be able to 
repeat those gains. Furthermore, many of the benefits from the declining cost of 
distance, caused by breakthrough inventions such as the railroad, the automobile, 
the airplane and the telephone, cannot be repeated. The same is true of the 
invention of electricity and a wide range of household appliances that are now 
fundamental to our lives.  
The extensive type of “catch-up” growth, stemming from adapting and improving 
existing technologies on a wider scale, is thus unlikely to provide satisfactory growth 
rates in the rich world. While emerging economies like India and China may help 
boost the world economy by adapting innovations from previous technological 
revolutions, the rich world will need to rely more on intensive growth — that is, its 
capacity to innovate new technologies. The concern is thus that the current digital 
revolution has not been as transformative as the invention of earlier general 
purpose technologies (GPTs) like electricity and the steam engine. This concern 
was raised as early as 1987, when Robert Solow remarked that “you can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”. After the surge in 
                                                          
8 Piketty (2014). 
9 Gordon (2012). 
10 Cowen (2011). 
11 Thiel (2014). 
12 Fernald and Jones (2014). 
Piketty estimates that growth has failed to 
outpace the rate of return on capital 
Innovation is important for growth, and some 
believe the recent slowdown in economic 
growth is due to a slowdown in innovation 
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productivity growth of the late-1990s came to a halt, the view that most of the 
benefits from the digital revolution have already been seen has received more 
attention.  
While a decline in the technological dynamism of the rich world would explain the 
recent fall in productivity and the growing concentration of wealth highlighted by 
Piketty, it does not explain why wages have failed to grow in tandem with 
productivity. One explanation is the changing nature of innovation. Although 
technology can raise productivity and boost wages, it can also take the form of 
capital that substitutes for labour. In that case, productivity growth will simply 
enhance capital's share of income, and thus the concentration of wealth.  
The Growing Gap between Productivity and Pay – Citi Economics 
Figure 3 shows the gap between compensation of workers and their productivity for the United States, considering 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The figure compares the total output per hour worked in the economy (a 
measure of productivity) against the hourly compensation rate for all workers, both adjusted for inflation. There has 
been a growing gap between the two for decades. Since 1980, productivity has grown at an annual average rate of 
roughly 2%, compared to just under 1% annual average growth for real hourly compensation. 
Figure 4 shows a GDP-weighted average estimate of the so-called productivity gap for 16 advanced economies.13 
Consistent with the US story, the advanced world as a whole has also seen productivity decouple from the 
compensation paid to workers. However, the decoupling for the advanced-economy as a whole is not as severe as 
it is for the US alone.  Since 1980, advanced-economy productivity has grown at an annual average rate of 1.7%, 
compared to 1.1% annual average growth for advanced-economy real hourly compensation. This 0.6 percentage 
point average growth rate difference between productivity and compensation in the advanced world is still 
nonetheless meaningful. It implies that, over time, a greater fraction of output produced per hour worked in the 
advanced world has gone to property owners in the form of profits rather than to workers in the form of 
compensation – a trend consistent with declining labour shares. 
Figure 3. Gap between productivity and pay in the United States  Figure 4. Advanced economy average productivity gap 
 
 
 
Source: : BLS, Citi Research  Source: European Commission, Citi Research 
 
 
                                                          
13 Figure 4 includes data for 16 advanced economies. Relative to those included in 
Figure 2 Australia, Austria and Greece were dropped due to data limitations. Output is 
deflated with the GDP deflator, whereas compensation is deflated by national consumer 
price indexes. 
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The view that a widening gap between productivity and pay is due to increased 
usage of labour-substituting capital is favoured by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee, arguing that the reason why wages have failed to keep pace with 
productivity is that ordinary workers are unable to adapt to an ever increasing pace 
of technological change.14 As a result, many workers are seeing their skills made 
redundant by new computer technologies. According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 
we are not likely to have a growth problem resulting from a slowdown in innovation: 
technological advances increase productivity only after long lags. As workplaces 
gradually restructure to accommodate new technologies, they argue, productivity 
growth will follow. Still, the concentration of wealth that Piketty forecasts may be 
exacerbated as computer-controlled devices are increasingly substituted for human 
workers. According to a recent study by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, 
as many as 47% of US jobs are at risk for automation over the forthcoming 
decades.15 
While Joseph Schumpeter famously noted that long-run growth occurs via structural 
change, which may inflict pain, this report will argue that the recent trend of 
declining living standards is not just the result of structural change. It is caused by 
the changing nature of innovation. 
The Digital Age: Why This Time is Different 
There is reason to be concerned that we are experiencing an era in which 
innovation benefits the few rather than the many. Because most individuals are 
consumers and producers, new technologies will have an impact on people’s living 
standards in both capacities, positively or negatively. In the past, some innovations 
have benefited ordinary people both as producers and consumers.16 Others have 
negatively impacted workers in production while helping consumers.  
To be sure, an important feature of the Industrial Revolution was that it benefited 
people both as producers and consumers over the long-run. In particular, the 
adoption of the assembly line created vast employment opportunities for low-skilled 
workers and enabled corporations such as the Ford Motor Company to manufacture 
the Model-T at a sufficiently low price for it to become the people’s vehicle. By 
contrast, the digital revolution has mainly benefited ordinary people as consumers. 
While the World Wide Web provides many things for free, new employment 
opportunities have mainly been created for highly skilled workers.17 At the same 
time, the potential scope of automation has rapidly expanded, substituting for 
ordinary workers in a variety of domains.18 In short, while the digital age has been a 
blessing to consumers, it is changing the world of work in ways that may make a 
growing share of workers worse off (in their capacity as producers) over the long-
run. 
  
                                                          
14 Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). 
15 Frey and Osborne (2014). 
16 Glaeser (2014). 
17 Berger and Frey (2014). 
18 Frey and Osborne (2013). 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee argue that we are 
not likely to see a growth problem resulting 
from a slowdown in innovation as 
workplaces restructure and productivity 
growth follows 
Innovation this time around benefits the few 
rather than the many which is cause for 
concern 
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So far, the digital age has been the age of capital rather than the era of labour. This 
sheds a different light on the six stylised facts about economic growth Nicholas 
Kaldor famously published in 1957. Having observed remarkable historical 
consistency in the shares of national income accruing to capital and labour 
respectively over longer periods of time, he concluded that these shares are roughly 
constant — an assumption that is still at the heart of many growth models. 19 As the 
labour share of GDP has steadily declined over the past decades, across countries, 
this assumption has nevertheless become difficult to maintain.  
Yet, in the future, digital technologies could also increasingly substitute for capital. 
Crucially, the digital economy allows many goods and services to be codified, and 
once codified, they can be digitised and replicated. Furthermore, as has been 
pointed out by Erik Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee and Michael Spence: “digital 
copies can be made at virtually zero cost and transmitted anywhere in the world 
almost instantaneously, each an exact replica of the original.”20 Consider Twitch, a 
live streaming video platform employing some 170 workers, which was acquired by 
Amazon.com for $970 million in September 2014. While receiving venture capital 
(VC) funding, the company did not need much physical capital relative to the 
industrial giants of the past. The same is true of Instagram and WhatsApp: both did 
not need much capital investment to get started, and thus not many workers to build 
up the new capital.  
While digital technologies increasingly substitute for labour, they may also reduce 
the demand for capital. In the digital age, innovators and entrepreneurs, not workers 
or investors, will be the main beneficiaries. 
Meeting the Challenge 
Technologies are diffusing much faster now than they have in the past. Historically, 
countries have adopted a new technology on average 45 years after its invention, 
although the lag has shortened over time. It took on average 119 years for the 
spindle to diffuse outside Europe. By contrast, the Internet has spread across the 
globe in only seven years. The extent to which new technologies have been 
adopted still varies substantially across countries and can account for some 25% of 
the differences in nations’ per capita income today.21 However, as adoption lags 
become shorter, the rich world’s advantage of being an early adopter will inevitably 
decrease.  
Figure 5 shows the shortening of the lag in adoption, from telephones needing 75 
years to get to fifty million users, to Angry Birds taking just 35 days. Services like 
Instagram reached 300 million users in just four years and Forbes recently noted 
that WhatsApp gained more followers in its six years of existence (700m) than 
Christianity did in its first nineteen centuries.  
                                                          
19 Kaldor (1957). 
20 Brynjolfsson, McAffe and Spence (2014). 
21 Comin and Hobjin (2010). 
The digital age has broken the historical 
observation that shares in national income 
accrue to capital and labour in a constant 
manner 
Digital technologies can also make capital 
less relevant 
The speed of technology diffusion has 
increased… 
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Figure 5. Time to reach 50 million users 
 
Source: Citi Digital Strategy Team 
 
There are good reasons to believe that the pace of technological innovation has, if 
anything, increased over time, and will continue to do so. Digital technologies are 
connecting almost everyone, allowing people to share ideas. Scientific knowledge is 
becoming readily available to anybody eager to learn — to be sure, there is no 
mechanism that automatically turns science into technology, but its availability 
allows people to combine previous discoveries in innovative ways. Finally, the 
companies leading the digital transformation are already vastly profitable, compared 
to companies leading past technological revolutions. For example, the operating 
income per employee at Google is roughly six times that of IBM, and about 12 times 
that of General Motors.  
Digital technologies will continue to create enormous wealth. Meanwhile, a sharing 
economy is emerging in which more things are becoming available for free, leading 
to unprecedented benefits for consumers. Airbnb connects hosts and travellers, 
providing consumers with much cheaper accommodation. In a similar way, Uber 
uses a smartphone application that connects passengers with drivers, substantially 
reducing costs for consumers. Technology also offers new possibilities for 
entrepreneurs. Etsy, an online marketplace for arts and crafts, enables artisans to 
reach global markets even from deprived areas.  
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Digital technologies have created enormous 
wealth and a sharing economy 
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Nevertheless, the digital age has also left many people behind. Income inequality is 
soaring, as evidenced by rising Gini coefficients in advanced economies (Figure 
6),22 especially at the top of the income distribution, most prominently in the US and 
the UK (Figure 7). As technology increasingly takes the form of capital that 
substitute for labour, inequality is likely to continue to surge. Breaking this trend will 
require a shift in mindsets, policies and investments. This report will seek to 
understand where technological change is leading us and the challenges that lie 
ahead.  
Figure 6. Average advanced economy Gini coefficient  Figure 7. Top 0.1% income shares, excluding capital gains 
 
 
 
Source: Solt (2014), Citi Research  Source: World of Top Incomes Database, Citi Research 
 
  
                                                          
22 The Gini coefficient shown in Figure 6 is net of redistribution. That is, it is a measure of 
how unequal the distribution of earnings is after taxes and transfer payments by the 
government have been accounted for. Market measures of the Gini coefficient — i.e. 
before redistribution — generally show higher levels of inequality, as most advanced 
economies have progressive social welfare systems. The data show a GDP-weighted 
average of Gini coefficients considering 19 economies (the same as those included in 
Figure 2 and some from Frederick Solt’s inequality database, which aggregates data 
from various sources including the Luxembourg Income Study, See Solt (2014). 
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2. Technology at Work 
The concern over technology rendering the skills of the workforce redundant 
is hardly a recent one. To be sure, the type of creative destruction Joseph 
Schumpeter famously argued was at the heart of long-run growth and 
prosperity has increased the living standards of many over more than two 
centuries. Nevertheless, technological progress has also created undesired 
disruptions. Historically, it was not so much the lack of innovation and 
entrepreneurial spirit that had hindered progress, but rather powerful 
interests promoting the technological status quo. The great Roman writer, 
Pliny the Elder, nicely illustrates this with a story from the reign of the 
Emperor Tiberius, where an inventor had discovered a way of manufacturing 
unbreakable glass. In anticipation of a reward he approached the emperor to 
display his invention. Fearing the creative destruction that would follow the 
diffusion of this technology, however, the Emperor had the man sentenced to 
death.23 
This story is not an isolated example. Indeed, it is illustrative of a broader tendency 
of how the ruling elite often blocked technological progress in the past. Under 
Emperor Vespasian, who ruled Rome between AD 69 and 79, the inventor of a 
machine for transporting columns to the Capitol was denied the use of his invention, 
with the Emperor declaring: “How will it be possible to feed the populace?”24 Even 
as late as 1589, when William Lee invented the stocking frame knitting machine, 
Queen Elizabeth I argued that: “Thou aimest high, Master Lee. Consider thou what 
the invention could do to my poor subjects. It would assuredly bring to them ruin by 
depriving them of employment, thus making them beggars.”25  
The combination of central government controlling progress and the lack of 
incentives to promote creative destruction thus held innovation and 
entrepreneurship back for a long time. In fact, to understand events like the 
Industrial Revolution, we need to understand the political economy of technological 
progress. 
The Political Economy of Technological Change 
The economic historian Joel Mokyr has persuasively argued that unless all people 
in a society accept the verdict of the market, innovations are likely to be resisted 
through political activism. In other words, the balance between job conservation and 
creative destruction reflects the balance of power in society, and how the benefits 
from innovation are being distributed.  
The British Industrial Revolution provides a case in point for how new institutional 
frameworks can lay the foundations for long-run growth and prosperity. As 
Parliamentary supremacy was established over the Crown, following the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, the craft guilds in Britain lost most of their political power.26 With 
merchants and inventors gaining political influence, legislation was passed in 1769 
making the destruction of machinery punishable by death.27 The shifting sentiment 
of the government towards the destruction of machinery was explained by a 
resolution passed after the Lancashire riots of 1779, stating that: “The sole cause of 
great riots was the new machines employed in cotton manufacture; the country 
                                                          
23 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) 
24 ibid 
25 ibid 
26 Nef (1957). 
27 Mokyr (1990). 
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notwithstanding has greatly benefited from their erection [and] destroying them in 
this country would only be the means of transferring them to another [...] to the 
detriment of the trade of Britain.”28 To be sure, there was still resistance to 
technology displacing artisan workers. The “Luddite” riots between 1811 and 1816 
partly reflected the fear of mechanisation. Nevertheless, the Crown and the guilds 
lacked the political influence to halt creative destruction. 
As the Industrial Revolution spread across the Atlantic and to mainland Europe, 
there were still forces that counteracted innovation. On the continent, where the 
guilds were still largely present, innovators often left for less regulated markets. For 
example, Heinrich Engelhard Steinweg, the founder of Steinway & Sons, famously 
left Germany for New York with his five sons in 1850, as the local guilds’ heavy 
regulation of the piano-making process did not allow for the Steinway production 
methods. Over 150 years later, New York is still the leading factory for Steinway 
pianos, alongside Hamburg.  
While the regulation of innovation activities may have long-lasting effects, the 
general tendency since the Industrial Revolution has been towards embracing 
technological progress. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this shift in 
attitudes was only a result of a shift in political power. Although working conditions 
were often horrific, the sustained progress that followed was as much a result of 
many ordinary workers gradually seeing the benefits of technological change. 
Steam Powered Production: From the Artisan Shop to the 
Factory System 
An important feature of the manufacturing technologies associated with the 
Industrial Revolution is that they mainly benefited low-skilled workers by simplifying 
the tasks workers had to perform in production.29 This skill replacing process 
occurred as the artisan shop was gradually displaced by the factory system, and 
picked up pace as production was increasingly mechanised, following the adoption 
of steam power.30 As a result, manual work that had previously been performed by 
highly skilled artisans was now decomposed into specialised sequences. 
Key innovations in manufacturing, such as continuous-flow production and 
interchangeable parts, were even specifically designed for low-skilled workers. At 
Ford, the new assembly line introduced in 1913 turned a one-man job into a 29-man 
operation, reducing the overall work time by 34%. This allowed complex products to 
be assembled from mass-produced individual components; work that required less 
skill, but more workers, to perform.31 
The differences in productivity between the factory and the artisan shop is nicely 
illustrated in the production of plows. In one artisan shop, two men spent 118 man-
hours using hammers, anvils, chisels, hatchets, axes, mallets, shaves and augers in 
11 tasks to produce a plow. By contrast, a steam-powered plow factory employed 
52 workers performing 97 distinct tasks to produce a plow in just about 3.75 man-
hours. 
 
 
                                                          
28 Mantoux (2006). 
29 Braverman (1977); Goldin and Katz (1998). 
30 Atack, et al. (2008a). 
31 Bright (1958). 
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The combination of increasing demand for low-skilled workers, and the surge in 
productivity following the transition to the factory system, helped boost employment 
and wage growth over the course of the 19th century, benefiting ordinary people as 
producers. According to some estimates, real wages nearly doubled between 1820 
and 1850.32  
A crucial feature of technological change in the 19th century was that it benefited 
ordinary people both as producers and consumers. While the factory system 
provided vast employment opportunities for unskilled workers, it also enabled Ford 
to manufacture the Model-T at a sufficiently low price for it to reach the mass 
market. It was these two processes of growing wages and falling prices of 
consumer goods that created the modern middle class. Some economic historians 
such as Gregory Clark have even argued that ordinary workers were the greatest 
beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution. 
Electrification and the Demand for Skills 
The idea that skilled workers have been the main beneficiaries of technological 
progress is largely a 20th century phenomenon. This shift in demand for skills can 
be traced to the switch to electricity and the removal of the steam engine, leading to 
a complete reorganisation of production.33 Crucially, the restructuring of the factory 
that followed significantly reduced the demand for maintenance workers as well as 
unskilled labourers who had previously carried unfinished goods and tools.  
Furthermore, the shift to continuous-process and batch production methods 
reduced the demand for unskilled workers in many assembly tasks. In short, while 
factory assembly lines had required vast amounts of human work, electrification 
allowed many stages in production to be automated. This, in turn, increased the 
demand for relatively skilled workers to operate the machinery.  
The transport revolution played an important role in incentivizing the shift to mass 
production, as it lowered the cost of shipping goods both domestically and 
internationally.34 Markets for artisan goods, that had previously been local, now 
became subject to increased competition, forcing companies to raise productivity 
through mechanisation in order to maintain their competitive edge. With the 
emergence of the multinational corporation, management tasks became more 
complex, increasing the demand for managerial and clerking workers. 
Crucially, this transformation did not lead to the type of technological unemployment 
John Maynard Keynes predicted in the 1930s. Workers adapted by making their 
skills complementary to the arrival of new technologies. In the United States, for 
example, the high school movement was essential to the transformation of the 
corporation, as the office entered a wave of mechanisation, with typewriters, 
dictaphones, calculators, and address machines. An important feature of these 
technologies is that while they reduced the cost of information processing, they 
increased the demand for high school-educated workers. Indeed, since 
electrification, the story of the 20th century has been what Claudia Goldin and 
Lawrence Katz have referred to as “the race between technology and education.” 
                                                          
32 Lindert and Williamson (1983) 
33 Gray (2013) 
34 Atack et al. (2008b) 
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The Computer Revolution and the Squeezed Middle 
While early 20th century office machines increased demand for clerking workers, 
recent developments in computer technology have permitted such tasks to be 
automated.  
This trend began with the first commercial uses of computers around 1960 and 
continued through the development of the World Wide Web in the 1990s. Between 
1945 and 1980, as the cost of computing declined at an annual rate of 37%, most 
telephone operators were displaced.35 In addition, the first industrial robot was 
introduced in the 1960s, and a decade later airline reservations systems led a wave 
of improvements in self-service technology.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the costs of computing fell even more rapidly, on 
average by 64% per year.36 During this period bar-code scanners and cash 
machines penetrated retail and financial industries. Furthermore, the advent of the 
personal computer (PC) in the early 1980s, and its functions, contributed to the 
displacement of many copy typist jobs and allowed repetitive calculations to be 
automated. 
The impact of computers on labour markets is captured in an influential paper by 
David Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane, showing that middle-skilled 
manufacturing and clerical occupations have experienced a secular decline in 
employment since the 1970s.37 The common denominator for these jobs, the 
authors document, is that they are intensive in rule-based activities (or routine 
tasks) which can be easily specified in computer code.  
Hence, the rapid improvements in computer technology over the last few decades 
have provided employers with ever cheaper machines that can replace humans in 
many middle-skilled activities such as bookkeeping, clerical work and repetitive 
production tasks. The result has been a shift in the occupational structure of the 
labour market in most developed countries over recent decades, with a hollowing-
out of traditional middle income jobs. 
Importantly, as computers and industrial robots have substituted for the same type 
of routine work that was once done by thousands of workers on assembly lines, 
most of these workers have reallocated to manual service occupations.38 This is 
because, at least in the past, computers and robots have been less capable of 
driving trucks, waitressing and cleaning than most humans.  
At the same time, with falling prices of computing, problem-solving skills have 
become relatively productive, explaining the substantial employment growth in 
occupations involving cognitive work where skilled labour holds a comparative 
advantage. For example, text and data mining has improved the quality of legal 
research as constant access to market information has improved the efficiency of 
managerial decision-making — that is, tasks performed by skilled workers at the 
higher end of the income distribution.  
 
 
                                                          
35 Nordhaus (2007) 
36 ibid 
37 Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003). 
38 Autor and Dorn (2013). 
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The current trend towards job polarisation is best captured by Maarten Goos and 
Alan Manning’s work on “Lousy and Lovely Jobs”, with employment growth in high-
income cognitive jobs and low-income manual occupations, accompanied by the 
disappearance of middle-income routine jobs.39 
Evidence of Polarisation in Jobs and Wages 
There is a compelling case that robotics and other technological marvels will have a 
dramatically positive overall effect on living standards. Automation will hasten the 
growth of labour productivity, and aggregate welfare will rise in tandem with real 
wages. But, not all technological changes are created equal. The extent to which an 
individual gains or losses from automation will depend on their level of skill as well 
as the degree of ‘skill bias’ embedded in new technology. In other words, it will 
depend largely on whether that individual is a substitute or a complement to the 
robot knocking on their workplace door. 
The dominant narrative characterising how global labour markets are responding to 
technological change is one of ‘job polarisation’: the fact that employment growth 
has been most robust at the highest and lowest ends of the skills spectrum. The 
middle skill jobs, in contrast, contain the highest concentration of routine tasks and 
are thus relatively easy to automate.40 
Evidence for job polarisation in the US is shown in Figure 8, which tracks 
employment trends since the 1980s for professions falling into three different 
categories of skills. High- and low-skilled jobs involve tasks that are non-routine, 
requiring either cognitive capacity or manual labour to complete them. At the high 
end, these include jobs in managerial and professional occupations, such as those 
in law, architecture and design, and finance; at the low end, jobs requiring manual 
labour are found in the construction sector, in installation and maintenance, and in 
the transportation and shipping sectors (e.g. truck drivers), to name a few. In the 
middle are routine jobs that require the use of either cognition or manual labour to 
complete tasks. Routine cognitive tasks are performed in sales and office-related 
professions (e.g. administrative secretaries); routine manual tasks are done mainly 
in the services sector, in healthcare support or food preparation roles, for example. 
Figure 8 uses data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS’s) Household 
Survey to make the point that much of the job growth witnessed in the US in recent 
decades has occurred in high- and low-skilled occupations – for those possessing 
cognitive or manual skills that are not easily automatable. 
                                                          
39 Goos and Manning (2007). 
40 A detailed analysis of the link between automation and job polarisation is provided in 
Autor, D. (2014a) 
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Figure 8. Employment growth in the United States reflecting job polarisation 
 
Source: Valletta (2015)  Note: Employment categories are based on the author’s calculations of BLS data from the 
Household Survey 
 
Figure 9 suggests that the US experience of job polarisation is not unique. Across a 
broad swath of advanced economies, occupations at the middle of the skills 
spectrum – under the assumption that these occupations pay average wages – 
have fallen as a share of total employment, whereas occupations at low or high skill 
classifications have gained. The data are not as granularly defined as those in 
Figure 8, which again separates routine job tasks from non-routine ones, but they 
do lend support to the hypothesis that the phenomenon of automation carving out 
jobs at the middle of the skill distribution is occurring globally. 
Figure 9. Change in employment shares by occupation, 1993-2006 
 
Source: Autor (2010). Note:  Wage categories are based on average wage levels at the start of the period measured 
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What is the implication of job polarisation for wages? It is not immediately clear that 
wages should accelerate at both ends of the skill distribution. The reason is that 
while it may be possible for workers to quickly ‘skill down’ – namely, to give up an 
automated middle-skill job to take a lower-skilled job which is more heavily in 
demand in the labour market – it may not be as easy for them to ‘skill up’ to take 
higher-skilled jobs for which wages are accelerating. To skill up requires increased 
cognitive capacity, which tends to come about from education and job training – 
both slow moving processes. Indeed, this is why some have dubbed our era as a 
‘race between technology and education.’ The former occurs rapidly and 
disruptively; the latter very slowly. The end result is that additional labour supply 
keeps wage growth relatively muted at the bottom, while its absence causes wages 
to accelerate quickly at the top. 
This appears to empirically be the case when we examine the data on wage growth 
globally. In Figure 10, we aggregate the data on hourly wages from the World Input-
Output Database to measure inflation-adjusted real wage growth for three 
occupational categories (low-, medium- and high-skill) on the basis of educational 
attainment.41 The trends in Figure 10 do not point toward polarisation in wages. 
What does appear to be the case, in general, is that wages for higher-skilled 
occupations have grown faster than those for middle- or lower-skilled occupations. 
This trend is true for eight of the 15 countries shown in Figure 10, many of which 
are large (apart from Spain, Italy and France, where wages in higher-skilled 
professions have not fared well, perhaps due to policies limiting labour-market 
flexibility in those countries). The eight countries in which wages at the top of the 
skill distribution have grown faster than wages at the middle or bottom account for 
more than 75% of the GDP produced by all 15 countries in the sample. Growing 
wage inequality in these countries has important policy implications, as well as 
implications for financial markets, which we elaborate on in a later section of this 
report.  
Figure 10. Change in employment shares by occupation, 1993-2006 
 
Source: Timmer (2012) Note: The hourly wage rate is calculated as total labor compensation divided by total hours worked. We deflate the reported nominal data using national 
consumer indexes. 
 
                                                          
41 The WIOD data counts jobs requiring lower secondary or primary education as “low 
skill,” those requiring post or upper secondary education as “medium-skill,” and those 
requiring first or second stage tertiary education as “high-skill.” 
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Lessons from History: What’s Next? 
How will technological progress alter the occupational structure of labour markets in 
the twenty-first century? Unfortunately, economic history does not necessarily 
provide obvious guidance for predicting how technological progress will reshape 
labour markets in the future.  
To be sure, over the past century technological progress has vastly shifted the 
composition of employment, from agriculture and the artisan shop, to manufacturing 
and clerking, to service and management occupations. Doing so, it has also shifted 
the demand for skills. But the relationship between new technologies and the 
demand for skills has been far from monotonic.  
During the Computer Revolution of the 1980s, the invention and diffusion of the PC 
favoured workers with a college education, but from the early 1990s that pattern 
changed. Although new jobs associated with the computer, such as database 
administrators and software engineers, still favoured skilled workers, the US 
economy experienced a slowdown in the demand for skills, while the share of 
employment in the middle even shrank. In the 2000s the change became more 
pronounced: employment among the least-skilled workers soared whereas the 
share of jobs held by middle- and high-skill workers declined. Work involving 
complex but manual tasks, like cleaning or driving trucks, became more plentiful. 
Both in the United States and in Europe, since 2000 low-skill and low-income 
service occupations have experienced job growth. At the same time, high-skilled 
workers are now taking on jobs traditionally performed by low-skilled workers, 
pushing low-skilled workers even further down, and sometimes even out of the 
workforce.42 
The decline in routine employment has been additionally spurred by the Great 
Financial Crisis, and there is indeed growing concern about the jobless recovery. 
Some even predict that jobless recoveries may become the new normal. According 
to a recent study, a long-term decline in routine occupations is occurring in spurts as 
these jobs are lost during recessions.43 This implies that future recoveries will likely 
be jobless as digital advancements now allow distressed companies to shed 
middle-income jobs in favour of automation – something that is happening across 
industries, including manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, financial services, 
and even public administration.  
While the concern over technological unemployment has so far proven to be 
exaggerated, the reason why human labour has prevailed relates to its ability to 
adopt and acquire new skills by means of education. Yet as computerisation enters 
more cognitive domains this will become increasingly challenging. To predict the 
future we therefore need to understand what is happening in technology. 
A well-known statement commonly attributed to Niels Bohr, is that “God gave the 
easy problems to the physicists.” While most conditions in social sciences are not 
timeless, physics is a closed system in which invariant statements can be made 
given sufficient boundary conditions. Arguably, technological progress has followed 
an evolutionary process whose path can never be predicted in detail, but we do 
have some idea of the near term boundary conditions in engineering. To understand 
how technology may impact on labour markets in the future, this report will argue 
that we need to understand the direction of technological progress, and thus the 
near term bottlenecks to our engineering capabilities.  
                                                          
42 Beaudery, Green and Sand (2013). 
43 Jaimovich and Siu (2012). 
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3. Technology in the 21st Century 
Automation prior to the 21st century predominately affected only a 
circumscribed set of routine manual tasks. Increasingly, however, technology 
is enabling the automation of tasks once thought quintessentially human: 
cognitive tasks involving subtle and non-routine judgment. The boundaries 
surrounding the tasks achievable only with human labour continue to 
contract at an alarmingly accelerating rate. The rapid pace with which 
technology enables new forms of automation is illustrated by Autor, Levy and 
Murnane,44 who write: "Navigating a car through city traffic or deciphering the 
scrawled handwriting on a personal check — minor undertakings for most 
adults — are not routine tasks by our definition.'" Today, both the tasks of 
navigating a car and deciphering handwriting are automatable. 
The Big Data Revolution and the Digitisation of 
Industries 
Machines, as yet, do not think and reason as we do. Human reasoning and our 
ability to act is built on the deep tacit knowledge we hold about our environment. In 
the case of deciphering handwriting, we employ intuitive knowledge of how a hand-
held pen interacts with paper (usually giving smooth lines) to ignore irrelevant 
imperfections in the paper. Further, our judgment of the identity of words is informed 
by our deep knowledge of the typical structure of language. We also make use of 
contextual clues to arrive at the most likely interpretation of text, considering the 
intentions of the author and the circumstances under which the text was written. 
Most of these cognitive processes are far beyond the scope of what algorithms can 
currently reproduce. However, clearly, this does not mean that they are incapable of 
performing human tasks: machine learning algorithms (a subfield of artificial 
intelligence that aims to build algorithms that can learn and act) were responsible 
for reading greater than 10% of all the cheques in the US in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
Recent technologies for automating complex tasks have closed the gap with human 
knowledge by employing the increasing availability45 of relevant big data. For 
example, modern algorithms for machine translation are built on large corpora of 
human-translated text. In particular, the success of Google Translate is built on 
Google amassing more than 10^12 translated words.46 These include two hundred 
billion words from official United Nations (UN) documents, which are required to be 
translated into the six official UN languages. The algorithms are then able to identify 
short phrases (n-grams) that are commonly translated to equivalent phrases in 
other languages, allowing it to substitute for such phrases to perform remarkably 
efficient translation. While Google's algorithms are unable to understand the deep 
semantics of this text, for many applications the big data approach is more than 
sufficient. 
 
                                                          
44Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003). 
45Predictions by Cisco Systems suggest that the Internet traffic in 2016 will be around 1 
zettabyte (1 × 10^21 bytes) (Cisco, 2012). In comparison, the information contained in all 
books worldwide is about 480 terabytes (5 × 10^14 bytes), and a text transcript of all the 
words ever spoken by humans would represent about 5 exabytes (5 × 10^18 bytes) (UC 
Berkeley School of Information, 2003). It seems clear that data is now available at an 
unprecedented scale. 
46Mayer-Schönberger, and Cukier (2013). 
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Here data serves as a substitute for the implicit knowledge human workers possess. 
Such data (termed training data in the parlance of machine learning) is usually 
drawn from recorded human judgment:47 for example, the data might be human-
provided labels of the translation of a piece of text. As such, these data can be seen 
as a way of encoding human knowledge such that it can be extended to many 
different iterations of a task. That is, algorithms allow for scaling beyond the human: 
a single dataset of human judgments might be drawn upon to make decisions many 
times a second for years. As a result, computerisation is no longer confined to tasks 
that can be written as rule-based procedures a priori, but is spreading to any task 
where big data becomes available. 
Retail and sales occupations may become susceptible to computerisation due to the 
rise of big data. As an example of the scale of data now employed in retail, 
Walmart's databases contain more than 2.5 petabytes (2.5 × 10^15 bytes) of 
information.48 The algorithmic recommender systems used by Netflix, Amazon and 
Spotify are built on big data characterising the preferences and spending patterns of 
their large customer bases. These recommender systems use sophisticated 
machine learning techniques to compare a particular customer's purchases to those 
of other customers, and, with instant recall of large product catalogues, can provide 
product recommendations that, in many instances, may be more useful than those 
of a human salesperson. Finnish company walkbase is taking a similar approach to 
physical retail, using big data analytics on in-store customer behaviour in order to 
offer in-store product recommendations. We expect these technologies to apply 
increasing competition to human retail assistants. 
Legal services are also being affected by the ability of computers to store and 
process big data. In particular, algorithms are increasingly substituting for tasks 
performed by paralegals, contract and patent lawyers. More specifically, law firms 
now make use of systems that can scan thousands of legal briefs and precedents to 
perform document review and to assist in pre-trial research. As an example, 
Symantec's eDiscovery platform is able to perform all tasks "from legal hold and 
collections through analysis, review, and production", and proved capable of 
analysing and sorting more than 570,000 documents in two days.49 Similarly, there 
are an increasing number of businesses, including Talent Party, Jobandtalent, 
Knack and Electronic Insight, using big data to automate recruitment.50 In particular, 
these firms use millions of CVs (résumés) and profiles characterising career 
trajectories in order to understand what makes different candidates suitable for 
different roles. These data can then be compared against those gathered on a 
specific candidate from the patterns of language used in their applications, and, in 
some cases, by having them play browser games. The power of algorithms to work 
with this big data in a way that is impossible for humans is likely to threaten 
employment in recruitment. 
In health care, the increasing availability of big data is leading to the automation of 
diagnostics tasks. For example, IBM's Watson system is being employed by 
oncologists at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center51 to suggest treatment 
options for cancer patients. These suggestions are informed by data from 600,000 
medical evidence reports, 1.5 million patient records and clinical trials, and two 
million pages of text from medical journals. With reference to this data, Watson can 
                                                          
47The human experts who provide such training data are rarely compensated in 
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49Markoff (2011). 
50Wall (2014). 
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personalise a treatment plan with reference to a given patient's individual 
symptoms, genetics, family and medication history. In critical domains such as 
health care, algorithmic recommendations, such as Watson's, may serve as inputs 
to human operators; in other circumstances, algorithms will themselves be 
responsible for appropriate decision-making. For example, finance is making 
increasing use of completely automated decision-making. Machine learning 
algorithms are able to process a greater number of financial announcements and 
press releases than any human trader, and then act faster upon them.52 Services 
like Future Advisor similarly use algorithms to offer personalised financial advice at 
larger scale and lower cost. 
Of course, using big data effectively is no easy task in itself, requiring careful 
statistical reasoning and informed judgment about what the data can really 
provide.53 Nonetheless, the trend is clear: algorithms built upon big data will play an 
increasingly large role in an ever-growing share of employment. 
The increasing availability of relevant big data is in large part due to the digitisation 
of industries. From traditional banking, to financial services and advertising, 
digitisation is transforming the world of work. We examine several of these trends in 
more detail.  
Digitisation is Transforming Banks 
The banking sector provides a prime example of how automation is spreading to 
new domains previously confined to human labour. Automation will continue to be a 
very important driver of change in retail banking, in banks’ back and middle offices 
in general and on the front end as well. The future of finance is more machines, 
more mobile interaction, fewer people and more advisory staff.  
One of the biggest changes to the banking sector has been the success of digital 
banking, which has resulted in a marked behavioural shift. Certain banks have 
identified that branch transactions have seen a 30% drop since 2010, while other 
banks have indicated that over half of all consumer lending is now transacted 
without the customer ever visiting a branch. As a result, the traditional branch model 
continues to come under review, with the possibility of large cost-savings in both 
real estate and people. A global comparison of bank branch density (branches per 
100,000 population) demonstrates the magnitude of the decline in branches over 
the past decade, reflecting a combination of bank consolidation and the level of 
adoption of digital and electronic banking in each country (Figure 11).  
For instance, Nordic markets have the lowest number of cheques issued per capita 
among the developed markets, with Germany not far behind. The same markets 
also have some of the highest debit card usage. Consequently, these markets have 
the lowest branch density. In contrast, Southern Europe generally screens poorly 
with a very branch intensive model, especially in Spain and Italy, albeit often these 
retail branches can be relatively small. Bank consolidation has only recently 
happened in Spain and is yet to occur in Italy, which remains a fragmented market. 
The continued move towards digital banking will see branch density continue to fall 
overall and some geographies look more vulnerable to this trend. While this should 
increase efficiency for banks, the trend is negative for staff levels.  
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Citi’s Digital Strategy Team in its recent report Digital Money: A Pathway to an 
Experience Economy estimates a 10% increase in the adoption of digital money can 
help an estimated 220 million individuals enter the formal financial sector. This 
translates to an additional $1 trillion moving from the informal economy to the formal 
economy. The Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) estimates that 
the cost of cash works out to be about 2.8% of the total cash takings by retailers. 
Based on this forecast, Citi estimates the adoption of digital money can result in 
over $125 billion in cost savings from cash handling.  
Figure 11. Commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 % Chg 
Spain 98.2 100.1 102.7 105.2 104.9 100.3 97.1 89.6 85.1 74.5 -24.1% 
Italy 63.5 64.1 65.4 66.7 70.3 67.6 66.5 66.0 64.4 62.0 -2.4% 
Switzerland 57.4 56.8 55.6 55.3 53.9 52.7 51.8 50.2 48.8 48.0 -16.4% 
Belgium 57.2 53.7 53.4 51.4 49.7 47.9 45.0 43.4 42.4 41.5 -27.5% 
France 
  
45.9 44.8 44.5 41.9 41.5 41.2 38.8 38.7 -15.6% 
United States 32.5 33.1 33.8 34.6 35.0 35.8 35.4 35.2 35.3 33.9 4.2% 
Japan 34.6 34.4 34.1 34.0 33.9 33.9 34.0 33.9 33.9 33.9 -2.1% 
Australia 30.7 30.6 31.2 31.4 31.6 31.5 31.3 30.9 31.8 30.7 0.2% 
Denmark 50.1 50.2 50.5 51.9 50.5 45.8 40.9 38.7 34.3 30.3 -39.6% 
Canada 
  
24.6 24.6 24.5 24.1 24.0 24.1 24.4 24.4 -0.6% 
United Kingdom 29.1 28.4 26.5 26.5 26.2 25.6 24.9 24.2 22.2 
 
-23.5% 
Hong Kong 23.6 23.2 23.0 23.3 23.6 23.3 23.6 23.7 23.5 23.1 -2.1% 
Ireland 35.9 34.6 34.0 33.4 34.1 34.9 28.7 27.7 25.0 23.0 -36.0% 
Sweden 23.6 23.6 23.7 23.6 24.0 23.0 22.5 21.7 21.8 21.7 -7.8% 
Netherlands 33.7 28.1 27.7 28.6 27.6 25.2 23.0 21.3 19.6 17.4 -48.3% 
Germany 21.3 20.2 16.7 16.3 16.3 15.8 15.7 15.5 13.9 14.7 -31.1% 
Finland 13.2 14.4 16.9 16.1 16.1 15.0 15.5 15.1 13.6 12.3 -6.9% 
Singapore 11.7 11.5 11.1 10.7 10.3 10.2 10.2 10.0 9.8 10.2 -13.4% 
Norway 13.1 12.1 12.0 12.3 11.6 10.9 11.0 10.7 9.9 9.1 -31.0% 
 
Source: IMF 
 
Post-crisis, both regulation and slumping returns have forced banks to take a hard 
look at each of their trading businesses to look for ways to minimise costs and 
maximise efficiencies. We believe these forces quickened the pace of automation in 
both the fixed income and equity markets. While market disclosure is limited, after 
speaking with industry participants we believe the product automation timeline is 
quite wide, with cash equities and treasury futures almost fully electronic and cash 
bonds at the early stages of electronification and still largely voice traded. Below we 
lay out the percentage of the market that is electronically traded by product, 
according to a joint report done by McKinsey and Greenwich Associates54 (see 
Figure 12). As more trading moves towards a fully automated market, we would 
expect to see continued headcount reductions and improved operating margins. 
After speaking with market participants, we believe that the biggest hurdle for more 
markets to move towards automated/electronic trading is the lack of standardisation 
among products. For example, investment grade and high yield bonds remain 
largely voice traded, despite significant attempts to create electronic trading 
platforms. We believe this is largely due to bond market structure, which lacks the 
standardisation needed to complete a match-based, electronic market like equities. 
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The equity market has taken the largest steps to electronically evolve. After 
speaking with industry participants we believe that currently ~95% of all stock 
executions are electronic. This is in stark contrast to only 15 years ago when the 
majority of stock orders were still traded manually on a physical trading floor. The 
evolution of the equity market has significantly changed the fundamental economics 
of the equity business, with machines replacing human traders and costs to trade 
declining dramatically. According to industry participants, the adoption of electronic 
trading in the equity markets has led to a 50% headcount reduction over a 10 year 
period. 
Figure 12. Treasury futures and cash equities are largely electronically traded, while cash bonds are at the early stages 
 
Note: Shaded area represents the percentage of the market that is electronically traded. 
Source: Citi Research, McKinsey & Greenwich Associates report 
 
Financial Services Continue to Move towards Passive 
from Active Investing 
Technological advances have led to the computerisation/automation of many facets 
of the financial services industry. The emergence of the “exchange traded fund” (or 
ETF) has, in many respects, been enabled by the evolution of trading technology. 
Passive and ETF funds now make up 28% of US retail assets under management 
(Figure 13), up from just 9% in 2000. This shift from active to passive can be seen 
in the employment numbers of the investment company industry where total assets 
under management from 1997 to 2013 have grown at a compound annual growth 
rate of 17.5% while employment over the same period has grown at just 4.8% 
(Figure 14). 
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Figure 13. Passive investment market share as % of retail AUM  Figure 14. Investment company industry employment 
 
 
 
Source: Citi Research  Source: ICI Factbook 2014 
 
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US approved an 
application for an “exchange traded managed fund’ or ETMF. This marks a 
milestone in the evolution of the mutual fund industry, and provides an interesting 
application of automation to a financial service distribution process that has been in 
place for many years.  
ETMFs represent “disruptive innovation” to the traditional actively managed mutual 
fund industry. This arises from their objective to transfer the traditional methods of 
buying/selling mutual funds to an “exchange traded” instrument. As with other forms 
of disruptive innovation, we expect an extended time line consisting of early 
adopters before moving to broader market appeal. Yet, the evolution of passive 
exchange traded products to a wrapper enabling exchange trading of actively 
managed mutual funds, and with it, cost savings to the investor derived from 
efficiencies of an exchange traded approach, provide an interesting application of 
technology-driven automation into the financial services industry. Not only have 
ETFs lowered pricing and taken share, the economies of scale of winning funds has 
also seen share concentration in the hands of a few providers.  
Programmatic and Self-Service Shaking up the Digital 
Advertising Ecosystem 
Technology is also transforming advertising. In particular, programmatic advertising 
has become a dominant force in the buying and selling of digital media and we 
forecast the portion of Internet advertising transacted programmatically in the US to 
grow at a 4-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 49% between 2014 and 
2018. Underlying the increasing adoption of programmatic is marketers’ desire to 
automate the buying and selling of inventory, leverage internal data and cut costs 
through reduced headcount and a more efficient allocation of ad dollars. With its 
growing momentum, programmatic has the potential to be highly disruptive to the 
advertising ecosystem, make other technologies and processes obsolete and 
reduce the need for human input in the buying and selling of advertising.  
Simply speaking, programmatic advertising is the buying and selling of digital 
inventory through automated methods of transaction. Traditionally, most media 
(including digital media) was transacted through a manual campaign-by-campaign 
request for proposal process that frequently included various advertising parties, 
slow negotiations and relatively high expense. Programmatic is helping streamline 
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this process through automation, which has resulted in reduced manual input, 
higher efficiencies, and greater transparency in how ad dollars are allocated. Over 
the last few years, the adoption of programmatic technologies by brands, agencies, 
trading desks and other marketers has gained momentum. Citi expects US 
programmatic spend to be $5.2 billion in 2014 and $25.6 billion in 2018, 
representing 32% of total US Internet advertising in 2018. 
Brand and other marketers are concerned that programmatic is resulting in reduced 
control over where ads will appear (the right sites and position), whether humans 
will actually see them (bot-driven traffic) and how post-campaign performance is 
tracked. Publishers (the suppliers of ad inventory) are concerned about controlling 
and optimizing the price of their inventory within these programmatic channels, 
especially for their premium inventory. Over the summer and throughout the fall of 
2014, we have seen the AdTech community respond to these concerns. For 
example, both Google and AOL have acquired ad attribution technologies. Also, 
TubeMogul and Rocket Fuel announced integrations of third-party protection and 
third-party reviews to combat fraudulent traffic and issues surrounding brand safety. 
Given its intended benefit of streamlining the buying and selling of media, 
programmatic represents a disruptive force in the advertising world. We have 
already begun to see a reallocation of labour at ad agencies and at the 
advertiser/brands themselves. Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate an emerging trend 
of brands bringing media buying, via programmatic technology, in-house. Out of the 
87% of brands currently without in-house capabilities (Figure 15), 88% of them 
expect to implement in-house programmatic buying technology within the next 12 
months. A recent survey by Chango also affirms this trend, with approximately 50% 
of respondents saying that they will be bringing more of their programmatic buying 
in-house, while also depending less on agencies. Ultimately, we see human 
resources at agencies, agency-owned trading desks, and firms heavily reliant on 
“Direct Sales” as the most exposed to the emergence of programmatic real-time 
bidding (RTB) and in-house tech. Given these efficiencies, it is no surprise that a 
self-service salesperson is able to generate client spend 9x greater than that of an 
assisted-service employee. With brands shifting to in-house programmatic models, 
we will likely see leaner agencies/trading desks and Direct Sales firms in the near 
future.  
Figure 15. Buyers: Have you bought programmatic video buying 
technology in-house? 
 Figure 16. Buyers: Are you planning on bringing programmatic video 
in-house within the next 12 months? 
 
 
 
Source: Adap.TV, Citi Research  Source: Adap.TV, Citi Research 
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Software: The Mechanism to Automate 
Within IT, there is ironically a high degree of manual processes that are being 
replaced through automation with software. Estimates we’ve seen suggest labour is 
between 25-50% of IT spending, depending on industry, maturity of company and 
other factors. As mentioned above, to some degree automation is helping 
companies grow incremental capacity in data centres and networks and support for 
more devices without adding IT headcount. We see this with the move towards the 
“software defined” infrastructure. A decade ago, nearly all devices and infrastructure 
elements were manually configured. One way to look at this is the server-to-
systems administrator ratio in data centres. Servers require certain maintenance 
and other tasks to be done, with some human intervention required to do these. 
While not all servers and environments are created equally and the definition of 
what an administrator does is not consistent, the trend on this ratio has continued to 
increase. Ten years ago, less than 10:1 was common with x86 (Intel) servers. Today 
this number is in the 50:1 ratio with many IT shops, while some push 100:1 with 
high degrees of automation. There have been some press reports suggesting that in 
web scale environments, with a high degree of server homogeneity and automation, 
this ratio can be above 1,000:1. There are analogous comparisons around other 
devices (e.g. storage and network devices) and processes (e.g. level 1 IT support) 
within IT that can have the impact of pressuring lower skill IT jobs. We note this is 
unlikely to have an impact on high-skill IT jobs such as software development, 
where automation is in the early stages or non-existent.  
Another area where low-skill customer-facing jobs are facing pressure is customer 
service automation technologies which drive efficiencies by enabling companies to 
scale operations without support personnel or outright cut headcount. Examples of 
these include Internet-based chat support, user self-support, diagnostic technology 
and modern call centre software. 
Digitisation and the Services Industry 
People and their talent form the basis of the Services industry (both IT and 
Business Process Outsourcing). Traditional industry contract structures have 
dictated that most Services work is done and billed for on a per-person, per-unit-of-
time basis. The billing rate generally depends on the complexity of work, the 
location of the worker, the expertise of the worker and the supply/demand dynamics 
of the specific labour classification.  
Against this backdrop, automation has long been a factor that has helped as well as 
hurt growth in the Services industry. Services companies, in their role as technology 
and process experts, clearly bring productivity benefits to their clients – this is a 
crucial selling point for their services and has been an important driver of growth. Of 
course, when Services companies use automation, a portion of the productivity gain 
is passed onto the client, which creates a headwind of growth to the industry. A 
second headwind is the deployment of automation directly by the client, which 
reduces the Services industry’s total addressable market. Often, such direct client 
deployment is due to the availability of software or online/mobile web/app-based 
solutions. In other words, other parts of the technology industry stack impinge on 
the Services opportunity.  
Given continuing developments in the area of automation, software is increasingly 
capable of performing tasks that humans have historically done. When applied to 
the workforce, we believe that low- and mid-level jobs in the Services sector that 
involve repetition (e.g. data entry, legal discovery work done by paralegals; journal 
entries done by accountants) are at the most risk of being lost. This is obviously 
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problematic for the people currently doing these jobs. However, from a societal 
standpoint, we note the issue is that the “knowledge” workers that lose jobs are 
typically above-average wage earners, which can obviously have negative 
derivative consequences. According to work done by Carl Benedikt Frey and 
Michael Osborne, 58% of Office & Administrative Support occupations are at risk of 
automation. 
Although these numbers sound dire, we note that certain “human” attributes are 
unlikely to be replicated in the near term. Humans can be empathetic; humans 
exhibit judgment; strategy and management are in the realm of humans. Asking the 
right question is easier for humans. Certainly the early implementations of “robotic 
process automation” systems immediately removed all exceptions processing to a 
human counterpart. Of course, humans have to design the software as well. But we 
do sound a note of caution here as well as the fact that the concept of judgment is 
an interesting one. AI-based self-learning systems can draw conclusions based on 
data and they can improve over time as more data is presented to them. So, as 
“data expertise” grows, does the importance of process and domain expertise 
diminish?  
We believe there is still a role for Services professionals in many situations, even if 
this is a different role from the present time. For Services vendors, the choice is 
simple – “If you can’t beat them, join them”.  There are already examples of 
companies such as Accenture, Cognizant, EXL Service, Infosys, WNS and 
Genpact, who have been investing in the development of end-to-end platform-
based systems that derive from their knowledge of the underlying process and 
(sometimes) technology. We believe this is crucial for the future as the Services 
industry changes towards an outcome based model.  
The Internet of Things and Advanced Sensors 
Driving the rise of big data is the increasing instrumentation of our physical 
environment. Take the ‘Internet of things’ (IoT), the label given to the connection of 
embedded computing devices to the Internet. Smart sensors might be installed 
around a building in order to give detailed and timely readings of air temperature 
and quality, or attached to goods in a warehouse to enable automated inventory 
control. The rise of the IoT, and the increasing sophistication of associated sensors, 
has made such sensor data one of the most prominent sources of big data.55 
Gartner highlights IoT as the most hyped technology of 201456 and predicts that 26 
billion IoT units will have been installed by 2020.57 Further, the 2014 EMC Digital 
Universe study58 estimates that the IoT generated 2% of the digital universe 
available in 2014, while forecasting that that figure will increase to 10% by 2020. 
Sensor data is often coupled with new machine learning fault- and anomaly-
detection algorithms to render many tasks computerisable. A broad class of 
examples can be found in condition monitoring, asset management and novelty 
detection, with technology substituting for closed-circuit TV (CCTV) operators, 
workers examining equipment defects and those responsible for plant control or 
factory monitoring. GE announced that its IoT software business, which uses 
sensors to monitor locomotives, wind turbines, gas turbines and oil and gas 
equipment, will be worth $1.1 billion in 2014.59 With the IoT allowing for the remote 
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monitoring of equipment and infrastructure, and with algorithms able to identify 
anomalous conditions, installation, maintenance and repair jobs are becoming 
increasingly automatable. 
Perhaps more profound are the implications of using the IoT to improve the 
monitoring of people. Particularly relevant are recent innovations in wearable 
devices such as the Apple Watch and FitBit Surge, which are equipped with 
increasingly sophisticated sensors capable of measuring heart rate and activity 
levels. Healthcare occupations will be affected by such sophisticated sensors and 
algorithms, including the clinical staff responsible for monitoring the state of patients 
in intensive care. Remote health monitoring may decrease the need for hospitals 
and attendant workers, with technology allowing some patients to stay at home, with 
their anomalous health conditions identified by machine learning algorithms. The 
comprehensive monitoring of consumers with wearables may allow stores to further 
automate retail. For example, a business may use heart rate measurements to 
assess a customer's emotional reaction to the product they have just picked up (as 
detected by the sensor on the product) and, depending on the assessment, then 
use the wearable device to make product recommendations. Employees equipped 
with wearable devices would also be much more thoroughly monitored than is 
currently possible, enabling employee compensatory schemes that are much more 
difficult to 'game'. Similar devices, again reliant on machine learning techniques to 
identify anomalies, might allow also for further automation of fraud detection and tax 
evasion. 
Advances in machine learning technologies have directly contributed to the growth 
in wearables by permitting improved user interfaces. In particular, intelligent user 
interfaces that can understand a wider range of user intentions are enabling smaller 
and more intuitive devices. For example, the predictive text capabilities of 
companies such as SwiftKey can correct for user's typing mistakes by learning their 
distinctive patterns of writing. Apple's Siri and Google Now use intelligent software 
to recognise spoken words, interpret their meanings, and act on them accordingly, 
even in the presence of ambient noise. These technologies allow a more efficient 
means of obtaining rich data from a human user, enabling automation by better 
access to human tacit knowledge. Moreover, these technologies may directly 
substitute for occupations requiring human interaction. For example, a company 
called SmartAction now provides call computerisation solutions that use advanced 
speech recognition software that have realised cost savings of 60% to 80% over an 
outsourced call centre consisting of human labour.60 
The IoT finds significance in that the volume of rich, heterogeneous data it delivers 
will better allow algorithms to understand and influence the physical world. This is in 
contrast to most current sources of big data (e.g. e-commerce), which are relevant 
only to our digital behaviours. Increasingly intelligent algorithms can hence be 
brought to bear on the automation of the many jobs that involve interacting with our 
physical environment. 
Sensors are Driving Automation  
Manufacturing has continued to adapt — first shifting to low-cost labour, then to tax 
holiday havens, and now to lowest landed total costs (a mixture of shipping, labour, 
taxes, real estate, etc.) — all the while embracing technology innovation of which 
sensors and connectors have become increasingly important.  
                                                          
60Canadian Automobile Association (2012). 
Sensors have improved the monitoring of 
people in health and workplace scenarios 
Advances in machine learning technologies 
have directly contributed to the growth of 
wearables 
Jim Suva, CFA 
US IT Hardware & Supply Chain Analyst 
 
Arthur Lai 
Asian Display and Touch Panel Analyst 
February 2015 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions   
 
© 2015 Citigroup 
33
Sensors are one of the most important parts for modern factory automation 
systems. Contemporary industrial automation systems rely on intelligent sensors 
(not only for monitoring and measurement, but also analysis) connected via low-
latency and real-time networks to high-performance programmable logic controllers 
and human-machine interface systems. With the reliability brought by advanced 
sensing technology, industrial automation systems are able to reduce labour costs 
and have transformed electronic manufacturing for many industries (i.e. surface 
mount technology in electronic manufacturing which place hundreds of parts 
together in seconds and robotics in automobile production, both of which have 
historically used a meaningful amount of manual labour while at the same time 
increased quality and lowered defective rates).  
In addition to the industrial manufacturing process to ensure/improve quality, sensor 
applications have expanded to consumer items like cars. Auto-use sensors are the 
eyes of electronic systems, monitoring information inside and outside the vehicle. 
There are more than 20 types of sensors in today’s automobiles with fuel economy 
and emission regulations leading to engine oxygen and nitrogen oxide sensors 
becoming commonplace. We estimate growth of total automotive sensor content 
with a weighted compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of +10.8% from 2008 to 
2013 and annual average sensor content growth is forecast at +7-10% versus just 
over 2% for electronic control units (ECUs). 
Robotics themselves require a lot of high quality components such as LED sensors. 
The high level concept is that automation equipment requires a lot of invisible light 
sensors (infrared light) to give the robots the correct input. It includes infrared 
components for integrated ambient light and proximity sensors (ALD). The total 
market size for infrared sensors likely reached $1.665 billion in 2014, up from 
$1.461 billion in 2013, a 14% year-over-year increase which is greater than other 
industrial LED applications (Figure 17). 
Figure 17. Infrared-related components (US$ millions) 
 2013 2014E 
Infrared LED 191 197 
Photodiodes 263 269 
IrDA Transceivers 54 51 
IR Receivers 169 176 
Ambient Light Sensor 240 282 
Proximity Sensor 14 13 
Others 531 6778 
Total 1,461 1,665 
 
Source: HIS, Citi Research 
 
We also note that connectors will benefit from the expanding application of sensors, 
as every sensor is connected by a connector and the trend towards wireless 
connection doesn’t mean fewer connectors but potentially more as wireless 
antennae need connectors for power and transmission. Automotive “electrification” 
is a driver for connectors as cars become smarter, connected and environmentally 
friendly. We forecast annual average connector volume growth of 4-6% per vehicle 
in addition to annual auto production growth of 2-3% less average price declines of 
0-2% resulting in organic connector growth of 6-8%.  
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Intelligent Robotics 
The continued technological development of robotic hardware has long had an 
impact on employment: over the past three decades, industrial robots have 
substituted for the majority of manufacturing workers. For example, a typical 
installation at BMW might use up to 1000 robots capable of handling up to 750kg, 
performing tasks impossible for humans. In recent years, robots are gaining yet 
further enhanced sensors and manipulators, allowing them to perform complex 
manual labour. This is evidenced by the sustained growth in robot sales, which 
increased in 2014 by 12% year-over-year, a growth rate that is expected to at least 
continue until 2017.61 The significance of this for work is suggested by the high 
"robot densities" in technologically advanced economies: in South Korea, for 
example, there are now 437 industrial robots to every 10,000 human employees in 
manufacturing.62 
In addition to existing uses in manufacturing, advances in technological capabilities, 
along with declining costs, will make entirely new uses for robots possible. For 
example, robots are beginning to be used for a diverse range of professional 
service tasks, with sales continuing to grow for milking robots, robotic fencers, 
mobile barn cleaning robots, underwater robots and medical robots for assisted 
surgery. Defence applications (e.g. mine detection, reconnaissance and 
surveillance) are a particularly strong driver, with Visiongain estimating the UGV 
(unmanned ground vehicle) market at around $700 million, and The Economist 
estimating the UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) market at around $3 billion. 
Decommissioning industrial facilities is another growth area for robotics, with an 
estimated market of £13.5 billion ($20.3bn) for robotic decommissioning at the UK 
nuclear facility Sellafield alone. A particularly important application for robotics 
development is in entertainment and leisure as toys and hobbies, e.g. LEGO® 
Mindstorms®, where novelty is valued and performance requirements may not be 
exacting. The market for entertainment and leisure robots was valued at around 
$900 million in 2013. Even more extraordinary growth is being achieved in the use 
of robots for personal and domestic purposes, with sales up 28% in 2013 versus 
2012.63 Such robots are finding use for vacuum and floor cleaning, lawn-mowing 
and in providing assistance to those with disabilities. It is clear that, with improved 
sensors, robots are capable of competing with human labour in a myriad of tasks. 
In this section, we examine the expanding scope of robotisation beyond 
manufacturing, including applications in the defence, healthcare and consumer 
services markets.  
The Effect on the US Defence Industry  
The military provides a prime driver of recent developments in intelligent robotics. 
The use of robots by militaries across the world continues to increase as countries 
seek ways to remove soldiers from harm’s way and to garner better intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. In fact, the United States, whose 
defence budget represents roughly half of the world’s total, saw its unmanned 
aircraft spending grow 14x between 2000 and 2014, driven by the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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Going forward, we expect unmanned systems to continue to garner government 
budget support worldwide, particularly in the US, which is seeking to create a 
smaller, more agile and more technologically advanced military, as a way to reduce 
the long-term structural cost of soldiers. Not only do unmanned systems address 
the cost side of the equation, but they can also be more effective given their size, 
speed and persistence. Funding isn’t linear due to post-war drawdowns, but the US 
military continues to focus on this growing technology. 
Figure 18. US Department of Defence systems funding (US$ millions) 
 
Source: US DoD Unmanned System Integrated Roadmap (FY2013-2038) 
 
Current market participants such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, 
Raytheon, General Dynamics, Textron, BAE, etc. are all likely to be the key 
providers of military robotics given their product portfolios and experience in 
developing new military systems. However, it is difficult to make an investment case 
based solely on robots given the propensity of governments, particularly the US, to 
insert ever higher levels of technology into force structures. Robots are a part of that 
story, but not a big enough part of it to make a structural difference for any one 
company. Rather, the broader trend of technology insertion matters most, with the 
US projecting to spend more on weapons vs. overhead going forward.  
Figure 19. US Department of Defence Base Budget (US$ billions) 
 
Source: US DoD 
 
Below, we outline the most common uses of unmanned systems and robots in the 
US military and the products that deliver those capabilities. We note that 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) is the most common use-case 
for unmanned systems. 
 Air – Represents > 90% of US spending, with current generation unmanned air 
platforms used for air strike (MQ-1B Predator, MQ-1C Gray Eagle, MQ-9 Reaper) 
and ISR (Puma, Wasp, Raven, Scan Eagle, RQ-5 Hunter, RQ-7 Shadow, RQ-4B 
Global Hawk). 
$m 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 CAGR
Air 3776 4819 4468 4217 4419 4%
Ground 13 47 44 54 66 50%
Maritime 330 410 409 430 382 4%
Total 4119 5274 4921 4700 4867 4%
$b 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 CAGR
Weapons 155 154 178 181 185 5%
Ov erhead 341 342 358 362 366 2%
Total 496 496 535 544 551 3%
Unmanned systems continue to garner 
government budget support worldwide 
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Figure 20. Various unmanned air platforms 
 
Source: Wikipedia 
 
 Land – A wide variety of systems for ISF, route clearance, transport and attack. 
There are no major identifiable platforms, although videos of human/animal-like 
robots being studied for their transportation capabilities are popular. 
Figure 21. Gladiator 
 
Source: US Defense Department 
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 Sea – Often overlooked, unmanned maritime systems are used above and below 
the surface for ISR, mine-hunting and strike. 
Figure 22. Silver Marlin 
 
Source: Military Technology 
 
Ethical and Legal Considerations of Military Automation 
Automation within the military is increasingly significant, and particularly 
controversial. It is easy to see why automation is attractive to the military; it 
potentially increases the speed of warfare, allows fighting from greater distances 
and shields soldiers from physical harm. Military automation is not a new 
phenomenon; automated missile defence systems have existed for over half a 
century. Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS), often known as ‘drones’, are already 
partially automated in their flight and surveillance functions.  
Yet with advances in Artificial Intelligence programming techniques, the automation 
of military systems could become more sophisticated in the future, raising concerns 
about the legality of automated systems as well as their compatibility with 
fundamental ethical principles. In RPAS, for instance, it might be possible to further 
reduce the role of the pilot to a point where an operator merely pre-programmes the 
machine so that, once deployed, it can carry out a mission independently.  
The debate on military automation primarily concerns the extent to which the 
automation of targeting processes is legally and ethically defensible. For a legal and 
ethical assessment of automated military systems, it is important to draw three 
distinctions. Firstly, it is crucial to distinguish between military systems that are 
classifiable as weapons — meaning that they have been designed to carry and 
deliver a ‘payload’ aimed at a specific target — and those that are not. A bomb 
disposal robot, for example, could be automated to a high degree, yet it is not 
designed to apply force to a target. Secondly, within military systems classifiable as 
weapons, it is vital to distinguish between the automation of functions that are not 
directly related to targeting and the automation of targeting functions; the flight 
functions of an RPAS could be automated, but this does not mean that its targeting 
functions should also be automated. Finally, it must be recognised that the 
automation of targeting functions is a complex undertaking. It is important to 
distinguish between the partial automation of the targeting process and automation 
of the whole targeting process.  
It is noteworthy that the potential automation of targeting processes is not illegal. 
Nevertheless, the legal threshold for the deployment of a weapon with automated 
targeting functions, especially when these are fully automated, is high. In particular, 
it must be shown that its deployment complies with the principle of distinction, which 
Dr Alex Leveringhaus 
James Martin Fellow 
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed 
Conflict, Oxford Martin School 
Concerns on military automation revolve 
around the extent to which the automation of 
targeting processes is legally and ethically 
defensible 
Automation of targeting processes is not 
illegal, but it must be shown that the weapon 
can identify the correct target 
 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions February 2015   
 
© 2015 Citigroup 
38 
obliges individual combatants, and belligerent parties in general, to distinguish 
between legally legitimate and illegitimate military targets; in other words, it needs to 
be shown that automated weapons can adequately, and with a high level of 
certainty, identify the correct target. Morally, robotic weapons are not unethical in 
themselves, but their development and deployment raises a number of substantive 
ethical concerns, for example relating to justifications for killing in warfare. While a 
legal ban and a moral consensus on automated weaponry is unrealistic, 
policymakers must ensure that the development and deployment of such weapons 
occurs only within carefully restricted contexts.   
Opportunity in Healthcare  
Robots are already being used in a variety of healthcare applications. Robotic 
surgery will make new forms of minimally invasive surgery possible, which could 
reduce patient scarring, rehab time, post-surgical complications and deaths. 
Intuitive Surgical is the leading supplier of robot assisted surgical systems, while 
Hansen Medical also specialises in robotic surgery. In 2013 there were 523,000 
surgeries performed using Intuitive’s da Vinci Surgical System (the majority of 
procedures being in the areas of gynaecology and urology) on an installed base of 
>3,000 machines worldwide (>2,000 in the US), compared with only about 1,000 
robotic surgeries worldwide in 2000.  
The use of robotics in surgery has not been without controversy, with some studies 
cited in the Wall Street Journal actually finding an increase in adverse events with 
robotic surgery and questioning whether the potential benefits of robotic surgery 
outweigh the additional costs given that the price of the systems range from $0.9-
$2.5 million, with additional consumables of $700-$2,300 needed for each 
procedure, according to Intuitive. However, a study published in the February 2015 
issue of Health Affairs, found that in terms of quality-adjusted life-years gained, the 
benefits of robotic assisted partial nephrectomy surgery for kidney patients 
outweighed the healthcare and surgical costs to patients and payers by a ratio of 
five to one.64 
In the field of medical robots, advances are aimed at creating a seamless 
connection between humans and robots such that robots can assist in human 
functions. Japanese company Cyberdyne, with its hybrid assistive limb (HAL) 
device, uses an exoskeleton with sensors to detect electrical signals from the body 
and helps transmit these to the brain, helping people suffering from paralysis to 
walk again. Citi’s Hidemaru Yamaguchi suggests HAL can be used for numerous 
neural and muscular disorders, including stroke, which affects up to 25 million 
patients globally, Parkinson’s disease (4 million people) and multiple sclerosis (2.5 
million).  
Brooks Automation’s Life Sciences division provides automated sample 
management platforms for biologic sample storage in a controlled environment and 
automates the process of retrieving specifically selected samples from within the 
storage containers. The automated controlled storage environment ensures that 
samples are preserved within a narrow temperature band to maintain sample 
integrity (manual retrieval has an increased rate of degradation due to temperature 
fluctuations, as more samples than needed are typically removed at one time to find 
the correct sample) and provide absolutely accuracy in the identification and 
selection of samples during storage and retrieval (manual retrieval has a 10% error 
rate).  
                                                          
64 Intuitive Surgical press release. 
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The current market for biologic sample storage is $500 million (33% is automated), 
with that number estimated to be $1 billion by 2018 (estimated 40% automated). 
Brooks currently competes in the -20 to -80 degree Celsius market with machines 
that can house 1 million samples and there are only 3 competitors and 200 
customers. Brooks is currently developing -150 degree Celsius automation 
machines that could house fewer samples, but would attract 15,000 customers. The 
-150 degree units requires significant R&D and enhanced technology to ensure that 
the robotics do not freeze (which occurs at -8 degrees Celsius). Currently, the -150 
degree market is 100% manual and Brooks is expected to have robotic prototypes 
available for delivery in 2015 with revenue generation starting in 2016.  
Robots can also be used to assist patients and the elderly in their own homes, 
thereby limiting the amount of home healthcare that is required and shortening 
hospital stays as patients can be monitored remotely. From carrying elderly patients 
to a bed, a bath or a wheelchair and assisting in food preparation, to lifting food and 
feeding patients and monitoring vital signs, robots are increasingly being used in the 
home setting. Examples of devices include 1) Riba by Riken, which can carry 
elderly patients to a bed, a bath or a wheelchair; 2) Twenty One, which helps 
disabled people out of bed and helps prepare meals; 3) Secom’s My Spoon, which 
can lift food to a patients mouth; and 4) Para, which is a therapeutic robot pet 
shaped as a baby harp seal that is designed to be a companion to the elderly and 
responds to touch, stroke, light and sound.  
Robots and Automation in Consumer Markets 
The last decade has seen the automation of grocery shop check-outs increase and 
now automation is extending into restaurants. The National Restaurant Association 
(NRA) suggests there are 13.1 million fast food workers in the US alone. In 
December 2013 casual dining restaurant chain Applebee's announced that they 
would have tablets installed at every table by the end of 2014, allowing customers 
to order and pay the bill at their tables. In October 2014, McDonalds then CEO 
Donald Thompson told the Wall Street Journal he plans to "make it easier for 
customers to order and pay for food digitally and give people the ability to customise 
their orders." McDonalds has started to install touch screens in Europe, eliminating 
the need for workers to take a customer’s order. A robot manufactured by 
Momentum Machines can assemble a burger with all the condiments in 10 seconds 
(i.e. 360 hamburgers an hour) and the company says the device could save fast 
food outlets $135,000 a year in labour costs according to Digital Trends. This also 
helps reduce employee turnover issues. In China a new fast food robot called "Chef 
Cui" slices noodles and costs ¥30,000 to buy ($2,000) vs. $4,700 per year for a 
human noodle chef, according to Associated Press. 
Some hotel companies are rolling out mobile check-in and room key access to save 
on reception staff and improve customer convenience. Marriott is rolling this out to 
4,000 hotels starting in 2014. Merlin Entertainment is rolling out virtual queuing in its 
theme parks to improve customer satisfaction and free up customers to spend 
money elsewhere in the parks. Virtual queuing allows you to effectively book your 
slot on a ride using an electronic device or a mobile app. In the meantime, the 
customer can grab a coffee or go on another ride rather than standing in the queue. 
Ticket clerks have also been automated at many cinemas and parking lots. In the 
travel industry, agents have been replaced by digital travel agents such as Kayak. 
And when travelling abroad many individuals now use automated gates at passport 
control. 
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The Market for Industrial Robotics 
Industrial Robotics – Big Opportunity in China, the US and 
Japan 
Global manufacturing labour costs today account for $6 trillion annually and further 
adaptation of automation could represent considerable cost savings; according to 
McKinsey, in developed countries, across occupations such as manufacturing, 
packing, construction, maintenance, and agriculture, 15-25% of industrial worker 
tasks could be automated cost-effectively (based on estimated 2025 wage rates) 
and in developing countries (on average) 5-15% of manufacturing worker tasks 
could be automated across relevant occupations by 2025. McKinsey estimates a 
potential economic impact of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion per year by 2015 based on 
cost savings using the estimated annual cost of advanced robots compared with the 
annual employment cost of an equivalent number of workers. 
Industrial robotics in particular has been one of the higher growth segments 
amongst automation. However, despite the rapid growth, the adaptation rate of 
robotics world-wide remains relatively low. The Robotic Industries Association (RIA) 
estimates that only ~10% of US companies, for example, that would benefit from 
automated production have installed any robots so far. Figure 23 and Figure 24 
show the value and volume of shipments of robotics in North America and we see 
an ample opportunity for continued investments in this field. 
Figure 23. Value of robot shipments in North America  Figure 24. Volume shipments of robots in North America 
 
 
 
Source: Citi Research, Robotic Industries Association  Source: Citi Research, Robotic Industries Association 
 
According to McKinsey, the number of industrial robots installed globally by 2025 
will rise to 25 million, up 15 million from the current level, implying 25% to 30% 
average annual growth in robot sales, which is considerably higher than the 
average growth rate over the past two decades. This in turn would require 
considering investments totalling about $900 billion to $1.2 trillion. It is worth noting 
that McKinsey’s definition of industrial robots is much broader than the one 
presented by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR). The IFR which tracks 
units of industrial robots sold globally, measures articulated, SCARA, cylindrical, 
parallel and linear robots. Therefore the size of the addressable market differs 
considerably. 
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The IFR forecasts the market to grow by 12% per year to 2017 (Figure 25). This 
compares to an average annual growth rate of 10% during 2000-2013 compared to 
an average growth of global GDP of 2.3% and Industrial Production of 3% over the 
same period. In recent years there has been a clear acceleration of growth, with 
double digit growth rates (for example 40% year-over-year growth in 2011). In terms 
of the number of units, the IFR estimates 298,000 units will be sold in 2017 
compared to 98,000 units sold in 2000 and 166,000 units sold in 2011. In terms of 
the sales value, (according to the IFR), in 2013, the sales value increased 12% to 
$9.5 billion. Including the cost of software, peripherals and systems engineering, the 
actual robotic systems market value is estimated to be $29 billion. 
Figure 25. Annual supply of industrial robots, 2000-2017E 
 
Source: IFR 
 
There is a significant scope for growth in robotics across all geographies, but in 
terms of the rate of growth Asia (in particularly China) is expected to outpace North 
America and Europe (Figure 26 and Figure 27). China, in particular, is rapidly 
becoming the largest and fastest growing market for industrial robots estimated by 
the IFR to grow by 25% CAGR during 2014-2017 compared to 15% per year 
between 2011 and 2013. According to the IFR almost 37,000 industrial robots were 
sold to China in 2013 (of which Chinese suppliers installed 9,000 units), up from 
14,978 units in 2010. Despite this growth, robot density in China is still low relative 
to other countries (only 23 robots per 10,000 employees in China vs. 332 in Japan) 
and structural drivers of (1) wage inflation, (2) changing demographics, and (3) the 
need for standardised quality, mean penetration should increase. The European 
and US markets, where demand is more closely tied with replacement needs, are 
expected to grow at 6% per year between 2014 and 2017. 
These high growth rates are driven by: (1) increased productivity requirements in 
developed markets; (2) increasing global competitiveness requirements in emerging 
markets; (3) the strategic importance of robotics in China; (4) rising wage inflation 
globally; (5) shortening life cycle of products; (6) declining cost of robotics; and (7) 
new applications for robotics which are emerging as technology advances. 
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Figure 26. Industrial robot shipment forecasts by region (units) 
 
Source: IFR 
 
  2012 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
North America         26,269      28,668      31,500      33,000      35,000      36,000  
   YoY %   9.1% 9.9% 4.8% 6.1% 2.9% 
Brazil           1,645        1,398        2,000        2,300        3,000        3,500  
   YoY %   -15.0% 43.1% 15.0% 30.4% 16.7% 
Other Americas 223 251 200 200 500 500 
Total Americas         28,137      30,317      33,700      35,500      38,500      40,000  
   YoY %   8% 11% 5% 8% 4% 
       China         22,987      36,560      50,000      70,000      85,000    100,000  
   YoY %   59.0% 36.8% 40.0% 21.4% 17.6% 
India           1,508        1,917        2,500        3,000        4,000        5,000  
   YoY %   27.1% 30.4% 20.0% 33.3% 25.0% 
Japan         28,680      25,110      28,000      30,000      31,000      32,000  
   YoY %   -12.4% 11.5% 7.1% 3.3% 3.2% 
South Korea         19,424      21,307      23,500      24,000      25,000      26,000  
   YoY %   9.7% 10.3% 2.1% 4.2% 4.0% 
Taiwan           3,368        5,457        6,000        6,500        7,500        9,000  
   YoY %   62.0% 10.0% 8.3% 15.4% 20.0% 
Thailand           4,028        3,221        4,200        5,000        6,000        7,000  
   YoY %   -20.0% 30.4% 19.0% 20.0% 16.7% 
Other Asia/Australia           4,650        5,235        5,800        6,000        6,500        7,000  
Asia/Australia         84,645      98,807    120,000    144,500    165,000    186,000  
   YoY %   17% 21% 20% 14% 13% 
       Czech Republic           1,040        1,337        1,800        2,000        2,300        2,600  
   YoY %   28.6% 34.6% 11.1% 15.0% 13.0% 
France           2,956        2,161        2,300        2,400        2,600        2,800  
   YoY %   -26.9% 6.4% 4.3% 8.3% 7.7% 
Germany         17,528      18,297      19,500      19,500      20,000      21,000  
   YoY %   4.4% 6.6% 0.0% 2.6% 5.0% 
Italy           4,402        4,701        4,800        5,000        5,200        5,500  
   YoY %   6.8% 2.1% 4.2% 4.0% 5.8% 
Spain           2,005        2,764        3,000        3,500        3,600        3,800  
   YoY %   37.9% 8.5% 16.7% 2.9% 5.6% 
United Kingdom           2,943        2,486        2,500        3,000        3,200        3,500  
   YoY %   -15.5% 0.6% 20.0% 6.7% 9.4% 
Other Europe         10,344      11,538      12,100      11,600      12,100      15,800  
Total Europe         41,218      43,284      46,000      47,000      49,000      55,000  
   YoY %   5% 6% 2% 4% 12% 
       Africa 393 733 800 850 900 1,000
   YoY %   87.0% 9.0% 6.0% 6.0% 11.0% 
Not specified by countries           4,953        4,991        4,500        5,000        5,500        6,000  
Total       159,346    178,132    205,000    232,850    258,900    288,000  
   YoY %   11.8% 15.1% 13.6% 11.2% 11.2% 
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Figure 27. Annual supply of industrial robots by region  Figure 28. Annual supply of robots to China 
 
 
 
Source: IFR World Robotics 2014  Source: : IFR World Robotics 2014 
 
Figure 29. Total robot density (per 10,000 workers) in 2013  Figure 30. Robot density (per 10,000 workers) in auto industry in 2013 
 
 
 
Source: IFR, Citi Research  Source: IFR, Citi Research 
 
China Rebalance to Drive Factory Automation Boom 
Labour costs in China are rising faster than productivity and Citi’s China Economics 
team believes the country is showing signs of losing its cost competitiveness. 
China’s unit labour cost has been growing since 2000, indicating that average 
wages were rising faster than productivity, and the pace has only accelerated since 
then. Meanwhile, labour productivity growth has been decelerating in recent years. 
In Figure 31, we chart the historical average wage in China vs. the US, along with 
their 15-year CAGRs. China wages have been increasing at a 13.7% CAGR since 
1995, eroding the cost advantage of offshore manufacturing vs. the US, which has 
only seen 3.5% wage inflation. Meanwhile, the working age population in China is 
predicted to fall dramatically over the next decades (Figure 32). 
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Figure 31. US vs. China wage growth  Figure 32. China working age population (15-64) (% Total) 
 
 
 
Source: Citi Research, Social Security Administration  Source: World Bank 
 
As a result, automation is a new focus and a new strategic area in China’s 12th Five-
Year Plan. In a Xinhua report in October 2014, the deputy director of the State 
Engineering Research Center for Robotics said that there were more than 30 robot 
factories being built in China, with about 420 so-called “robot enterprises”. 
China has now replaced the US as the world’s largest market for automation and it 
is expected to maintain its rapid growth. Industry consultant ARC forecasts high 
growth in a range of Industrial automation segments in China as all being double 
digit. A different source, GCIS, expects CAGR during 2010-15E to be 16.5% for the 
whole automation sector in China combined with industrial robotic growth at the 
fastest rate of around 19%. Drivers of this growth include: (1) rising wages; (2) 
difficulties in hiring a sufficient number of trained and capable employees; (3) rapid 
staff turnover; (4) work environment improvements; (5) growth in auto 
manufacturing; and (6) concerns about a “peaking out” of the workforce.  
US Manufacturing Renaissance 
Could manufacturing within the US economy be bottoming? Manufacturing was 
once a powerhouse of the US economy, generating roughly a third of total economic 
output in the early 1950s and 1960s. However, steady erosion has taken place 
since then, as the US shifted to a more services-driven economy at the expense of 
manufacturing jobs.  
While manufacturing output in pure dollar terms has grown at a steady pace, the 
sector as a percentage of national GDP has fallen from over 35% in the 1950s 
down to around 12% in 2011, illustrating the shift towards a services-driven 
economy, away from manufacturing and away from US shores. However, the rate of 
decline has stalled in the past decade, likely having bottomed out and achieved its 
minimum potential share of the economy. If conditions optimise in the near-term, the 
US could see a resurgence in the contribution of manufacturing output to total GDP, 
though it is unlikely that it will ever recover to pre-1980 levels. 
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Figure 33. US manufacturing output and its percentage of US GDP 
 
Note: US manufacturing output shown in 2005 dollars. 
Source: Citi Research, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Many manufacturing decisions are driven by the idea that production has essentially 
become a commodity to be sourced at the lowest cost. The US remains one of the 
most expensive countries in terms of labour cost, with hourly wages several times 
higher than emerging market competitors. However, wage inflation in developing 
countries like China is beginning to erode their cost advantage, though it will likely 
be at least a decade before wages in these regions reach the levels of developed 
country counterparts. At a 14% 8-year CAGR, wage inflation in China is steadily 
eroding its cost advantage. That said, average hourly manufacturing compensation 
in China is still over 8x cheaper than in the US. 
Figure 34. Global hourly manufacturing compensation (USD)  Figure 35. US vs global average manufacturing productivity 
 
 
 
Note: China’s CAGR is over 8 years. All other listed CAGRs are for 14 years. 
The Global Average metric is an average of 19 developed and developing countries 
around the world. 
Source: Citi Research, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 Note: Output shown in 2005 US dollars. Global Average represents mean of 
developed countries only. 
Source: Citi Research, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
The US is still leading in terms of manufacturing productivity. When adjusted for 
inflation, the productivity levels of the US labour force is considerably above the 
global average and the differential has only widened over time. As developing 
countries observe their labour costs rise from wage inflation, global manufacturers 
could begin seeking more efficient and productive workers, a trend that could prove 
advantageous to the US labour pool. Productivity levels of the US labour force have 
remained consistently above the global average, and the differential has only further 
widened over time. Because of this, we believe the US will benefit from reshoring 
and investment in new manufacturing capacity.  
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The Boston Consulting Group Manufacturing Survey suggests that more American 
companies are weighing the decision to manufacture in the US again. Figure 36 and 
Figure 37 provide a snapshot of the survey published in the Wall Street Journal. 
Figure 36. Q: Given the fact that China’s wage costs are expected to 
grow 15-20% per year, do you expect your company will move 
manufacturing to the US? 
 Figure 37. Q: Please rank the most important factors you consider 
when deciding where to locate production for products consumed in 
the US 
 
 
 
Source: Boston Consulting Group Manufacturing Survey, Feb 2012, WSJ  Source: Boston Consulting Group Manufacturing Survey, Feb 2012, WSJ 
 
We highlight in Figure 38 several examples of manufacturing investment in the US 
from both domestic and international industrial companies. This illustrates the 
theme of a global flow of capital into the US sector; the new facilities have not only 
increased the activities of multinational companies within the US, but have also 
added thousands of manufacturing sector jobs in the country. With this comes an 
increase in automation and more efficient production resources. There are now 
~225,000 operational robots in US-based factories, placing the US second only to 
Japan in terms of robot use. One driver of the shift to robotics in North America has 
been the increase in capex investments by automotive original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) and component suppliers, which allocate about 50% of their 
spending on robots. There has also been a growing application of robots in other 
non-auto industries, such as metalworking and life sciences/biomedical. This 
notable and broad-based growth in robotic equipment could further increase US 
manufacturing productivity, though it could come at the expense of manufacturing 
jobs as more production becomes automated. 
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Figure 38. Reshoring examples in recent years 
Company Products Investment Location From-To 
Year 
(announced) Jobs Reshore/New 
Apple Mac products $100 mn Texas, US China-US 2012 
 
Reshore 
Caterpillar Small construction machinery - Georgia and Texas, US Japan-US 2011 > 1,000 Reshore 
Celebriduck Toys - - 
 
2012 50 Reshore 
Farouk Systems Hair Dryers - - China-US 2009 1,500 Reshore 
Ford Cars $6,200 mn US 
 
2011 12,000 New+Reshore 
GE Appliances $1,000 mn Kentucky, US China-US 2012 c. 1,000 Reshore 
K'nex Toys - Pennsylvania, US China-US 2020 25-30 Reshore 
Lenovo PC Manufacturing - North Carolina, US 
 
2012 100 Reshore 
Masterlock 
 
- Wisconsin, US 
 
2012 100 Reshore 
Motorola Cellphones - Texas, US 
 
2012 2,500 New+Reshore 
NCR ATM manufacturer - Georgia, US 
 
2009 c. 3,000 Reshore 
Nissan Cars (Sentra model) - Mississippi, US Mexico-US 
 
1,000 Reshore 
Oracle Data centre services & storage systems - Oregon, US Mexico-US 
 
430 Reshore 
Philips Shaver production - Drachten, Netherlands China-Netherlands 2011 - Reshore 
Selected Furniture Furniture - Indiana, US China-US 
 
40 Reshore 
Trellis Earth Products Bioplastic goods  $8.3 mn New York, US China-US 2013 189 Reshore 
United Technologies Elevators - South Carolina, US Mexico-US 2012 360 Reshore 
Whirlpool Small appliances $40  mn Ohio, US China-US 2014 400 Reshore 
Whirlpool KitchenAid hand mixers - South Carolina, US China-US 2012 25 Reshore 
 
Source: Citi Research, Company, WSJ, Huffington Post 
 
Robots and Japan 
Data from the Japan Robot Association (JARA) show that in 2013 the Japanese 
market for robots was worth ¥402 billion ($4bn). Overall shipment value fell 4% 
year-over-year, with the biggest drop seen in chip mounters down by 18%. In 2014 
we think the market grew by over 20%, to close to ¥500 billion ($4.6bn), with CAGR 
of more than 10% expected over the next few years, as per volume forecasts made 
by the IFR. On a regional basis the largest and fastest growing market for the 
Japanese robot makers is China which now accounts for approximately 25% of total 
demand with the largest and most significant end user segment said to be the auto 
industry. 
The largest makers of industrial robots in Japan are Fanuc and Yaskawa, with 2014 
revenues of about ¥170 billion (+20% year-on-year) and ¥140 billion (+16%), 
respectively. Other smaller suppliers include Kawasaki Heavy, Nachi Fujikoshi and 
Daihen. However, we note that industry data from the JARA also includes chip 
mounters, which do not meet most people’s idea of a robot, and it is worth 
highlighting that revenues at Fuji Machine in 2014 grew by about 5%, to ¥52 billion, 
with other large mounter makers including Panasonic Factory Solutions, JUKI and 
Yamaha. On the component side, Fanuc and Yaskawa both use in-house made 
servo motors and controllers but there are a wide range of Japan-based component 
suppliers such as Nabtesco (with its 60% share in precision speed reducers); 
Harmonic Drive (a smaller, niche player in precision speed reducers which is also 
partly owned by Nabtesco); THK (roller bearings); and Obara (a leading maker of 
welding guns). 
Including chip mounters, data from the JARA showed that in Japan the auto industry 
made up ~35% of the value of industrial robot demand in the third quarter of 2014. 
This is relatively low compared to the US where the auto industry is said to make up 
about half of total demand. Yaskawa suggest that maybe 70% or more of its total 
industrial robot shipments are to the auto industry but this ratio is closer to 80% in 
China. It is quite clear that the challenge for Yaskawa, Fanuc and other robot 
makers in China is to expand applications in the non-auto industry. 
Japan and its robot industry 
Japanese names also dominate the supply 
chain 
Auto industry is about one-third of demand 
in Japan, half in the US but maybe three-
quarters in China 
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One reason for the relatively low dependence of the auto industry in Japan is the 
simple fact that current production capacity is over 10 million, while production in 
2014 was around 9.5 million units, including exports. As shown below, helped in part 
by the weak yen, demand for robots from the auto industry has seen a recovery 
over the past three quarters but on an annual basis demand is still well below the 
pre-Global Financial Crisis level. At the same time, the domestic auto industry 
already has one of the highest robot densities globally (1,520 units per 10,000 
workers) compared to only 214 in all other industries. 
Figure 39. Annual demand for robots from the auto industry in Japan  Figure 40. Quarterly demand for robots from the auto industry in Japan 
 
 
 
Source: JARA, Citi Research  Source: JARA, Citi Research 
 
In terms of the impact of robots on employment, the relationship is complicated. 
Using Yaskawa as an example, visiting their robotics plant in Jiangsu (China) we 
recently saw a plant where monthly production is being ramped up towards 500 
units but there were only a handful of robots being used to tighten screws and in the 
paint shop. As of late November 2014, the plant employed 190 people and was 
producing ~320 units/month. However, it is clear that more people will be employed 
to cope with the expected increase in output. In contrast, the company told us 
recently that at its new #3 robot plant in Kita Kyushu (Japan) they have managed to 
reduce workers at one assembly process by about 80% (from 20 to only 2-3), and 
have re-assigned these workers. Similarly, their dual-arm robots are being used on 
the assembly line at their domestic servo motor plant in Iruma (Saitama) with the 
specific aim of reducing higher cost employees. 
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Autonomous Robots 
Industrial robots are an exciting opportunity, however, it is in the coupling of the 
advanced sensors and actuators in industrial robots to machine learning algorithms 
to create autonomous robots that the most profound impact upon employment will 
be found. Many tasks have remained non-automatable by virtue of the difficulty of 
encoding the tacit knowledge we hold about how to interact with and manipulate our 
physical environment. For example, when navigating in a vehicle, we draw upon a 
rich knowledge of the automotive environment: we recall landmarks, interpret road 
signs and account for recent changes due to construction or snowfall in order to 
determine where we are in space. We might even use deep knowledge of culture 
and society in order to inform our judgment: for example, a dirt track is unlikely to 
lead to a supermarket, and a bus is most probably heading to or from a major 
settlement. However, in recent times, this complex tacit knowledge has not 
prevented the automation of driving: the Google self-driving car was licensed to 
drive in the US state of Nevada in 2012. 
The explanation for how human tacit knowledge was sidestepped is firstly found in the 
availability of increasingly instrumented vehicles. Mass-production vehicles, such as 
the Nissan LEAF, contain on-board computers and advanced telecommunication 
equipment that render the car as potentially a fly-by-wire robot.65 Advances in sensor 
technology mean that vehicles are likely to soon be augmented with even more 
advanced suites of sensors. These will permit an algorithmic vehicle controller to 
monitor its environment to a degree that exceeds the capabilities of any human driver: 
they are not subject to distraction, have the ability to simultaneously look both 
forwards and backwards, and can natively integrate camera, GPS and LIDAR data. 
The big data provided by these improved sensors are offering a substitute to human 
tacit knowledge. Firstly, many modern vehicles offer Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS) that draw upon sensor data to provide adaptive cruise control, 
automated braking and even automated parallel parking. Further, the use of sensors 
to create three-dimensional maps of road networks has allowed for the automation 
of navigation; Google's driverless cars use an array of sensors to gather inch-
precision readings of its environment costing over $150,000.66 On-board algorithms 
can then compare a vehicle's current environment against prior maps stored on the 
vehicle in order to determine its location. Modern approaches store maps that 
characterise the different appearance of the environment throughout all the 
changing seasons (e.g. after snowfall).67 Machine learning techniques have also 
been developed to identify unexpected changes to the road network, such as those 
due to road construction.68 Many auto manufacturers are expecting to be able to 
offer autonomous vehicles between 2020 and 2025.69 
Given their superior sensing capabilities, algorithms are thus potentially safer and 
more effective drivers than humans. This is no trivial contribution: road fatalities are 
within the top 10 global causes of death, with human error responsible for more 
than 90% of traffic accidents.70 There are further potential contributions from 
autonomous vehicles: 20% of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on the road are due 
to inappropriate accelerations, while 2% of US GDP is wasted because of 
congestion. If robotic vehicles join the Internet of Things, we can envisage a 
networked fleet of vehicles whose inter-communication and decentralised planning 
may be able to tackle these problems. 
                                                          
65A fly-by-wire robot is a robot that is controllable by a remote computer. 
66Guizzo (2011). 
67Churchill and Newman (2012). 
68Mathibela, Osborne, Posner, and Newman (2012). 
69Citi GPS (2014). 
70ibid 
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Autonomous Vehicles: Transforming Mobility as We Know 
It 
Automated vehicles offer potentially wide-ranging societal and business benefits 
from improved safety, improved fuel economy, new forms of mobility and the 
unlocking of time spent in the vehicle. As outlined in our report Citi GPS: The Car of 
the Future, a safer and more convenient vehicle will likely become less expensive 
and more enjoyable to operate. Eventually, fully automated vehicles and new forms 
of mobility services might allow greater access to cars for consumers who either 
cannot or do not drive. As cars become connected machines that can “see” and 
learn, road efficiencies could increase—think high-speed highways. Cars will be 
able to share their positions, experiences and driving tips with each other. New 
forms of human-machine interfaces, such as augmented reality, could completely 
change the way we interact with our surroundings.  
Despite major advancements in automotive safety systems throughout the past 20 
years, road fatalities still claim over 1 million lives around the world each year 
(Figure 41). In the U.S. alone, annual fatalities top 30,000. The outlook is 
unfortunately even grimmer considering the aging population and the increasingly 
connected (i.e. distracted) driver. By 2030, road fatalities are poised to rank in the 
top 5 causes of death globally. Why should driving be this unsafe?  
It is estimated that 93% of US accidents are caused by human error, with Europe 
sporting a similar ratio. Alcohol remains a major US contributor involving ~30% of 
fatal crashes. Speeding is also a major factor at ~30%, driver distraction ~20%, lane 
keeping ~14% and failure to yield ~11%. It is estimated that if a driver is afforded an 
extra ½ second of response time, roughly 60% of accidents could be avoided or 
mitigated. So why should driving a car be this unsafe when the root of the problem 
is concentrated in driver error and impairment?  
Key Drivers of ADAS Demand 
We see three core drivers of future ADAS demand: 
1. Regulations: In terms of regulation, the EU new car assessment program is 
leading the way by essentially requiring all vehicles to have ADAS by 2017 to 
achieve a 4-star rating on automatic emergency braking. We expect US 
regulation to be solidified over the next few years as well.  
2. Possible Future Insurance Savings: As ADAS penetration rises and begins to 
prove out in real-world reductions in claim frequency/severity, the potential for 
lower insurance premiums might also accelerate ADAS demand.  
3. Consumer Value: Safety ranks highly in consumer preference surveys and 
there is evidence that consumers are willing to pay premiums for a ‘value 
bucket’ of ADAS convenience applications – adaptive cruise control, traffic jam 
assist and soon automated highway piloting. 
  
Itay Michaeli 
US Autos & Auto Parts Analyst 
Phil Watkins 
European Autos Analyst 
Figure 41. Global auto fatality stats 
 Fatalities/ 1,000 vehicles 
United States 15 
Germany 7 
Japan 7 
South Korea 26 
  
China  36 
India 315 
Thailand  119 
Brazil 71 
 
Source: Autoliv company reports 
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ADAS Migration to Automated Vehicles 
Autonomous vehicles tend to be grouped into categories depending on the level of 
automation and driver involvement. ADAS tends to be considered Level 1—
sensor/software provides assistance but the driver is driving as usual. Level 2 
includes things like automated highway piloting where the driver is required to 
monitor the system as the primary operator of the vehicle even as the vehicle 
performs autonomous task. This is the next stage that’s likely to sweep the industry 
over the next 1-3 years. Level 3 is full automation where the driver doesn’t have to 
monitor the system but must still be engaged enough to take control after a brief 
warning (maybe 10 seconds). Think of the car driver playing the role of an airplane 
pilot. Level 3 is likely 4-8 years away but is already deep into the development 
process.  
The final level — Level 4 — is a fully autonomous driverless vehicle. Most 
expectations peg this becoming reality in the early/mid-2020s. Beyond technical and 
cost hurdles, driverless vehicles pose challenges from a regulatory, legal and 
security perspective. There’s a healthy debate around Level 3 vs. Level 4 vehicles 
— will drivers even want to give up the joy of driving? But what about mobility 
models like driverless tax-speeds (particularly at a safer low-speed) or mileage 
efficiencies in the fleet as cars start operating without occupants? And what’s the 
cost premium for going from Level 3 to Level 4? It’s clearly early to fully tackle all of 
these questions, but we do believe that there are some compelling use cases for 
the eventual driverless vehicle, particularly in fleets and 2nd/3rd car replacements. 
Google’s efforts in this area will undoubtedly be monitored closely and in doing so 
likely establish greater consumer awareness of ADAS and autonomous vehicles.  
Figure 42. Phases of automated driving technology 
Now ADAS: A critical line of defence but doesn’t drive the vehicle 
 
Leap 1: 1-3 years 
(2015-2017) 
All ADAS + Automated braking, Automated throttle, Automated steering with 
forward vision and GPS connectivity. 
Key App = Auto Highway Piloting. 
 
Leap 2: 4-8 Years 
(2018-2022) 
Car can accelerate/brake/steer by itself through transitions, lane changes, 
intersections, country roads and cities. 
Drivers operate like today’s pilots do; standing by to take over in case of 
emergency or system failure. 
 
Final Leap:  
(2022+) 
Driverless car. Versus Leap 2/3, key issues relate to legislation, security and 
incremental cost vs. consumer demand. We see a strong case for low-speed 
applications like taxis and car-pooling, but the mass adoption case is unclear yet. 
 
 
Source: Company Reports, Citi Research 
 
 
 
  
ADAS is moving through different categories 
depending on the level of automation and 
driver involvement over the next 8 years 
Fully autonomous driving is not expected to 
be a reality until the early/mid-2020s 
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Autonomous Robots Outside the Auto Industry 
This emerging technology in automation will affect a variety of transportation and 
material moving jobs. Agricultural vehicles, forklifts and cargo-handling vehicles are 
imminently automatable, and hospitals are already employing autonomous robots to 
transport food, prescriptions and samples.71 Kiva Systems was bought by Amazon 
in 2012 for $775 million to automate its warehousing, with the company providing 
robots able to navigate their way around crowded warehouses. Further, the 
computerisation of mining vehicles is being pursued by companies such as Rio 
Tinto, seeking to replace expensive labour in remote Australian mine-sites.72 If such 
vehicles become commonplace, they will provide a rich resource of big data 
gathered by sensors that may have many knock-on effects for employment. For 
example, law enforcement may be affected by the recordings made by vehicles 
near crime scenes. 
Improved machine intelligence is behind other advances in robotics. Baxter, a 
$22,000 general-purpose robot, provides a well-known example. The robot features 
an LCD display screen displaying a pair of eyes that provide an expressive reaction 
to user input. Baxter is able to learn new manual tasks by having a human worker 
guiding its robotic arms through the motions that will be reproduced in completing 
the task. Baxter then memorises the patterns of the motions and can communicate 
that it has understood its new instructions.73 OC-Robotics' robotic snake arm is 
unique in its ability to manipulate and explore cramped environments. However, its 
flexibility comes at the cost of increased difficulty in control: it is only advances in 
machine intelligence that permit its application to plant maintenance. 
As robot costs decline and technological capabilities expand, robots can thus be 
expected to gradually replace human workers in a wide range of low-wage service 
occupations. Alarmingly, it is in these occupations that most US job growth has 
occurred over the past decades:74 robotic automation may cause considerable 
disruption to US employment. 
Autonomous Mining 
Contrary to other sectors such as Automotive, where our Autos team believe that 
driverless vehicles won’t be commercially viable until 2025, autonomous mining 
equipment is available “here and now”, and the incentives to go autonomous are 
big. Labour is one of the biggest cost drivers for a big miner, contributing to over 
30% of a miner’s cash cost. There is also the aspect of safety. Not only is this 
important in itself, but the safest mines are often the most productive. The adoption 
so far has been slow, with surface technologies only recently commercially viable. 
Driverless underground technology has been in place since the 1960s, when 
LKAB’s Kiruna iron ore mine in Sweden (considered the world’s largest modern iron 
ore mine) started using driverless underground trains. The presentation of the first 
fully autonomous drill rig, a year ago, by Atlas Copco and Rio Tinto, added to 
already autonomous trucks/haulers in surface mining, closing the technology gap 
further with underground technologies, with now only excavators still in need of 
manned control. Telematics (condition monitoring) have been in place since the last 
peak in 2007, monitoring the performance of the equipment to avoid downtime, but 
the real savings visible is when machines can replace staff, contributing to pure 
overhead savings but also increasing productivity as autonomous machines move 
faster, are more precise, and cover longer distances. 
                                                          
71Bloss (2011). 
72Rio Tinto's computerisation efforts are advertised at 
http://www.mineofthefuture.com.au. 
73 MGI (2011). 
74 Autor and Dorn (2013). 
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The Numbers – Calculating the Benefit 
The biggest saving in applying autonomous technologies is undoubtedly through the 
possibility to cut labour costs, with over 30% of a miner’s cash costs stemming from 
staff. According to online media (Unmanned Systems News, Engineering and 
Mining Journal), it takes 4-5 drivers to operate a truck 24-hours, but up to 10 people 
in total once support staff are taken into account. Each driver is paid a salary on 
average of $120,000 per year, thus around half a billion dollars in cash costs for the 
operation of each truck (excluding the cost of support). According to an article in 
Wall Street Daily in May 2014, the population of autonomous trucks today is a mere 
0.5% of the 40,500 total global population of trucks. Our discussions with BHP 
suggest that one-tenth of trucks could be autonomous in the near future, whilst the 
most bullish comments suggest fully automated mines are a reality within the next 
10-15 years (according to Unmanned Systems News and Science and Technology 
World).  
A simple calculation of the benefits just from cutting down staff (ignoring the 
increase in productivity) looks as follows:  
According to a study by Deloitte on the economics of autonomous mining, 
introducing an autonomous truck could reduce the number of operators by 75%, i.e. 
1-2 operators are sufficient instead of 4-5 today. This implies a $360,000 reduction 
in cash costs, or $1.4 billion in total assuming 10% of the truck population is 
autonomous (Figure 43). A cost reduction of $1.4 billion is meaningful and 
compares to about $8 billion of total savings from the majors achieved so far and 
$35 billion of cost headwinds over the last decade.  
On the productivity gains and other costs such as maintenance, John Meech at the 
University of British Columbia in Canada presented his findings in the paper 
“Simulation of Autonomous Mine Haulage Trucks” in 2012, which showed a 15-20% 
increase in output, 10-15% decrease in fuel consumption and an 8% reduction in 
maintenance costs, by shifting to autonomous haulers. Compared to autonomous 
drill rigs, this is interesting, as Sandvik and Flanders have presented figures 
showing that autonomous drill rigs can increase productivity by near double the 
level of autonomous haulers — by 30%, and in some cases by 60% when shifting to 
autonomous drilling (Figure 44). 
Figure 43. Implied cost savings by adopting autonomous trucks 
     Truck population (units)  
 No of drivers 
per truck 
Salary per 
driver ($) 
Cash costs 
per truck 
($m) 
Savings per 
truck ($m) 
Manual Autonomous Total 
savings 
($bn) 
Today 4-5 120,000 600,000  40,500 203  
Implied 1-2 120,000 240,000 360,000 36,450 4,050 1.4 
 
Source: Citi Research, Deloitte, University of British Columbia 
 
We can see $1.4 billion of savings from 
introducing full autonomy into just 10% of 
existing mining trucks, a meaningful number 
against total operating expenditure 
reductions of $8 billion so far and $35 billion 
of cost headwinds over the last decade 
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Figure 44. Estimated productivity increase shifting to fully autonomous trucks and drill rigs 
 
Source: Citi Research, Sandvik, Flanders, University of British Columbia 
 
Mine Automation – Today and the Future 
To date, most automation in the mine has been focused on components and sub-
systems and at a relatively small scale to the number of mines and processing 
plants. The focus so far has been on telematics (condition monitoring) and 
traditional process automation technologies applied in downstream operations. 
Telematics have been in place since 2007 across most major mines monitoring the 
performance of the equipment to avoid downtime. These “asset health” systems 
generate data onboard the equipment which is streamed wirelessly to evaluators 
based at the miners’ operations centres, who analyse and take steps to maximise 
the operational effectiveness of individual pieces of equipment. Downstream 
operations have traditionally been at the centre of mine automation with process 
automation in crushers, grinders, and smelters in place for the last two decades, 
and traditional process automation technologies with distributed control systems 
(DCS) controlling and optimizing the productivity at different plants, and the 
flexibility of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) also more recently being 
integrated to offer a more hybrid automation offering. 
The focus today is to build a fully autonomous mining system that can carry out 
tasks with minimal or no human control. Such development is naturally much more 
advanced, particularly upstream, as mining machines move around and are often in 
complex and hazardous environments. 
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3D Printing 
3D printing, also known as "additive manufacturing", has been around since the 
1980s. Relative to traditional manufacturing techniques such as injection moulding 
or CNC milling, 3D printing is slower, has poorer finish quality and is more 
expensive per item. However, 3D printing requires less cost, time, and expertise to 
create a small number of new items and it obviates the need for expensive retooling 
to manufacture new products. It hence has traditionally found value in prototyping 
new designs, and for some high-value, low-volume products. The recent 
significance of additive manufacturing is found in its democratisation and 
automation of manufacturing tasks. 3D printing is able to make direct use of designs 
produced using CAD (computer-aided design) software to manufacture even 
complex geometries, whereas other manufacturing techniques demand detailed 
expertise to specify tooling paths. With an increasingly networked society, 
appropriate designs are readily shared or purchased, allowing even non-experts to 
begin 3D printing. Hence 3D printing provides a connection from the digital world to 
a flexible means of physical manufacturing, reducing the need for manufacturing 
workers. 3D printing technologies have recently been extended to produce items in 
plastics, glass, paper, ceramics and even metal. Growing demand has led to 
dramatic reductions in the size and cost of 3D printing devices, yet furthering their 
broad adoption, with printers now available for as little as $500 and able to 
comfortably fit on a workbench. 
Clearly, 3D printing will play a role in the future of manufacturing. It is capable of 
producing products unachievable by any other means, including those that 
comprise mixtures of materials. For example, its ability to create complex 
geometries is being used by General Electric to print components for its next 
generation LEAP engine. As such, it is likely to generate employment in niche 
manufacturing industries. It will enable nimble just-in-time manufacturing that is able 
to respond quickly to new demand. These demands could be rapidly determined 
using big data analysis enabled by the IoT and an increasingly networked society. 
Crucially, 3D printing is well suited to personalisation: products will be increasingly 
tailored to a customer's preferences, both explicitly stated and inferred from their 
data. 
This personalisation comes to the fore in medical and dental applications, allowing 
components tailored to detailed body measurements. The industry is beginning to 
adopt 3D printing for commercial purposes: in particular, 3D printing is core to the 
manufacturing process of both Phona, manufacturer of hearing aids, and Align, 
manufacturer of Invisalign dental braces. Personalisation is also the driver behind 
the nascent industry that is starting to use 3D printing for clothing, such as 
Electroloom, who print using composites of synthetic and organic materials. For 
example, Continuum offers 3D printed bikinis, in nylon, bespoke to the body shape 
and measurements submitted by a customer through their website. 
The employment impact of these technologies, however, is unlikely to be of the 
same magnitude as others mentioned in this report. In the United States, for 
example, manufacturing has already been heavily automated, dropping from 30% of 
employment in 1950 to less than 6% today. The jobs that remain often involve a 
portfolio of skills, the management of many machines, for which one additional 
machine is unlikely to be able to substitute. Nor does the broad distribution of 
manufacturing devices, capable of personalisation, suggest a transformational 
change in employment. Similar developments were realised with the introduction of 
the home (2D) printer and sewing machine, which did not stop people from 
purchasing newspapers and clothes, respectively, from traditional suppliers. 
“Additive manufacturing”, or 3D printing, 
requires less cost, time and expertise than 
traditional manufacturing techniques 
3D printing is able to create complex 
geometries and is likely to generate 
employment in niche manufacturing 
industries 
There will be some employment replaced by 
3D printing, however it is unlikely to be of 
the same magnitude as other technologies 
mentioned in this report 
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The most significant influence of 3D printing, however, may also be the hardest to 
quantify. By lowering the barrier to manufacturing physical products, 3D printing 
may foster a new wave of innovation and the birth of new hardware startups, just as 
the lowering of the cost of producing software led to innovation and the birth of new 
software startups. 
Automating the Design Process 
From the beginning, the benefits of 3D printing were apparent in the industrial 
design process. 3D printing enabled “rapid prototyping” by speeding up the iterative 
design process. The technology allowed designers to iterate on designs in real time 
without the constraints of waiting for traditional job shop works to mill, mould or 
carve out physical prototypes. We are beginning to see the next phase with 
software vendors like Autodesk getting more involved in additive manufacturing 
(producing its own 3D printer). By more tightly integrating the hardware with 
software, we are beginning to see the next stage of additive design. Autodesk has 
applied computer learning into its CAD software, enabling engineers to simply 
determine what a product should do, leaving PCs and 3D printers to best determine 
the hows of design physics and assembly.  
Automation Benefits of 3D Printing could “Bring Production Home” 
Additive manufacturing also has the ability to drastically reduce the human 
involvement in the manufacture and assembly of end goods. Once a CAD design 
file has been converted into a 3D printer compatible STL file, the build process 
could theoretically be completely automated. 3D printing allows for complete 
freedom of design, enabling shapes previously unbuildable, including moving 
components within parts. The ability to print moving parts within a single build could 
potentially eliminate the need for factory workers to assemble the finished product. 
At this time, 3D printing is not completely absent human involvement; technicians 
are still needed to periodically monitor the fabrication process, empty build boxes, 
replenish consumables and perform some post processing (remove excess build 
material and in some instances polish items). However, even these basic manual 
processes are likely to be eliminated as printer OEMs are already trying to 
incorporate monitoring and continuous printing capabilities into systems (Makerbots 
now equipped with cameras, voxeljet has a built-in conveyor belt).  
Indirect Impact on Logistics 
As the total cost of ownership continues to fall, the eventual result could be the 
revival of local manufacturing. Bringing production closer to the end buyer does not 
specifically automate any distribution channels but we do see it streamlining many 
human elements needed to import goods from abroad (shipping, train trucking). As 
the ease of use continues to improve, an optimistic future could see 3D printers 
proliferate within the home. Some believe that manufacturers could one day simply 
sell consumers rights to design files similar to the iTunes model and put production 
of most consumer goods within reach of their fingertips.  
We are still in the early stages of truly understanding the impact of 3D printing on 
the world of manufacturing. The heightened investments in this sector have enabled 
industry leaders to push the boundaries of the technology to new levels. 
Researchers are already exploring concepts such as virtual surgical procedures, 
self-healing parts, self-assembly (4D printing) and even self-creation. The common 
denominator with each new application is the ability for machine to extricate the 
human element from the process.  
 
Kenneth Wong, CFA 
US IT Hardware & Software Analyst 
Human involvement in the manufacturing 
process has decreased with additive 
manufacturing 
As 3D printing lowers manufacturing costs, it 
may also lead to the revival of local 
manufacturing 
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4. The World of Work in the 21st 
Century 
What will the future of employment look like? Most past attempts to predict 
this have arguably been unsuccessful. In his famous chapter on machinery, 
published in the third edition of The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation in 1821, David Ricardo argued that the substitution of workers by 
machines may “render the population redundant.”75 In a similar vein, John 
Maynard Keynes predicted widespread technological unemployment as a 
result of mankind failing to find sufficient new uses for its labour as machines 
replace workers in old occupations and industries.76 
The obvious reason why this concern has not materialised is that the replacement 
of workers by machines will have effects on all product and factor markets. An 
increase in the efficiency of production which reduces the price of one product will in 
turn increase real income and thus increase demand for other goods.  
In short, technological progress has two competing effects on employment. As it 
substitutes for labour, there is a destruction effect, requiring workers to reallocate 
their labour, but there is also the capitalisation effect, as the demand for other goods 
and services increase, and new occupations and industries are created. 
Although the idea of technological unemployment did not materialise during the 20th 
century, there is growing concern that Keynes’ prediction may come true. What will 
happen in the 21st century remains to be seen, but it is clear that the potential scope of 
job automation is expanding and will inevitably continue to expand. Meanwhile, the jobs 
created by digital technologies have so far largely been confined to skilled workers. In 
this section, we highlight these developments and their potential implications. 
The Expanding Scope of Automation 
Historically, automation has been confined to routine tasks involving explicit rule-
based activities that can easily be specified in computer code.77 The term 
“computer”, for example, initially referred to an occupation stemming from the 
invention of calculus in the 18th century. With the advent of the electronic computer, 
the routine task of performing mathematical operations was transferred to 
machines, displacing human labour in the process.78  
Since then the potential scope of computerisation has increased dramatically, and 
will inevitably continue to do so. Algorithms for big data are now rapidly entering 
domains reliant upon pattern recognition and can readily substitute for labour in a 
wide range of non-routine cognitive tasks.79 Moreover, intelligent robots with 
enhanced senses and dexterity are now able to perform a much broader scope of 
non-routine manual tasks.  
This is changing the nature of work across occupations, industries and countries. 
With the improved sensing available to robots, jobs in transportation and logistics 
are now at risk of automation. Take the recent development in autonomous 
vehicles, for example, potentially making bus, truck and taxi drivers redundant.  
                                                          
75 Ricardo (1821). 
76 Keynes (1930). 
77 Autor et al. (2003). 
78 Grier (2013). 
79 Frey and Osborne (2013). 
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Although history tells us that one should be careful when making predictions about 
technological progress, we have a reasonably good idea about the type of tasks 
computers will be able to perform in the near future — not least since these 
technologies are already being developed, as described in Chapter 3, but are yet to 
be adopted on a larger scale.  
Occupations at Risk 
How significant will these developments be in terms of their employment impact? As 
shown in Figure 45, research by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, 
estimates that 47% of the US workforce is at risk of automation as a result of these 
trends.80 Although this number cannot be directly transferred to other countries, the 
occupations that are at risk will be the same across countries and regions, including 
a wide range of jobs in transportation, logistics, and office and administrative 
support.  
These findings speak to several trends we are currently witnessing in technology. 
Computerised cars are already being developed and augmenting vehicles with 
advanced sensors is becoming more cost-effective, making many jobs in 
transportation vulnerable. Algorithms for big data are also already taking over jobs 
that are reliant upon storing or processing information, suggesting that a growing 
share of office and administrative support jobs will soon be subject to automation. 
Figure 45. Distribution of BLS 2010 occupational employment over the probability of 
computerisation 
 
Source: Frey & Osborne (2013) 
 
                                                          
80 Frey and Osborne (2013). 
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More surprising perhaps, is the finding that the bulk of service occupations, where 
the most US job growth has occurred over the past decades, are now at risk. 
Already the market for personal and household service robots is growing by about 
20% annually — a trend that is likely to continue.81 As machines get better at 
performing tasks involving mobility and dexterity, the pace of displacement in 
service occupations is likely to increase even further. 
Although there is a growing popular perception that computers now mainly 
substitute for cognitive work, the victory of IBM’s Deep Blue computer over chess 
grandmaster Garry Kasparov, or Watson’s ability to outperform humans at US game 
show Jeopardy!, does not mean that most skilled jobs are now at risk. On the 
contrary, skilled jobs are relatively safe.  
Instead, as shown in Figure 46 and Figure 47, low-skill and low-income jobs are 
now for the first time most likely to be automated. This implies a break from the 
trends we have seen in the past. While 19th century manufacturing technologies 
largely substituted for skilled labour through the simplification of tasks, the computer 
revolution of the 20th century caused a hollowing-out of middle-income jobs. Our 
estimates thus predict a shift from the computerisation of middle-income jobs, to 
computers mainly substituting for low-income, low-skill workers over the next 
decades. 
Figure 46. Relationship between occupations at risk and education  Figure 47. Relationship between occupations at risk and wages 
 
 
 
Source: Frey & Osborne (2013)  Source: Frey & Osborne (2013) 
 
The common denominator for low-risk jobs is that they are intensive in social and 
creative skills. In particular, generalist occupations requiring knowledge of human 
heuristics, and jobs involving the development of novel ideas and artifacts, are not 
yet readily automatable. The reason is simple: computers do not yet have the 
human ability to engage in complex interactions, such as negotiating and 
persuading, and while they can now solve most crisp problems, they are not as 
good at developing original ideas. 
As a result, most management, business, and finance occupations, which are 
intensive in work requiring social skills, but also most jobs in education and 
healthcare, are not fully automatable. The same is true of occupations that involve 
developing original ideas, such as many jobs in arts, media, engineering and 
science.  
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Industries at Risk 
The expanding scope of automation promises future gains in productivity in a wide 
range of industries. In the same way the mechanised assembly line transformed 
manufacturing, allowing companies to substantially cut production costs, 
sophisticated algorithms and robots with enhanced dexterity are now transforming 
industries such as construction, healthcare, professional services and finance. 
To estimate the industry employment impact the expanding scope of automation 
may have, we matched our occupation level data to the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).82 The susceptibility of various industries to 
automation thus reflects the intensity of different occupations and their probability of 
automation. For example, while all Tax Examiners work in the Government industry, 
only 44% of Computer Programmers work in Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services. In fact, most occupations span across a wide range of industries. 
Figure 48. Employment share at risk by industry 
 Low Risk (%) Medium Risk (%) High Risk (%) Accommodation & Food Services 2.8% 10.5% 86.7% 
Administrative & Support Services 1.6% 36.2% 62.2% 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 75.6% 12.0% 12.3% 
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation 47.9% 12.5% 39.6% 
Construction 21.6% 19.8% 58.6% 
Educational Services 63.1% 19.7% 17.2% 
Finance & Insurance 28.9% 17.3% 53.7% 
Government 46.2% 30.6% 23.2% 
Health Care & Social Assistance 39.4% 25.0% 35.6% 
Information 51.6% 38.3% 10.1% 
Management of Companies & Enterprises 82.8% 6.2% 11.0% 
Manufacturing 19.9% 18.4% 61.7% 
Mining, Quarrying and Oil & Gas Extraction 7.8% 46.3% 45.9% 
Other Services (ex Public Admin) 44.9% 24.7% 30.4% 
Professional, Scientific & Technical Services 54.0% 10.9% 35.1% 
Real Estate and Rental & Leasing 0.7% 32.0% 67.2% 
Retail Trade 14.5% 18.9% 66.6% 
Self-Employed 60.4% 8.9% 30.7% 
Transportation & Warehousing 5.5% 19.4% 75.0% 
Utilities 40.3% 27.8% 31.9% 
Wholesale Trade 15.9% 18.4% 65.7% 
 
Source: Oxford Martin School 
 
As shown in Figure 48, the susceptibility to computerisation varies substantially 
across industries. In Accommodation & Food Services, as many as 87% of workers 
are at risk of automation, while only 10% of workers in Information are at risk. 
Although several occupations in Information, such as Motion Picture Projectionists 
and Broadcast Technicians are highly susceptible to computerisation, these only 
constitute a fraction of the industry’s total employment: 8,000 and 27,000 jobs, 
                                                          
82 This analysis considered total employment of 98 million workers, against the 138 
million considered in Frey and Osborne (2013). Available data from O*NET records 
employment in an industry if at least 10% of employment in an occupation is engaged in 
that industry, leaving some employment uncounted. For example, the breakdown for 
Electrical Engineers records that 38% work in Manufacturing, 31% work in Professional, 
Scientific and Technical Services and 10% work in Utilities, such that 21% of 
employment for Electrical Engineers is distributed amongst the other industries in an 
unspecified way. We assume that this unspecified distribution is not reflective of 
computerisability and that it does not introduce any systemic risk. 
Intelligent robots are now transforming 
industries such as construction, healthcare, 
professional services and finance 
The susceptibility of computerisation varies 
substantially across industries 
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respectively.83 By contrast, occupations such as Computer Network Specialists and 
Web Developers, of which many work in Information, already employ 143,000 and 
141,000 workers, respectively, and are expected to add another 94,200 jobs before 
2022, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) occupational 
projections. This illustrates an important challenge facing companies in most 
industries: as low-skill jobs are being replaced and new high-skill jobs created, they 
will need to invest substantially in up-skilling their workforce. 
Other industries that are at low-risk of automation include Management of 
Companies and Enterprise, and somewhat surprisingly Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
and Hunting, most likely reflecting that most jobs that can be automated in 
agriculture already have been. The potential scope for further automation is 
substantially larger in Manufacturing, where 62% of jobs are still at risk. 
No single industry is completely immune to the expanding scope of automation. 
Even in some relatively skilled industries such as Finance and Insurance, 54% of 
jobs are at risk. Traditional low productivity industries such as Healthcare, Education 
and Government are facing future transformations too. At a time when government 
budgets are under pressure, such productivity gains would be a blessing. 
Countries at Risk 
To be sure, some countries are better positioned to adapt to the expanding scope of 
automation than others. Because different occupational classifications exist across 
countries, however, meaningful direct comparisons are notoriously difficult to make. 
In a recent study, for example, Bruegel translated our findings for the US to 28 
European Union (EU) countries, using 22 (instead of 702) more aggregated 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) job categories for which 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) provides consistent data. Doing so, they 
find that 54% of EU jobs are at risk of automation, spanning 47% in Sweden and 
62% in Romania (see Figure 49).  
Nevertheless, while the ILO data used by Bruegel is comparable across the 
countries they examine, the relatively crude occupational classification being used 
is likely to be systematically upward biased. Because many occupations with very 
different probabilities of automation often fall into the same broader category, and 
the employment share in occupations that have a higher probability of automation is 
likely to be relatively low, the Bruegel study most likely overstates the share of jobs 
at risk relative to the US. This is also suggested by other studies using more 
detailed occupational classifications for single European countries. According to a 
study by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), examining 410 
detailed occupations, about 37% of jobs in Finland are at risk of automation. 
Similarly, when translating our findings to the United Kingdom, analysing 369 
occupations, we found that 35% of UK jobs are highly susceptible to automation, 
and in skilled places like London that figure is even lower (29.5%). 
                                                          
83 Based on BLS employment figures for 2012. 
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Figure 49. Employment share at risk by country 
  Study (Level of detail)   
Country Frey & 
Osborne 
(2013) 
Bruegel 
(2014) 
ETLA  
(2014) 
Frey & 
Osborne; 
Deloitte (2014) 
SSF 
 (2014) 
Unionen 
(2014) 
 702 
occupations 
22 
occupations 
410 
occupations 
369 
occupations 
109 
occupations 
353 
occupations 
Austria  54%     
Belgium  50%     
Bulgaria  57%     
Croatia  58%     
Czech Republic  54%     
Denmark  50%     
Estonia  54%     
Finland  51% 36%    
France  50%     
Germany  51%     
Greece  56%     
Hungary  55%     
Ireland  49%     
Italy  56%     
Latvia  51%     
Lithuania  52%     
Luxembourg  50%     
Malta  51%     
Netherlands  49%     
Poland  56%     
Portugal  59%     
Romania  62%     
Slovenia  53%     
Slovakia  55%     
Spain  55%     
Sweden  47%   53% 37% 
United Kingdom  47%  35%   
United States 47%      
 
Source: The Oxford Martin School 
 
While there are a number of measurement problems associated with comparing 
countries according to their susceptibility to automation, it is clear that differences 
across countries and regions exist. The Bruegel study, for example, finds a strong 
negative relationship between a country’s GDP per capita and the share of their 
workforce at risk of automation, suggesting that countries transition into jobs that 
are less susceptible to automation along the development path. In particular, 
developing countries are likely to find a larger share of their jobs at risk, as lower 
wages keep many jobs that are possible to automate from being displaced. 
However, as incomes rise and technological progress makes labour substitution 
cheaper, even these countries will eventually have to adapt. The challenge ahead 
for any country is managing this transition at a sufficient pace for workers to find 
new employment opportunities as existing jobs are being automated.  
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Technology and New Work 
Digital technologies do not only destroy jobs, but also create jobs in entirely new 
occupations and industries. For example, computer technology has recently given 
rise to many new occupations, such as database administrators and web designers. 
Beyond computer-related jobs, occupations such as that of the radiation therapist 
similarly underwent significant changes, following the arrival of new technologies. 
After the first magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine was patented in 1974, 
leading the way for the proliferation of MRI scanning techniques, a new 
occupational title emerged: MRI special procedures technologist, operating and 
monitoring diagnostic imaging equipment. Indeed, the more than 1,500 new job 
titles that appeared in the occupational classifications following the invention of the 
PC reflect a pervasive transformation of the world of work.84 
New technologies have also created entirely new industries. Consider the Video 
and Audio Streaming industry, which appeared as a new title in 2010, following a 
series of recent innovations — in 1999, Apple developed QuickTime, a programme 
capable of handling various video formats, and in 2002, Adobe introduced Flash, a 
streaming format that is used by YouTube.  
The Video and Audio Streaming industry is not an isolated example: Internet news 
publishers, Social Networking Services and Internet video broadcast sites are all 
new industry titles that are associated with the advent of the World Wide Web.85 
Figure 50. New industries emerging from digitisation 
Detailed Industry % of New Industry Titles % of U.S. Employment % with College degree Avg. Wage ($) 
Internet publishing and broadcasting and web search portals 85.7% 0.06% 69.6% $  81,138 
Electronic shopping 42.8% 0.08% 49.7% $  45,372 
Data processing, hosting, and related services 32.0% 0.08% 48.0% $  64,729 
Electronic auctions 66.6% 0.01% 52.2% $  47,257 
 
Source: Berger and Frey (2014b) 
 
Although there are a number of measurement problems associated with examining 
the share of jobs that stems directly from new technologies, new industry titles that 
emerge in official classifications as a result of new technologies becoming available, 
at least provide an indication. Thus, a recent study by Thor Berger and Carl Benedikt 
Frey used such data to systematically capture employment opportunities created by 
new industries of the 2000s in the United States. Their findings are quite revealing. 
First, the magnitude of new jobs created from the arrival of new technologies 
throughout the 2000s has been strikingly small: in 2010 only about 0.5% of the US 
workforce was employed in new industries that did not exist a decade earlier.86  
Second, workers in these industries are substantially better educated than the 
average population and earned much higher wages: the average wage for workers 
in new industries is more than twice the US median wage. For any given level of 
education, workers with a STEM degree are also more likely to work in new 
industries. 
Hence, in short, although technological progress continues to create new jobs, 
these have largely been confined to skilled workers. Cities and nations with a large 
pool of skilled workers have thus benefited disproportionally from recent 
technological change.  
                                                          
84 Berger and Frey (2014a). 
85 Berger and Frey (2014b). 
86 ibid 
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The Concentration of New Work and the Rise 
of Innovation Cities 
While it is clear that the arrival of digital technologies have created new employment 
opportunities, new work has become relatively concentrated over time. As a result, 
most people who have not followed the new jobs have not directly seen the benefits 
of their emergence. 
The concentration of new work largely stems from the shift towards tech industries 
and finance, where knowledge transmission is particularly important. The 
continuous renewal of prominent clusters like Silicon Valley is largely the result of 
workers frequently switching jobs, leading to the creation of new companies and 
industries.  
For example, about a year after Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory was founded 
in 1956, several of its engineers left and created a new company: Fairchild 
Semiconductor. Two of these would go on to form Intel in 1968. In the same way, 
frequent job-hopping and the pool of skilled workers has recently attracted a new 
generation of companies leading the digital revolution: Google, Facebook, eBay and 
LinkedIn, are all based in Silicon Valley. Similarly, Instagram, Dropbox, Uber, 
Internet Archive and Twitter are all located or began in San Francisco. 
The consequences of the concentration of new jobs and industries are particularly 
evident in America, where cities have fared very differently over recent decades. In 
his recent book The New Geography of Jobs, Enrico Moretti nicely illustrates the 
divergence across US cities, using the example of Visalia and Menlo Park — two 
cities that are about a three hour drive apart. Although the cities were not identical, 
they had similar crime rates and schools of comparable quality as recently as the 
1960s.87 Workers in Menlo Park were on average slightly better educated and 
earned somewhat higher wages. Today, the two cities are worlds apart. While 
Visalia has the second lowest percentage of college educated workers in America, 
half of Menlo Park’s residents have a college degree, and the city still keeps 
attracting new tech companies, including Facebook. 
In The World Is Flat, Thomas Friedman famously argued that the digital age would 
make location irrelevant.88 Yet so far the opposite has been true. The digital age has 
in fact been a chief driver of the Great Divergence between cities. According to a 
recent paper by Thor Berger and Carl Benedikt Frey, cities with larger pools of 
skilled workers before the advent of the Computer Revolution of the 1980s have 
been in a much better position to take advantage of new technologies, leading to a 
substantially faster shifting of workers into new occupations.89 
Meanwhile, old manufacturing cities such as Buffalo, Cleveland or Detroit have 
become increasingly associated with urban obsolescence as new economic 
powerhouses are replacing old ones. The growth of cities like Shenzhen, where the 
iPhone is assembled, almost perfectly mirrors the decline of US manufacturing 
locations. In short, the restructuring of global supply chains, enabled by 
improvements in information technology, and the rise of skilled innovation cities, has 
changed the world of work significantly. While nations have been converging, cities 
in the rich world have been diverging. 
                                                          
87 Moretti (2013). 
88 Friedman (2005). 
89 Berger and Frey (2014a). 
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For workers in the rich world, the digital age has thus been a mixed blessing. 
Although people living in skilled cities have benefited, many workers in old 
manufacturing cities have not. Furthermore, as skilled cities are becoming more 
attractive, rising house prices makes them less affordable places to live. This has 
implications particularly for the poor, who often cannot afford to relocate to places 
where new jobs are available — something that is evident from studies of both 
America and France.90  
Housing constraints can also provide constraints on growth. A recent study 
estimates that between 1964 and 2009 output in America was 13% below its 
potential, due to constraints to housing supply in skilled cities.91 Thus, so far, the 
digital economy has made geography more important, not less.  
Self-Employment: The New Normal? 
Yet in theory, the digital economy could make geography less important, and in 
some cases it has. For example, a recent story in the Financial Times featured a 
self-employed worker based in Dharavi — a slum in Mumbai — making around 
$20,000 annually selling goods through eBay.  
An important feature of the digital economy is that it allows even people in deprived 
areas to reach global markets, as even more traditional goods have become 
increasingly mobile. Etsy provides such an example, allowing local artisans to reach 
customers all over the world through its online platform. In addition to around 750 
workers employed in the company’s Brooklyn office, some 1 million self-employed 
artisan sellers have emerged worldwide.92 These entrepreneurs all take advantage 
of the opportunities provided by the digital economy, offering their crafts to the 
global market.  
At the same time, e-entrepreneurship typically requires less capital investment, 
while online platforms for crowdfunding make capital more accessible. In other 
words, digital technologies have made self-employment an option to a growing 
share of workers. This is reflected by the emergence of the “app economy”, which 
has grown substantially since Apple launched its app store in 2008. According to a 
recent estimate the app economy today provides work for more than 750,000 
Americans.93 94 
Yet, while self-employment has been on the rise since the turn of the century, its 
causes remain unclear. In Britain, the number of people in self-employment has 
increased by more than 30% since 2000, with the result that one in seven is self-
employed.95 In America, the rise of self-employment has been even more 
substantial, growing by nearly 50% over the same period.  
                                                          
90 Anderson et al. (2014); Gobillon, Selod and Zenou (2007). 
91 Moretti and Chang-Tai Hsieh (2014). 
92 The Economist (2014a). 
93 Progressive Policy Institute (2013). 
94 Citi’s Internet analyst estimates the “App Economy” grew 45% in 2014 to reach $29 
billion and could grow to $52.5 billion by 2017. Native apps, as opposed to web 
browsers, have become the primary means of consumption on mobile devices. Mobile 
apps make money from paid downloads, app marketing, app commerce and app 
advertising. Both Google and Apple share 70% of gross booking with app developers. 
While gaming apps and Facebook consume much of the time spent on apps today, 
productivity apps are growing quickly, suggesting a broadening of the use case for 
mobile phone apps. 
95 Dellot (2014). 
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Disentangling the reasons behind the surge in self-employment is difficult due to the 
limitations of the data. For example, some people do not report income from self-
employment, while others just do it on the side in addition to having a full-time job. 
Nevertheless, some evidence on the underlying drivers of self-employment exists. 
To be sure, unemployment is a part of the story. A recent study found a close link 
between the unemployment rate in a given American locality and the rate of new 
business startups.96 Similarly, according to a recent survey of Britain by the Royal 
Society of Arts and Populus, 27% of those who started up in the recessionary period 
of the last five years did so to escape unemployment. Yet, the largest increase in 
self-employment since 2008 has been in professional occupations, consisting 
mainly of relatively skilled workers. 
The growing skills gap may thus be another reason, causing employers to rely 
increasingly on contractors. Indeed, as digital technology becomes more heavily 
integrated in the daily operations of firms across a wide range of industries, digital 
literacy will become crucial for the vast majority of workers. Yet, according to the 
European Commission, some 47% of European workers have insufficient digital 
skills; 23% have none at all.97 
At the same time, self-employment is becoming more socially acceptable and thus 
increasingly a preference. In Britain, 84% reported that self-employment made them 
more content with their work. In another survey by the Resolution Foundation, 73% 
of respondents said their move into self-employment partially or largely reflected 
personal preference, although a growing minority indicated they had gone self-
employed because of a lack of alternative options.98 
The idea that workers should expect to stay with the same employer until retirement 
seems somewhat dated. While the recent surge in self-employment is clearly 
associated with unemployment, this is only one side of the story. The digital 
economy is making self-employment more attractive for skilled entrepreneurs, but 
also provides opportunities for less skilled workers in deprived areas: 
Freelancer.com and Elance-oDesk already connect 3.7 million businesses with 9.3 
million workers. As the economy is becoming increasingly digitised, self-
employment may even become the new normal. 
                                                          
96 Fairlie (2013) 
97 European Commission (2013). 
98 Resolution Foundation (2014). 
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5. Digital Transformation: Risks and 
Opportunities 
Like every technological revolution, the digital transformation entails risks 
and opportunities. By understanding the associated challenges, the risks can 
be mitigated, and by taking advantage of the opportunities, the benefits of 
digitisation can be maximised. This chapter seeks to shed some light on the 
digital transformation ahead in terms of related risks and opportunities.  
Risks 
Inequality 
The rise of inequality in the rich world is indisputable—both in terms of wealth and 
income. Oxfam in a recent report calculated that the richest 85 people on the planet 
in 2014 owned as much as the poorest half of humanity. While much has been 
written about the top 1%, the surge in income inequality among the other 99% is 
equally striking. Much of this rise can be explained by what economists refer to as 
skill-biased technology change, increasing the demand for educated workers. 
In America, the college premium began rising in the late 1970s — between 1980 
and 2005 about two thirds of the rise in earnings dispersion can be accounted for by 
the premium afforded to education. Cognitive skills, especially, are today rewarded 
across the labour markets of all 22 OECD economies, although there is substantial 
dispersion. In countries like Sweden, Norway and the Czech Republic, the premium 
is below 13%, while countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and 
Spain, exhibit premiums above 20%. 99  
At the same time, the proliferation of digital technologies has reduced the demand 
for workers in a wide range of manufacturing and clerking tasks. The result: a 
secular decline in employment in traditional middle-income jobs, accompanied by a 
structural shift in the labour market, with workers reallocating to low-income jobs 
that are less susceptible to automation, further worsening income inequality.100  
In addition, over the past three decades, the top 1% income share has more than 
doubled. A possible explanation for this is described by Sherwin Rosen in a 1981 
paper entitled The Economics of Superstars, arguing that technological changes 
allowing the best performers in a given field to serve a bigger market would lead to 
a ‘winner-take-all’ effect.101 This feature of the digital economy, allowing companies 
such as Google, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp to capture almost their entire 
market, would explain the growth of the share of income accruing to the top 1%.  
Yet, while other Anglo-Saxon countries have witnessed similarly sharp increases in 
the top 1% income share, there is substantial variation across countries: many other 
advanced countries such as Japan, Germany and France have seen much more 
modest increases in the top 1% income share.102 Thus, it seems that common 
factors such as technological change and globalisation cannot account solely for 
this phenomenon. The regulation of markets, tax policy, remuneration systems, and 
approaches to corporate governance that prohibits rent-seeking, all play a role.  
                                                          
99 Autor (2014) 
100 Autor and Dorn (2013); Goos et al. (2007). 
101 Rosen (1981). 
102 Alvaredo et al. (2013). 
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Furthermore, digital technologies make it easier to substitute labour for capital. 
Although such substitution helps productivity, it does not boost wages. Instead it 
merely enhances the capital share of income, leading to a higher concentration of 
wealth. As a result, while income inequality is on the rise, the concentration of 
wealth is also striking. According to a recent study the wealthiest 0.01% of American 
families now control 11.2% of total wealth: about the same share as back in 1916, 
which is an all-time high.103  
The relationship between wealth and income inequality across countries is however 
far from intuitive. In some countries like America, both are high, whereas places 
such as South Korea exhibit both low wealth and income inequality. Countries such 
as Switzerland and Denmark, on the other hand, have relatively low levels of 
income inequality, but also the highest levels of wealth inequality in the OECD.104 
Perfect equality may not be desirable. Financial gain is important to spur risky 
entrepreneurship and innovation. This means, as Arthur Okun famously argued, that 
societies must make trade-offs between equality and efficiency. Nevertheless, 
extreme inequality can also lead to inefficiencies. Not least since income inequality 
tends to translate into inequality in wealth, health, and exposure to crime.  
Furthermore, as highlighted in the recent book by Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson, Why Nations Fail, economic inequality often results in political inequality, 
where: “those with great wealth and easy access to politicians and policymakers will 
try to increase their power at the expense of society. That sort of hijacking of politics 
is a sure-fire way of undermining inclusive political institutions, and it is already 
under way in the US.” There are thus good reasons to be concerned by the rise of 
inequality. 
Automation, Inequality and the Equity Market 
The booming stock market is part of the inequality story, but is it associated with 
automation? Automation is a key driver of productivity growth — the amount of 
output produced per worker. In turn, productivity is the key driver of long-term 
economic growth. Economic growth is the key driver of long-term corporate 
earnings per share (EPS). And finally, EPS growth is the key to long-term stock 
market returns. Equity investors have been clear beneficiaries of the economic 
gains associated with automation. 
That’s the long-term story. But can we find evidence that accelerating automation is 
proving especially beneficial for shareholders right now? And are workers losing out 
as a result?  
Whether technological innovation is driving capital substitution for labour is 
notoriously difficult to measure. One potential measure is the progression of profits 
relative to the number of company employees. We have aggregated both for the 
non-Financial listed US companies represented in the MSCI US benchmark.105 We 
also show the same calculation for the MSCI EM Asia index, on which we comment 
more later. 
                                                          
103 Saez and Zucman (2014).  
104 The Economist (2014b). 
105 This reflects the largest (often multinational) companies that dominate the US stock 
market. It closely tracks the S&P benchmark. Like the S&P, it omits the employment 
decisions of smaller unlisted companies which are important drivers of the US payroll 
data. 
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The dominant US-listed non-Financial companies generated EBIT (i.e. earnings before 
interest and tax) of $1.3 trillion in 2013, up from $600 billion made 10 years earlier. 
These same US blue chip companies employ 24 million workers, up from 18 million in 
2003. That’s a much bigger increase in EBIT (+119%) than number of employees 
(+31%). As a result, the ‘profits productivity’ of the US stock market has risen sharply. 
EBIT per employee is up from $32,000 in 2004 to $53,000 in 2013 (Figure 51).  
Figure 51. Non-Financials EBIT/employee ($)  Figure 52. Non-Financials EBIT margin 
 
 
 
Source: Worldscope, Factset, Citi Research  Source: Worldscope, Factset, Citi Research 
 
Perhaps this reflects the impact of automation. US workers are being replaced by 
increasingly sophisticated machines. These machines don’t take sick-leave. They 
don’t ask for pay rises or take holidays. They don’t go on strike or demand better 
working conditions. Even the tax system is tipped in favour of machines — capital 
expenditure (capex) is tax-deductible in most countries. Hiring more workers usually 
involves paying more payroll taxes. 
We can find plenty of evidence to suggest that the bargaining position of US 
workers has deteriorated in recent years. Listed non-Financials EBIT are up 119% 
since 2003, but hourly earnings in US manufacturing are up only 22%. Profit share 
of GDP is up, wages share of GDP is down. Academic studies have attributed 
some, but not all, of this to automation.106 Lower rates of unionisation are also seen 
as a reason. Globalisation, especially the shift of low-skilled manufacturing jobs to 
Asia, is seen as another important driver. Overall, these factors seem to have been 
more helpful for shareholders than workers. Despite a lacklustre economic recovery 
since the financial crisis, US non-Financial profit margins are back around pre-crisis 
highs (Figure 52). 
We can then break the US market down by sector. Figure 53 shows that in 2013, 
with the oil price above $100/bbl, the Energy sector generated the highest income 
per employee. This highly profitable, automated and capital intensive industry 
earned $200,000 per employee, up 78% since 2003. Of course the subsequent 
collapse in the oil price will now be putting intense pressures on sector profits. Other 
industries which have seen a sharp increase in profitability per employee, perhaps 
indicating intensifying levels of automation, include Telecoms, Information 
Technology and Materials. 
                                                          
106 For a summary of the current debate around the labour share of GDP, please see 
Giovannoni (2014). 
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Towards the bottom of the profitability/employee ranking are the two Consumer 
sectors, although it is interesting to see that Consumer Discretionary (which 
includes Retail stocks) have seen a sharp rise in employee profitability (+71%) in 
the past 10 years. This may indicate a rising level of automation in a traditionally 
employee-heavy sector. 
Figure 53. US listed non-Financials: EBIT per employee (%)  Figure 54. US listed non-Financials : Employees vs. Capex 
 
 
 
Source: Citi Research, Factset, Worldscope  Source: Citi Research, Factset, Worldscope 
 
While we can identify shifts in employee profitability, the very different nature of 
each industry will be reflected in very different levels of capital or employee 
intensity. Figure 54 shows that the Energy sector accounts for 32% of total capital 
spending by US non-Financials. But it only employs 12% of workers. Of course, the 
booming oil prices (until last year at least) will have boosted jobs in the US Energy 
sector, but it has boosted capex by much more.  
By contrast, Consumer Discretionary employs 31% of workers but spends only 14% 
of total capex. If the capex/employee relationship is some indicator of current levels 
of automation, we might expect the US Consumer Discretionary sector to offer more 
opportunities to replace workers with machines then Energy. 
Emerging Asia is Different 
So that’s the US story. Shareholders of listed companies have benefited more than 
their workers, as indicated by a sharp rise in profitability per employee. Some of this 
is attributable to higher levels of automation. But what about other parts of the 
world? Can we also see a shift towards shareholders and away from workers, partly 
driven by automation? To examine this, we look at similar data for listed companies 
in Asia as reflected by the MSCI EM Asia index. 107 
The key listed non-Financial companies in emerging market (EM) Asia generate 
EBIT (i.e. profits before interest and tax) of $340 billion, up 260% from the $94 
billion made 10 years ago. This is around 2 times the growth than their US 
counterparts, partly reflecting much stronger Asian economies over the period. 
However, unlike the US, EM Asia non-Financial have been hiring as fast as they’ve 
been growing profits. The total employee count of the MSCI EM Asia non-Financial 
companies is now 12 million (a remarkably low number in a continent of 4 billion 
                                                          
107 This index is dominated by China (32%), Korea (23%), Taiwan (19%) and India 
(11%). 
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people) compared to just 4 million in 2003. As a consequence, EM Asia net income 
per employee has been flat in the past 10 years (Figure 55). It is harder to argue 
that there has been an automation-driven shift that has helped shareholders relative 
to workers. Unlike the US, EM Asia profit margins have fallen over the period 
(Figure 52). 
To summarise all these differences, Figure 55 compares the growth in employees, 
EBIT, and capex for US and EM Asia non-Financial companies. In the US, 
employee growth has lagged well behind EBIT and capex growth, perhaps 
suggesting accelerating automation. But for EM Asia companies, the divergence 
between capex and employment growth has been less intense (Figure 55). Capex 
has been more of a complement than substitute for labour. 
The Market Cares about Returns 
Investors are becoming increasingly obsessed (again) with technology stocks. This 
has distorted the relationship between market valuations and company employees. 
For example, internet company WhatsApp, with just 55 employees, was recently 
bought by Facebook for $19 billion. This is a similar valuation to retailer Gap which 
has 137,000 employees. WhatsApp is priced at $345 million/employee compared to 
Gap at $124,000/employee. We suspect this reflects a potential bubble in selected 
IT stocks rather than an explicit investor desire to buy more automated companies. 
Indeed, across the broader market, there is little evidence to suggest that investors 
value capex-heavy/automated companies much more highly than their more 
employee-driven peers. For example, we have already seen that the US Energy 
sector was responsible for 32% of total market capex in 2013. But it currently 
accounts for only 12% of equity market valuation. New capex, and associated 
technological innovation, can be disruptive for incumbents and highly profitable for 
the innovators. But it can also end up being highly deflationary for the industry as a 
whole. Shale oil is an obvious current example of this theme. 
In the end, stock markets care most about investor returns. Whether these are 
maximised by using robots or people is less of a concern. For US-listed companies 
a sharp profit recovery in recent years has been associated with strong capex but 
sluggish employment growth. For EM Asia companies, strong profit growth has 
been associated with strong capex and strong employment growth. Even if the 
employment profiles look quite different, shareholders have benefited from higher 
profits in both the US and EM Asia, but those profits have been achieved in different 
ways.  
As labour costs start to catch up with those in the US, perhaps Asian companies will 
increasingly turn to automation in order to keep costs down and profits up. A US-
style gap between profit growth and job creation could start to open up. This may 
keep shareholders happy but could also be associated with stagnating labour 
markets and subsequent social and political tensions. It may also bring a slow-down 
in end demand growth. After all, machines may make model employees, but they do 
not make particularly enthusiastic customers.  
 
Figure 55. Growth per year 
 
Source: Citi Research, Factset, Worldscope 
Stock markets care about investor returns — 
whether these are maximised by robots or 
people is less of a concern 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
US EM Asia
Employees
EBIT
CAPEX
 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions February 2015   
 
© 2015 Citigroup 
72 
Macroeconomic Stability Risk 
While real pay for most ordinary workers in the rich world has stagnated or even 
fallen, economists have long understood that it is not income that matters but 
consumption. Importantly, in America, the hollowing-out of middle-income jobs and 
the surge in income inequality has been accompanied by sizeable increases in 
borrowing, which has helped sustain consumption levels. 
In his book Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, 
Raghuram Rajan argues that the credit expansion before the financial crisis of 2007 
was the result of political pressures to maintain the consumption levels of the 
increasingly squeezed middle. Thus, the underlying cause of the financial crisis was 
the rise in inequality, encouraging the provision of easy credit to boost employment 
despite stagnating incomes. 
A recent IMF Working Paper similarly shows that the period leading up to the crisis 
was characterised by high-income individuals saving more, and increased 
borrowing among low-income workers, leading to lower consumption inequality 
relative to income inequality.108 The increase in saving and borrowing, in turn, 
created a growing demand for financial services, intermediating borrowers and 
lenders. The result can be seen in the ratio of banks’ liabilities to GDP, which 
increased substantially. This build-up of household debt that culminated in the 
financial crisis of 2007 was no doubt more costly than redistribution policies to 
reduce the underlying problem: income inequality. From a macroeconomic 
stabilisation point of view, policies to reduce inequality and excessive credit 
expansion ex-ante would thus be preferable to ex post bailouts or debt 
restructurings. 
However, an empirical association between income inequality and credit booms 
does not necessarily imply causality: both inequality and credit expansion can occur 
as a result of a third factor. Financial market liberalisation, for example, may have 
increased the relative earnings of the financial sector, and has thus contributed to 
growing income inequalities. To be sure, the recent surge of inequality may not have 
been the sole cause of the financial crisis, but it is nevertheless a risk to 
macroeconomic stability.  
Secular Stagnation 
As sophisticated algorithms and computer-controlled devices are likely to replace 
mainly low-skilled workers, already growing income inequality is likely exacerbated. 
At the same time, the capital share of income may increase even further, benefiting 
those with a lower propensity to consume. The result: reduced spending in the 
economy and permanently lower aggregate demand. 
As has been pointed out by Lawrence Summers, growing inequality could lead to a 
period of secular stagnation. Yet growing inequality is not the only force that may 
cause stagnation. The very nature of the digital economy itself could cause stagnant 
or even falling growth rates. 
The secular stagnation thesis was presented by Alvin Hansen during the Great 
Depression. According to Hansen’s theory, a slowdown in population growth and 
the rate of capital-absorbing innovation would cause net savings at full employment 
to grow, and net investment to fall. This, in turn, would result in a savings glut and 
slower growth caused by a decline in new investment opportunities.  
                                                          
108 Kumhof and Ranciere (2010). 
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Over recent decades, the US economy has witnessed a downward trend in 
indicators of technological dynamism: the rate of business startups and the pace of 
job relocation have recently fallen, while the share of US employment accounted for 
by young firms has declined sharply throughout the 2000s.109 Even the high-tech 
sector started to decline in the post-2000 period, experiencing a shift in economic 
activity away from young to more mature firms. 
An appealing, but mostly neglected, explanation for this is offered by the life-cycle 
pattern of the computer revolution. As investment in computer and information 
processing equipment surged throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a wide range of 
entirely new computer-related jobs were created. Beyond the peak investment 
stage in 2000, however, the US economy experienced a decline in the demand for 
new work relative to the early stages of the computer revolution.110 The question 
thus arises: where will the next generation of capital-absorbing innovations come 
from? 
In Hansen’s framework, stagnation stems from a slowdown in technological 
progress, resulting in fewer investment opportunities. Indeed, a number of 
economists, including Robert Gordon and Tyler Cowen, have suggested that the 
most useful innovations have already been made.111 Yet the technological 
opportunities offered by the digital revolution may well be greater than anything we 
have seen in the past.  
Crucially, the sluggish job creation in digital industries does not necessarily imply a 
slower or faster pace of innovation. Instead, it stems from the fact that digital 
innovation is much less capital-absorbing, meaning that there is little demand for 
labour to build the new capital. While WhatsApp started with $250,000 of seed 
funding, they still only employed 55 workers at the time the company was acquired 
for $19 billion.  
That the digital economy may cause secular stagnation is a real risk.112 The simple 
reason is that businesses of the digital revolution require less capital investment 
and thus fewer workers to build the new capital, relative to the investment 
opportunities brought by technological revolutions of the past. As economies are 
becoming increasingly digitised, investment opportunities will continue tapering off. 
Accompanied with a rising share of profits, the savings glut is likely to persist.  
Macro Policy Implications 
The risk of secular stagnation has significant implications for policy. The stance of 
monetary policy at any moment depends crucially on the output gap, or the 
difference between potential GDP, which assumes full utilisation of available inputs 
(land, labour and capital), and actual GDP, the amount of expenditure actually 
occurring in the economy. When potential GDP is running above actual, this means 
that slack and underutilisation is abundant, leading to downward pressure on wages 
and prices and thereby to action by the central bank to ease monetary policy to 
meet its inflation target. Conversely, actual GDP running above potential implies an 
overheating economy and a tightening stance of monetary policy. 
 
 
                                                          
109 Decker et al. (2014). 
110 Frey (2015). 
111 Gordon (2012); Cowen (2011). 
112 Frey (2015). 
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Everything else being equal, skill-biased technological change would increase 
potential GDP by making both capital and labour more productive in the production 
process. The question then is whether actual GDP can keep up with potential, 
absent policy intervention. 
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that if technological change occurs at 
the high end of the skill distribution, causing wage gains to be concentrated there, 
the answer is no. In that scenario, skill-biased technological change may lead to a 
persistent gap of potential GDP over actual GDP, leading to downward pressure on 
inflation and thereby to chronically depressed central bank policy rates. 
The mechanism driving the growing gap between potential and actual GDP works 
through saving and investment decisions. If skill-biased technological change 
occurs at the upper end of the skill distribution, wage gains are likely to be 
concentrated where income levels are already relatively high. The academic 
literature, on balance, favours the idea that saving rates rise with income.113 Hence, 
skill-biased technological change may result in more income flowing to those with 
relatively high saving rates, depressing aggregate consumption demand. Weak 
consumer spending may in turn negatively impact capex decisions at firms, which 
are a function of future consumer demand. The end result in this stylised example is 
that aggregate expenditure in the economy is unable to keep up with the economy’s 
potential, leading to subdued wage and inflation pressure and thereby to a 
persistently loose stance of monetary policy.114 
In addition, technological change could depress policy rates through a mechanism 
unrelated to the wage distribution, by resulting in a decline in the relative price of 
investment goods (think cheapening of personal computers). This process has 
already been underway for decades.115 If new technology continues to make certain 
goods in the economy relatively cheap, that could result in downward pressure on 
overall price inflation, leading to a bias by central banks to favor lower policy rates. 
                                                          
113 For example, in Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2006), savings in the bottom income 
quintile are roughly zero compared to over 25% of income in the highest quintile. 
Consistent results hold for proxies of permanent income, such as levels of educational 
attainment and lagged and future earnings obtained from longitudinal surveys.  
114 As mentioned, all of this is ‘everything else equal.’ In an open economy setting, capex 
decisions are not made solely on the basis of expected future domestic consumer 
demand; rising foreign demand could offset the weakness in investment spending 
brought on by high domestic saving patterns. Moreover, demographics complicate the 
picture greatly. Older people tend to spend more than younger people. Thus, aging 
demographics, which are occurring in a number of advanced economies, will likely put 
upward pressure on domestic consumer spending, thus leading to an upward bias on 
policy rates – see Goodhart and Erfurth (2014). Finally, borrowing constraints matter 
greatly. Steve Randy Waldman argues that so long as debt accumulation by lower-wage 
earners occurs alongside growing wage inequality, it will negate the consumption-
depressing effects of growing wage inequality – Waldman (2012).  Moreover, Gauti 
Eggertsson and Neil Mehrotra describe an overlapping generations model where a 
within-generation rise in wage inequality leads to an excess of the supply of savings over 
the demand for savings, thereby depressing the real interest rate, provided that those 
demanding savings (those in the younger generation and those at the bottom of the 
wage distribution in the generation that saw an increase in wage inequality) are credit 
constrained – see Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014).  
115 In Buiter, Rahbari and Seydl (2014),  we document that since 1970, the average price 
of a unit of investment for a broad range of advanced economies has fallen by roughly 
17% relative to the price of a unit of GDP and by 20% relative to a unit of personal 
consumption (as measured by the PCE deflator). 
Macro policy depends on whether actual 
GDP can keep up with potential GDP 
Saving and investment decisions drive the 
gap between potential and actual GDP 
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Empirically, it is true that much of the advanced world is still grappling with large 
output gaps following the fallout of the 2008 global financial crisis (Figure 56). Is that 
a result of technological change and the robotics revolution? Probably not. That 
outcome probably has more to do with the long-lasting demand-side effects of the 
previous business cycle. Many advanced economies remain in debt-deleveraging 
mode from years of excessive debt accumulation (especially in the housing sector), 
and this has held back consumer spending and business investment. In fact, for all 
the talk of a ‘Second Machine Age,’ it has yet to show up in the productivity data; 
total factor productivity, a measure of an economy’s long-term technological 
dynamism, has not noticeably sped up on the back of the robotics revolution (Figure 
57). In other words, the output gaps we are observing are not a result of 
accelerating potential GDP but of weakly growing actual GDP.116 
Figure 56. Output gap   Figure 57. Total factor productivity growth (3-year rolling average) 
 
 
 
Source: IMF  Source: European Commission 
 
To be sure, tracking economy-wide productivity in real time is a difficult empirical 
endeavour; one in which economists don’t have a good track record. And there may 
be good reasons to think that the official productivity data are not tracking changes 
in the information economy quickly enough.117 So what do the data on wages say? 
Are they accelerating at both ends of the skill distribution in line with the job 
polarisation story, or just at the high end? 
The answer depends on the country under consideration. The United States has 
seen wages accelerate at the high end of the skill distribution much more quickly 
than at the low end (Figure 58). The same is true for Canada, Germany and 
                                                          
116 If anything, the sluggish recovery since the global financial crisis has served to 
reduce the growth rate of potential GDP through ‘hysteresis effects’ (e.g., workers losing 
their skills from being out of the labour force for an extended period). See Summers 
(2014). 
117 One concern is that the statistics on economic output do a poor job of tracking goods 
and services that, while expensive to design initially, can be copied at very low or zero 
marginal cost. See Mokyr (2014). In addition, Barry Eichengreen emphasises the 
importance of “range of adaptation” with regard to new technology, meaning that it often 
takes time for existing industries to reorient themselves around new technological 
breakthroughs. While robotics is disrupting production in a number of industries, it may 
take a while for the effects to fully show up in the economy-wide productivity statistics. 
See Eichengreen (2015).  
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Australia. In contrast, the United Kingdom and Japan have seen wages at the 
bottom and top of the skill distribution rise roughly in tandem, consistent with the job 
polarisation story. In other advanced economies such as Spain and France, wages 
at the bottom of the skill distribution have actually accelerated more quickly than at 
the top. The wage data for emerging markets tell a similar country-specific story 
(Figure 59). 
The large degree of heterogeneity of low- versus high-skilled wage trends across 
countries points toward institutional differences that may be playing a role. In 
particular, improving worker productivity from new technology is not the only force 
driving wage trends, especially at the bottom of the skill distribution where political-
economy factors such as union participation and the generosity of unemployment 
compensation also likely play a determinant role. 
Figure 58. Ratio of real high-skilled average hourly wage rate to real 
low-skilled average hourly wage rate 
 Figure 59. Ratio of real high-skilled average hourly wage rate to real 
low-skilled average hourly wage rate 
 
 
 
Note: The wage data comes from the WIOD Socio-economic Accounts, in which skills 
are defined on the basis of educational attainment. The hourly wage rate is calculated 
as total labor compensation divided by total hours worked. The wage data are deflated 
using national consumer price data. 
Source: WIOD Socio-economic Accounts, Citi Research 
 Note: The wage data comes from the WIOD Socio-economic Accounts, in which skills 
are defined on the basis of educational attainment. The hourly wage rate is calculated 
as total labor compensation divided by total hours worked. The wage data are deflated 
using national consumer price data. 
Source: WIOD Socio-economic Accounts, Citi Research 
 
The bottom line is that there is some evidence that wage inequality between high- 
and low-skilled workers is rising in some countries, likely driven in part by increasing 
automation in the workplace. Whether this translates into persistent output gaps and 
chronically depressed policy rates is still an open question. It is interesting to note, 
however, that financial markets, which are forward looking, have to some extent 
priced in low interest rates well into the future. Indeed, stock prices seem high in 
many advanced economies (Figure 60), but not if there has been a sizeable change 
in the discount rate due to lower expected policy rates. Home prices, which are also 
sensitive to forward-looking assumptions about policy rates, are also high in some 
countries (Figure 61), though home price movements have been more disparate 
than stock price movements since the 2008 financial crisis. 
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Figure 60. Real values of advanced economy stock market indices  Figure 61. Advanced economy real home prices  
 
 
 
Note: US = DJIA, EA = STOXX, Japan = Nikkei 225, Canada is S&P/TSX Composite. 
Each is deflated by the respective national consumer price index. 
Source: Haver Analytics, Citi Research 
 Source: Dallas Fed, Citi Research 
 
We conclude by stressing that even if technological change has macroeconomic 
consequences in the form of widening output gaps and weaker price pressure, 
those consequences will not go unaddressed by policymakers. Central bankers may 
rely on additional programs of quantitative easing to boost effective demand, or they 
may eventually take even bolder steps such as increasing inflation targets above 
the roughly 2% target that most central banks currently adhere to. On the fiscal 
side, we are likely to see an increased effort by policymakers to deal with the large 
swath of workers who will inevitably be displaced by automation. Public job 
guarantees for those displaced could boost effective demand; and in the event that 
supply continues to outpace demand due to technological change, policymakers 
may take deliberate steps to reduce supply by implementing more work-sharing 
policies to spread job tasks across a broader pool of available workers.118  
In short, technological change never occurs in a vacuum. How policymakers deal 
with the consequences brought on by the digital revolution is likely to be a crucial 
factor influencing valuations in financial markets for years to come. 
  
                                                          
118 For a detailed reading of the various ways in which policymakers could respond to 
increasing inequality from technological change, see Meyer (2014). 
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Opportunities 
Productivity 
The digital age has so far arguably failed to deliver the leaps in productivity 
associated with earlier general purpose technologies (GPTs) like electricity and the 
steam engine. This concern was raised as early as 1987, when Robert Solow 
remarked that “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics”. After the temporary surge in productivity growth of the late-1990s came 
to an end, the view that most of the benefits from the digital revolution have already 
been seen has gained in resonance. 
This has been forcefully argued by economists like Robert Gordon, examining 
trends in productivity in the United States. Between 1939 and 2000, average output 
per person grew at 2.7%; much faster than the period before from 1891 to 1939 
when average annual productivity growth was 1.5%. Since the turn of this century 
productivity has been even more sluggish. Over the period 2000 to 2013, 
productivity grew only at 0.9%.119  
How does this square with the astounding technological advances in machine 
intelligence and robotics we are currently witnessing? Part of the answer may be 
that many of the things the digital economy allows us to access for free are not 
captured in the productivity statistics. Nevertheless, as Robert Gordon has pointed 
out, it has always taken time for official statistics to incorporate new technologies in 
productivity measurements. For example, between 1908 and 1929, the price of the 
Ford Model T declined from $900 to $265, but the automobile was not entered into 
the consumer price index until 1935. 
A more refined explanation for the sluggish growth in productivity over the last 
decade is that technological progress increases productivity only after long lags. 
According to research by Chad Syverson “productivity growth during the IT era echo 
those observed during electrification. […] a slowdown that in the electrification era 
was followed by a productivity growth acceleration.”120 Crucially, productivity surged 
between 1996 and 2004 as corporations started to redesign their organisations to 
accommodate new technologies. In particular, business process re-engineering 
became common practice in most firms producing manufactured goods by the mid-
1990s.  
The idea behind re-engineering was brought forward by Michael Hammer, arguing 
that: “Instead of embedding outdated processes in silicon and software, we should 
obliterate them and start over. We should 'reengineer' our businesses: use the 
power of modern information technology to radically redesign our business 
processes in order to achieve dramatic improvements in their performance.”121 By 
the mid-1990s, about 60% of the Fortune 500 companies claimed to have done 
some re-engineering efforts or planned to do so, which involved economizing 
heavily on the middle-management workforce.122 
More direct evidence for this surge in productivity stemming from organisational 
restructuring is provided by John Fernald, suggesting that the GPT characteristics 
of computers and complementary software technologies fostered business 
                                                          
119 Gordon (2012) 
120 Syverson (2013). 
121 Hammer (1990). 
122 Rifkin (1995). 
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reorganisation. He further argues that his findings are “consistent with the view that 
benefiting from IT takes substantial intangible organisational investments that, with 
a lag, raise measured productivity. By the mid-2000s, the low-hanging fruit of IT had 
been plucked.” 
Much of the benefits from recent developments in machine learning and mobile 
robotics are yet to be seen. Another recent study suggests that productivity follows 
investment in digital technologies with lags of between 5 and 15 years.123 As many 
of the technological developments we are currently witnessing, such as 
autonomous vehicles, are yet to be realised, and other developments in online 
education and medical diagnosis have just started, we are likely to see substantial 
future productivity gains.  
Digital technologies offer much potential in traditional low productivity sectors, such 
as healthcare and education. In other words, services in sectors that have 
traditionally been associated with William Baumol’s cost disease — meaning that 
they experience wage growth without productivity growth, pushing costs onto 
consumers — may become more affordable. 
The more transformative a technology, the longer it may take for individuals, 
organisations and economies to adapt. There is still much to be gained from the 
digital economy, but shifts in mindsets and organisational structures can take time. 
Automation and Productivity 
Adopting automation technology to increase productivity and lower manufacturing 
costs has been the trend in the technology supply chain for several years. However, 
the recent increased flexibility to more easily reprogramme the automation process 
has enabled this trend to accelerate. One example is the evolution in technology for 
the wafer and semiconductor chip manufacturing sector, which has now evolved to 
a “lights-out manufacturing environment” wherein a factory is fully operated by 
machines and robots without the need for humans on-site. The development of 
automation significantly increased semiconductor fabrication productivity and 
compares to the traditional manual operating mode where humans previously 
touched and moved wafers through the manufacturing process, which is less 
precise and also involved toxic working environments for human beings.  
Additional examples include the production of smart electronics using automated 
injection moulding with the help of vision system mounted robots, which can more 
precisely determine the placement, shape and density accuracy of components 
(metal and plastic) and inspect them faster than a human can in quality control for 
insert moulded parts. In addition, evolving automation manufacturing processes 
enable Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS) companies to provide tailored 
designing capability in both high volume low mix (i.e.. consumer electronics such as 
smartphones or TVs) and low volume high mix (i.e. hospital and doctor medical 
devices) products and create value for customers. Putting pen to paper and 
quantifying the financial impact of this can be seen by looking at Flextronics, one of 
the biggest EMS companies in the world. Flextronics was able to improve its 
revenue per employee by 95% to $174,000 in 2014 from $89,000 in 1997 with 
product portfolio ranges from traditional consumer electronics to automotive smart 
electronics and clean tech products.  
                                                          
123 Basu and Fernald (2007). 
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The Sharing Economy 
While productivity is at the heart of long-run growth, consumer surplus is arguably a 
better measurement of the benefits to societal progress. Thus, even though much of 
the emerging sharing economy is not captured by productivity statistics, its benefits 
to most people are certainly real: Wikipedia, Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram 
and Dropbox all contribute to the sharing economy, and they are all available for 
free. As the sharing part of the economy is likely to continue growing as a result of 
digitisation, consumers along with talented entrepreneurs will be the greatest 
beneficiaries of the digital age. 
The opportunities offered by the digital economy are immense as the Internet and 
smartphones make it cheaper to match supply and demand. People can now 
register their unused assets on various online platforms, connecting owners and 
users. Satellites and smartphones even make it possible for consumers to locate 
services nearby.  
This is the idea behind a range of online services that enable people to share cars, 
accommodation, car-parking spaces, bicycles, musical instruments, garden 
equipment, household appliances and other items. Such peer-to-peer rental 
concepts can provide additional income for owners, while providing cheaper 
alternatives to consumers.  
The most prominent sharing service is probably San Francisco-based Airbnb, 
allowing users to rent out their vacant rooms or homes to travellers around the 
world. Recently valued at $10 billion and with reported revenue of $250 million last 
year, the company shows how beneficial the sharing economy can be to talented 
entrepreneurs. Yet the benefits to consumers are equally substantial: the platform 
reached 10 million transactions last year in 192 countries.  
The way Airbnb provides cheaper accommodation, car-sharing concepts provide 
new alternatives to commuters. While some companies, such as Buzzcar and 
RelayRides, offer peer-to-peer car-rental services allowing consumers to use 
somebody else’s car for a fee, there are now also taxi-like services.124 Companies 
like Uber use smartphone apps with satellite location to connect drivers and 
passengers, and provide a cheaper alternative to traditional taxi companies.  
The rise of the sharing economy is however not merely the result of digital 
technologies connecting people: it is as much a result of how they can be used in 
clever ways to build trust. A decade ago, when eBay started, people were still 
hesitant to provide things like their credit card details to online marketplaces. That is 
no longer a major obstacle. Secure Internet payment systems have been crucial, 
but also transparent rating systems. Home owners that register on Airbnb offering 
accommodation to strangers rely heavily on users’ past ratings, and travellers 
staying in a strangers’ flat can read reviews from previous guests. In addition, some 
services integrate Facebook, allowing users to check if they have mutual friends. 
The sharing economy still has much more potential. Governments could start 
unlocking some public assets, like publicly owned vehicles, providing benefits to 
communities as well as tax payers. Furthermore, as the sharing economy allows 
people to access more things cheaper or even for free, leisure may also become 
more attractive.  
                                                          
124 The Economist (2013). 
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A World of Leisure 
In a 1932 essay entitled In Praise of Idleness, Bertrand Russell argued that a 
shorter working day would allow people to enjoy “the necessities and elementary 
comforts of life.”125 How could such a life be obtained? According to John Maynard 
Keynes, technological progress provides the answer, potentially solving mankind’s 
“economic problem”, and depriving us of our traditional purpose of subsistence. 
Instead he predicted that we could eventually be facing the dilemma of how to use 
our freedom from economic cares and occupy our leisure.126 
In the past, the wealthy elite have enjoyed the most leisure, while the poor needed 
to work relatively hard for their subsistence. According to research by Hans-Joachim 
Voth, average hours worked increased in Britain during the early Industrial 
Revolution, from 50 to 64 hours per week between 1760 and 1800.127 At the time, 
Jane Austen’s novels about the wealthy elite depicted a society at leisure. 
Yet, over recent decades, things have been different in developed economies. Not 
only have average working hours declined, but the wealthy are now the ones 
working relatively long hours. According to a recent study, leisure in America 
increased by 6 to 8 hours per week for men and 4 to 8 hours for women between 
1965 and 2003.128 Furthermore, research shows that low-educated men saw their 
leisure grow between 2003 and 2007, while highly-educated workers saw their 
leisure decline. More recent data from the American Time Use Survey 2013 also 
show that workers with at least a bachelor’s degree work on average two hours 
more per day than high-school graduates.129  
This is not a trend that is specific to America. For the countries where data are 
available, the vast majority of people today work fewer hours than they did in 1990. 
Western Europeans, who worked more than Americans as late as 1960, now work 
much less suggesting that unionisation and labour market regulations are partly 
behind the decline in hours.130 Leisure is seemingly also associated with 
productivity-increasing technological progress. Workers in Greece put in the most 
hours in the OECD: they work more than 40% more than Germans, for example. Yet 
German productivity is about 70% higher, more than making up for the difference.131  
Technological change also partly explains why low-income workers enjoy more 
leisure. An important feature of the digital age is that it provides many things for 
free, giving low-income earners a more enjoyable leisure. According to a study by 
Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. 
Stone “people with greater income tend to devote relatively more of their time to 
work, compulsory non-work activities (such as shopping and childcare), and active 
leisure (such as exercise) and less of their time to passive leisure activities (such as 
watching TV).” As information technology makes especially passive leisure more 
interesting and cheaper, the demand for leisure among low-income earners is likely 
to increase further. Companies like Netflix and Spotify have recognised this trend, 
and many others are following.  
                                                          
125 Russel (1932). 
126 Keynes (1930). 
127 Voth (2001). 
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Skill-biased technological change may also have induced skilled workers to work 
more. According to research by Peter Kuhn and Fernando Lozano, for example, the 
rise in hours worked by highly-educated men between 1980 and 2000 is primarily 
driven by the premium associated with working longer hours, incentivising 
especially skilled workers to increase their labour supply.132  
To be sure, the growing leisure among low-skilled workers is not all good news, as 
some of it may be involuntary, caused by unemployment.133 But information 
technology is undoubtedly making leisure more attractive for ordinary people. 
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6. Adapting to Technological 
Change: Pathways and Strategies 
“The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion 
comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new markets… [This process] incessantly revolutionises 
the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one. This process of creative destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism.”134  
Technological change is at the very heart of the creative destruction described by 
Joseph Schumpeter. While revolutionary technologies of the past have created 
enormous wealth, they have also been a source of disruption. The digital age may 
cause more upheaval than previous technological revolutions as it is happening 
even faster and is fundamentally changing the way we live and work. 
Yet technology is not destiny. With the right understanding of associated challenges, 
and the right strategies, the digital age may be an inclusive one. To be sure, there 
are profound economic risks associated with the rapid technological change that is 
currently taking place. Surging inequality is not only dividing societies, it is also 
threatening macroeconomic stability. As digital technologies do not require much 
capital investment, and mainly benefit those with a lower propensity to spend — 
leading to reduced investment and consumption — the digital age could also 
become a period of secular stagnation. 
While the digital age has so far mainly benefited skilled workers as producers, it has 
also benefited unskilled workers as consumers, making their leisure more 
interesting and self-fulfilling. A surge in productivity, as organisational structures are 
redesigned to accommodate new technologies, could make up for some of the fall 
in investment and consumption, and together with policies designed to boost 
aggregate demand and reduce inequality, growth rates could rebound and even 
surge. 
In this chapter we will emphasise the need for countries to adapt to these trends in 
an inclusive manner. To achieve greater equality, and avoid the threat of secular 
stagnation, governments have to understand the direction and pace of technological 
change and plan for the long term.  
Planning for the Long Term 
In considering future technological development, one question hangs over our 
predictions: when? Specifically, what is the timeline over which anticipated impacts 
of technological change will unfold? The most concise answer to this question is 
simply: soon. The technologies we discuss, from autonomous vehicles to 
algorithmic sales assistants, are largely already available within research labs: any 
uncertainty is due less to the surrounding rates of technological development and 
more to questions of adoption. Nonetheless, this uncertainty is still considerable, 
due to two variable and regionally-dependent influences. As a first concern, 
adoption of labour-saving inventions will be influenced by the availability of cheap 
labour. Secondly, technological adoption may be slowed by regulatory concerns and 
political activism. Protests from traditional taxi companies, along with public 
concern, has been at the root of resistance to the app-based company Uber, which 
has now received cease-and-desist orders in Brisbane, Frankfurt and Taiwan, and 
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which has closed down its Spanish operations entirely. Another related obstacle to 
technological deployment is found in software patent "trolls", whose claims on ill-
defined patents are estimated to have directly cost firms $29 billion in 2011.135 
In casting our minds ahead to the influence of technologies yet undeveloped, we 
face the difficulties136 associated with forecasting technological progress. These 
difficulties are particularly profound in speculating about the development of 
machine intelligence competitive with human labour: the field of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) has a poor record in predicting when human-level intelligence may be 
algorithmically possible. Examples of unsuccessful predictions range from the 
expectation that AI could be solved during a 2 month, 10 man, summer project in 
Dartmouth in 1956, to AI pioneer Marvin Minsky's claim in 1970 that "in from three 
to eight years we will have a machine with the general intelligence of an average 
human being''. The question of when human-level AI will arrive features many 
characteristics of problems that are difficult to predict.137 Feedback on the success 
of prediction is largely unavailable; the problem is difficult to decompose; and 
progress in AI is, to some extent, dependent on surprising insights. Despite these 
difficulties, we can, nonetheless, reasonably expect that human-level AI is not 
impossibly remote. The most recent and comprehensive survey of AI experts138 
concludes that we will probably (with over 50% probability) reach overall human 
ability in machine intelligence by 2040-50, and very likely (with 90% probability) by 
2075. 
Clearly, however, we will not need to wait for these forecasts to be tested to see the 
employment impact due to intelligent machines. In particular, just as the typing pool 
was replaced by word-processing software unable to understand what was being 
typed, technology will continue to substitute for human labour by simplifying the task 
to be performed. A recent example is found in Kiva Systems, which automated the 
moving of objects around a warehouse by simplifying the navigation task: bar code 
stickers were placed on the floor to inform robots of their precise location.139 At all 
stages en-route to true human-level AI, we expect to see technologies that will 
radically alter the nature of work. For governments to adequately respond to these 
trends, a shift in mindset, investment and policies is needed. As around 47% of jobs 
are at risk of displacement by technologies that are largely already available that 
shift needs to happen sooner rather than later. 
Tax Wedges and Active Labour Market Policies 
The fast-changing world of employment increases the risk that more and more 
workers would be left behind over time, which is at the heart of some of the risks 
and negative implications of the digital revolution. But there are a number of labour 
market policies that could potentially limit some of those negative implications. We 
can think of them in two broad categories: first, policies that reduce the cost of 
labour, or, conversely increase labour income. And second, policies that make it 
easier to find jobs.  
We highlighted earlier in the report that the number of workers on low wages will 
likely increase as a result of ‘job polarisation’ – in fact, in some countries, such as 
the UK, it has already increased noticeably in recent years. If wages are already 
low, it would make sense to at least make sure that most of the cost of labour ends 
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up in the pockets of the workers. However, in practice, the so-called tax wedges — 
the difference between gross labour costs and ‘take-home pay’ — can be very 
large, particularly in a number of European countries. The tax wedge is composed 
of employers’ and employees’ social security contributions and personal income 
taxes. In Belgium, France or Hungary it is around a staggering 50% of total labour 
costs for low-wage earners (i.e. earning 67% of the average wage) according to 
OECD data. Significantly lowering tax wedges can be an effective way to boost 
take-home pay (for unchanged gross labour costs) or raise employment (if gross 
labour costs fall) and likely a combination of the two.  
Figure 62. Change in tax wedge between 2007 and 2012 (for single person at 67% of average earnings, with two children) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
This is indeed what the UK has done in recent years. Between 2007 and 2013, the 
UK lowered the tax wedge by almost 9 percentage points for low-wage earners 
(meaning that low-wage earners now keep 9 percentage points more of their wages 
than previously), more than in that in any other OECD economy. In fact, in roughly 
half the OECD countries, the tax wedge rose over this period, including in some of 
the fiscally challenged countries such as Spain, Greece, or Italy, but also in Japan 
and the US (Figure 62). The fall in tax wedges is surely not the only reason why job 
growth in the UK has been above the industrial country norm in recent years, but it 
has surely contributed. 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs, such as job placement services, benefit 
administration, special labour market programmes and training) instead are aimed 
at helping and providing incentives for the unemployed to find gainful employment. 
Active labour market policies are an integral part of the ‘flexicurity’ model of labour 
markets of the Scandinavian countries and there is some evidence that, if done 
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right, active labour market policies can be an efficient way to keep employment 
levels high and keep long-term unemployment low.140  
But the extent to which ALMPs are used varies quite widely across different 
countries (Figure 63). For example, in Denmark, ALMP spending amounted to more 
than 2% of GDP in 2012, according to OECD data, roughly 1% of GDP in the 
Netherlands, France and Germany, but less than 0.5% in Italy, Portugal and the UK. 
In many of these countries, ALMP spending remains relatively unchanged 
compared to the level of ALMP spending in 2007, when unemployment was 
generally much lower (but fiscal coffers were fuller). 
Figure 63. Expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies (% of GDP) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Will Taxation Have to Change to Adapt to the World of Work in the 21st 
Century? 
The changes in the world of work that we describe can have large fiscal costs for 
two reasons. First, to the extent that average wage growth is suppressed and 
unemployment raised, tax receipts will suffer. Second, some potential policy 
responses to ameliorate the adverse effects of the changes in the structure and 
nature of employment (such as expanding active labour market policies or lowering 
tax wedges, or increased spending on education or social spending) will likely carry 
substantial fiscal costs, too. Unlike in the past where such policies were sometimes 
dialled up in a downturn, the new structure of work may imply that such policies may 
need to be adopted much more consistently and in greater scope.  
                                                          
140 See e.g. European Commission (2006) and Boone and van Ours (2004) 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Changes in the nature of work going forward 
will have an effect on fiscal costs 
February 2015 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions   
 
© 2015 Citigroup 
87
But in times of high (and often still-rising) public debt, an appropriate follow-up 
question would be where the resources can be found to fund such additional 
spending? The answer to this question is not obvious. This is despite the fact that in 
principle there are several fairly obvious candidates. Our analysis has shown that 
there are, of course, beneficiaries of the changes we describe. Some of the 
potential options to generate the money to fund additional spending could come 
from raising taxes on the better-off. In principle, this could happen by raising top 
marginal income tax rates, increasing capital income tax rates, raising corporate 
income taxes, introducing some form of wealth taxes or taxing goods or services 
that are primary consumed by the wealthy more heavily.141  
Such changes in taxation would seem sensible to us, but they would also be a 
reversal of the trends of the last few decades. The OECD notes that top statutory 
personal income tax rates have fallen significantly in each of the three decades 
between 1980 and 2010.142 In 2010, the OECD average top statutory personal 
income tax rate was 41.7%. In 1981, it was 65.7%. Corporate income taxes have 
also fallen in recent decades, from 49% in 1981 to 32.5% in 2013.  
However, some of these trends may already be reversing. A number of countries 
already increased their top personal income tax rates in recent years. There is no 
sign of headline corporate income tax rates rising systematically across countries. 
But significant efforts are under way to close loopholes in the current fiscal 
arrangements for corporates, to make life harder for tax havens and to tackle tax 
evasion and avoidance more effectively. 
Could wealth taxes be the solution? Thomas Piketty made headlines in 2014 when 
he famously called for global wealth taxes as one of the main policy responses to 
rising (income and wealth) inequality. Piketty called for a tax of 1% on wealth of 
between €1-€5 million, 2% on wealth of €2-€5 million (and a much higher tax on 
even larger fortunes), and even the IMF has noted that a wealth tax may be 
appropriate in some circumstances. Yet outside of extreme circumstances there 
have been few (and usually only timid) attempts to increase the taxation of financial 
or real property in recent years (and they are quite rare in history). Similarly, the 
taxation of capital income has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions 
and speeches, notably the special treatment offered to particular types of capital 
income (such as for ‘carried interest’ of private equity owners). In his recent State of 
the Union address, US President Obama once more called for increases in capital 
income taxes and for abolishing some of these privileges. Yet we have seen very 
little in the way of an effective increase in the taxation of capital income anywhere.  
One of the reasons why wealth taxes have not been raised more widely is that they 
are difficult to design, costly to administer and often relatively easy to evade. For 
ad-hoc wealth taxes, the risk is that households would fear that such taxes could be 
imposed again in the future. For financial assets, a major risk is that the capital will 
simply find a home elsewhere — a growing issue in a world of global financial 
mobility and still-increasing financial interdependence. Wealth taxes would therefore 
be much more likely to be effective if they were imposed globally (as Piketty 
argues). The same applies for corporate income and capital income taxation, but we 
see little scope for such an initiative in a world where global leadership is rare in any 
area, not least against what would likely be fierce lobbying.  
                                                          
141 Another direction would be to reduce other government expenditures. Given 
historically high ratios of government expenditure to GDP in many countries, this route 
strikes us as eminently sensible, but is outside the scope of this section. 
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Making Growth Inclusive 
A key challenge of the 21st century will be to make growth inclusive again. Tax 
reform provides part of the answer. At a time when the ever falling cost of computing 
makes it cheaper to displace workers with technology, while consumers benefit from 
declining prices of many products and services, shifting tax burdens from labour 
towards consumption would be a step forward. For example, a reduction in income 
and payroll taxes would make it cheaper to hire, while a luxury tax on positional 
goods could make up for some of the fall in tax revenues. 
Taxes can also be shifted from labour towards wealth, including capital and income 
from assets. As proposed by Thomas Piketty, the wealth gap that has emerged 
between owners of capital and those who rely on their labour could be combatted 
by a global wealth tax. Although such a tax is unlikely to get implemented, some 
proposals are underway. In Europe, a financial transaction tax has been put forward 
and in the UK a tax on mansions worth over £2 million has also been proposed. In 
addition, tax avoidance, evasion and loopholes are also being explored.  
It would be a mistake, however, for governments to focus too narrowly on the 
redistribution of income. Although taxation as such can clearly help combat 
inequality, the crucial task of the tax system must be to channel funds into public 
investment that boosts growth in an inclusive manner. As has been highlighted in 
this report, the main risk for both investors and workers is a future of secular 
stagnation, driven by a decline in the demand for new goods and services. Such a 
scenario can only be avoided by embracing technological progress, while making 
the right investments to create growth and new employment opportunities. As 
shown by Thomas Piketty himself, a faster growth rate reduces the importance of 
wealth in a country, while sluggish growth will increase it. Technological progress is 
thus an essential ingredient of inclusive growth: while it creates new income it also 
destroys old wealth.  
To ensure continuous creative destruction governments need to capture the 
opportunities created by the digital revolution. Crucially, while digital technologies 
are making tasks previously confined to labour automatable, they are also making it 
cheaper for entrepreneurs to start their own business: e-entrepreneurship typically 
requires less capital investment, and digital technologies allow people in deprived 
areas to reach global markets, as even more traditional goods are made 
increasingly mobile. In other words, digital technologies have made self-
employment an option to a growing share of workers. As recent survey evidence 
also shows that people in self-employment were more content in their working lives, 
there are good reasons to believe that more people will choose to start their own 
business. Indeed, the future of work may well be one where self-employment is the 
new normal. The main challenge for economic policy is thus to encourage more 
entrepreneurial risk-taking. Reducing red tape and implementing tax systems that 
do not discourage self-employment is crucial, but building welfare systems that cap 
the downside to entrepreneurial failure may also help.  
Nevertheless, as technology is increasingly taking the form of capital that displaces 
labour, technological progress also risks leaving many people behind. According to 
research by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, as many as 47% of US jobs 
are at risk of automation over forthcoming decades. Inclusive growth thus requires 
fostering creative destruction while ensuring that ordinary workers are able to shift 
into new job opportunities as existing occupations and industries are being eroded. 
To successfully manage this transition, more investment in skills and training is 
required to prepare workers for the jobs of the future.  
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Predicting the type of new jobs that will emerge is notoriously difficult. Nobody in the 
early 20th century would have predicted many of the jobs and industries we have 
today, including software engineering, tourism and nanotechnology. Yet, we do have 
some idea of the type of jobs that are emerging. Big data architects, cloud services 
specialists, iOS developers, digital marketing specialists, and data scientists, are all 
occupations that barely existed on LinkedIn only five years ago, resulting from new 
technologies.143 Public investment in promising technologies for the future could 
help drive job creation too. Solar energy systems engineers, wind energy engineers, 
informatics nurse specialists, bioinformatics scientists, and biomass plant 
technicians are new and emerging occupational titles, where public spending could 
help facilitate new job creation. To be sure, these are all very different jobs, but they 
share one common characteristic: they are significantly more skilled than most jobs 
of the past. Although education alone is unlikely to solve the problem of surging 
inequality, it remains the most important factor. 
Transforming Education 
While the concern over technological unemployment has so far proven to be 
exaggerated, the reason why human labour has prevailed relates to its ability to 
acquire new skills. Yet this will become increasingly challenging as new work 
requires a higher degree of cognitive abilities. At a time when technological change 
is happening even faster, a main hurdle for workers to adapt is thus the surging 
costs of education. In Europe, for example, education is increasingly putting 
pressure on government budgets, leading countries like Britain to pass on a growing 
share of the costs to students. In America, this has been common practice for some 
time — public American universities increased their fees by 27% between 2007 and 
2012, while fees in private non-profit universities rose by 28% over the course of the 
decade leading up to 2012. Alarmingly, American student debt now amounts to $1.2 
trillion, leaving many students with gloomy future prospects as they enter a faltering 
labour market.144 
Much of the recent surge in fees stems from an increasing share of resources being 
absorbed by administration. According to The Goldwater Institute, the cost of 
administration among America’s leading universities has been growing substantially 
faster than budgets for teaching and research activities: between 1993 and 2007 
the number of teachers and research staff per 100 students grew by 18%, while the 
number of full-time administrators surged by 39%.  
Fortunately, in the way the digital age is transforming the world of work, it can help 
transform education as well. Cost reductions to make education more accessible, 
without putting additional pressure on government budgets, can be achieved 
through online education. At Georgia Tech, for example, a new online master’s 
degree in computing costs less than a third of an on-campus degree — $7,000 
instead of $25,000.145 Costs are also likely to decrease further as online education 
makes more big data readily available, allowing an increasing share of 
administration work to be automated. 
To be sure, MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) are already transforming both 
schools and higher education. The virtual Khan Academy, for example, already has 
about 10 million users, making it the world’s largest school. Yet, red tape often 
inhibits the diffusion of new educational models. For example, a key challenge in 
the US for education technology companies remains distribution. Vendors in the US 
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have to navigate a byzantine labyrinth of a system spanning 50 state education 
agencies, 14,000 school districts each with a varying approach to procurement, and 
upwards of 65,000 individual schools. A survey conducted by the education industry 
association found that only 23% of education tech providers are satisfied with the 
ability to gain visibility in a school district. InBloom, a well-funded non-profit 
education tech start up supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, was 
recently wound up. Alternatively News Corp has invested approximately $1.1 billion 
in its Ed Tech division Amplify since 2010 and has yet to see a significant return in 
terms of revenue, with just $130 million forecast in 2015. The pace of technological 
change within schools remains slow. 
In higher education things are progressing faster, although critics often point at the 
drop-out rates associated with online courses, which often exceed 90%. Yet, these 
numbers need to be put in perspective. Many leading universities accept fewer than 
10% of their applicants. The few students that are accepted and have a high 
propensity to pass constitute only a fraction of the number of students that apply. 
MOOCs, on the other hand, are accessible to all potential students, and there is 
virtually no cost associated with starting a new course while looking for 
employment. 
MOOCs further have the potential to make geography less important as students 
can access the best content and teachers regardless of their location. For example, 
of the 155,000 students who registered for MIT’s prototype Circuits and Electronics 
course, most came from America, Colombia, India, Britain, and Spain.146 Thus, 
students in deprived areas and relatively poor countries are now able to access 
some of the best classes in the world, making even high-end education an option 
for many students that could previously not afford it. 
Perhaps the most promising aspect of MOOCs is their potential to increase 
productivity by making time a redundant factor in contemporary education. As has 
been forcefully argued by Clayton Christensen, students with different learning 
requirements no longer need to conform to rigid academic programmes which span 
over a specified period of time.147 This form of factory-based education that 
emerged in the 19th century, following the industrial revolution, is seemingly out of 
date. Today, students with different backgrounds and learning requirements can 
complete courses at their own pace. On campus lectures have no pause, rewind or 
fast-forward buttons, but MOOCs allow students to learn in ways that suit them the 
best. Students can skip some lectures while attending others several times at 
virtually no additional cost. They can also take assessments as many times as 
necessary until they have gained their desired proficiency in a subject or acquired a 
new skill. In other words, digital technologies allow time to become the variable 
factor while learning is fixed. 
Making time a variable factor in education would also make it easier for people to 
acquire skills later in life. In particular, at a time when technology is making the skills 
of many workers redundant at a faster pace than perhaps ever before, new 
approaches to life-long learning will be essential. This is suggested by the fact that 
higher-education enrolment among people aged 35 or above has increased 
substantially in America over recent decades. In the 1990s, 314,000 students aged 
35 or above enrolled at an institution for higher education. In the 2000s, the 
equivalent figure was 899,000.148 By breaking down the learning process, leaving 
students with a menu of skills and competencies they can chose to acquire without 
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necessarily completing a standardised academic programme, MOOCs can provide 
modularised approaches to education that appeal to employers looking to retrain 
their workforce. 
Online learning does not only offer the potential to reduce costs, it can also help 
improve the quality of education. With more students signing up, big data 
approaches make it easier to evaluate the students’ learning process, and measure 
their progress. This success has been partially due to new structural innovations, 
particularly the semi-synchronous nature of the courses, but future prospects rest 
upon MOOCs' increasing use of data and machine learning algorithms. MOOCs 
already make use of big data detailing how students interact on forums, their 
diligence in completing assignments and viewing lectures, and their ultimate 
grades.149 This data will ultimately allow for algorithms that act as interactive tutors, 
with teaching and assessment strategies statistically calibrated to match individual 
student needs.150 These advances will permit the global access to high quality, 
interactive, education that is needed to prepare students for the future workforce.  
A recent study comparing a MOOC in physics at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) to its equivalent on-campus course on the same subject found 
that the MOOC student actually learned more than they normally would during a 
regular lecture.151 Nevertheless, MOOC students compared poorly in group work, 
suggesting that interactive face-to-face learning methods are still important in 
fostering many of the soft skills demanded by employers. 
Online education is thus unlikely to fully substitute for on-campus teaching. Physical 
interactions between students (and between students and teachers) are likely to 
become even more important, as social, creative and problem-solving skills will be 
essential in most developed labour markets. Nevertheless, as online courses 
provide unprecedented access to knowledge at much lower costs, and improved 
methods of learning, the productivity gains will likely be substantial. 
 
 
                                                          
149 Simonite (2013); Breslow et al., (2013). 
150 Woolf (2010). 
151 Colvin et al. (2014).  
Online learning can both reduce costs and 
improve the quality of education 
Despite its positive impact, online education 
will unlikely be a full substitute for on-
campus teaching 
 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions February 2015   
 
© 2015 Citigroup 
92 
About the Oxford Martin School 
The Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford is a world-leading centre of 
pioneering interdisciplinary research on the major challenges facing humanity.  
No other university or institution hosts a research body like the Oxford Martin 
School. Our community of more than 300 researchers, from Oxford and beyond, is 
working to address the most pressing global challenges and opportunities of the 
21st century. The great challenges of our time share one feature. They cannot be 
understood and tackled by any one academic field alone. This common factor 
makes these challenges difficult for individuals, businesses, governments and 
societies to address. Each Oxford Martin School research programme brings 
together academics from different disciplines to provide fresh perspectives on 
complex global issues. These include the future of the global financial system, 
cybersecurity, demographic change, the future of food and farming, the implications 
and mitigation of climate change, and the applications of innovation in 
healthcare.  The unifying criteria for membership of the School are that, to qualify 
for its support, research must be of the highest academic calibre; must tackle issues 
of a global scale; could not have been undertaken without the School’s support; and 
must have a real impact beyond academia.  
The School was founded in 2005. It was made possible through the vision and 
generosity of Dr James Martin (1933-2013). Dr Martin believed that this century, 
and specifically the next two decades, will be a crucial turning point for humanity. He 
understood that we now have the power to destroy possibilities for future 
generations but, equally, we have the potential to improve dramatically the 
wellbeing of people across the planet. It is this combination of urgency and 
optimism that characterises all the work at the Oxford Martin School. 
Oxford Martin School faculty have demonstrated a strong record in informing 
thinking on significant global policy issues, focusing on critical gaps where the 
School’s innovative research and interdisciplinary ethos are uniquely placed to 
influence decision making. At the global level, the School’s experts are engaged 
with numerous international agencies and activities, advise multinational businesses 
and are involved in policy formulation in over twenty countries.  They have helped 
develop alternatives to tackling climate change beyond the Kyoto Protocol; provided 
advice to the World Health Organization on understanding and combating 
dangerous global pandemics; and contributed to new rules to improve global 
financial stability. In the United Kingdom, Oxford Martin School academics regularly 
provide expert testimony to parliamentary hearings and have been advising the 
Prime Minister and cabinet members on strategic science and technology policy 
issues. The Oxford Martin School regularly works in partnership with governments, 
the private sector, think tanks and inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. 
 
For further information, please visit the Oxford Martin School website: 
www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk  
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NOW / NEXT 
Key Insights regarding the future of Innovation and Employment 
 
  
 
LABOUR MARKET Low-skilled workers benefited in the 19th century during the Industrial Revolution, while skilled workers 
have been the main beneficiaries of technological progress in the 20th century through the Computer 
Revolution. / As the scope of automation is increasing, intelligent robots with enhanced senses and 
dexterity are now able to perform a much broader scope of non-routine manual tasks, jeopardizing low-
skill jobs and industries otherwise thought to be safe from automation. 
 
 
 
  
 
SHIFTING WEALTH In the Industrial Revolution, people benefited both as producers and consumers over the long run. / So 
far, the digital age has been the age of capital rather than the era of labour. Digital technologies 
increasingly substitute for labour meaning that innovators and entrepreneurs, not workers or investors, 
will be the main beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
  
 
TECHNOLOGY Historically, countries have adopted a new technology on average 45 years after its invention. / 
Adoption lags are falling away with new technology being adopted faster than ever before and changing 
how we live and work. 
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